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T H E
NEGOTIATIONS
mesmes
OF
COUNT D'AVAU, X,

Ambassador from his Most CHRISTIAN
MAJESTY to the STATES GENERAL
of the United Provinces.

CONTAINING

The Steps taken by the Prince of ORANGE to
ascend the Throne of GREAT BRITAIN; and
the Intrigues of the Court of FRANCE to coun-
teract his Measures during that interesting Period.

Translated from the FRENCH.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. I.

L O N D O N:

Printed for A. MILLAR; and D. WILSON and
T. DURHAM, in the Strand.

MDCCLIV.

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NEGOTIATIONS

COUNT D'AVAN

Arrived from his Most Christian
Majesty to the States General
of the United Provinces

MUSEUM
BRITAN
NICUM

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T H E

P R E F A C E.

AS the last revolution was one of the most remarkable events in our history, it must ever appear surprizing, that the secret steps which led to it, have so long been wrapped up in obscurity; from hence we have imagined, that a view of the measures which the Prince of Orange took to ascend the throne of Great Britain, and of the obstacles he met with from France, in the execution of this great design, will be acceptable to a nation, which cannot but be interested in whatever concurred to promote or disappoint the projects of a Prince, who restored the possession of that religious and political liberty which it now enjoys.

The Count D'Avaux was sent ambassador from Lewis XIV. to the States General, with the sole view of traversing the designs of the Prince of Orange: this commission he executed with the greatest address, and by his artifices conquered difficulties that appeared insurmountable, though the politics of the Prince, at last frustrated all the designs of his enemies.

The circumstances of these affairs made it necessary for the author to begin at their source, to trace the gradual progress of a long negotiation, and to dwell on what may at first appear to have but little connection with those great events, to which they will be found to have

have an immediate relation: from hence it follows, that this work grows more interesting, in proportion as it draws nearer to that period in which we are more immediately concerned.

A translation of the other volumes will be printed with all possible dispatch; and we flatter ourselves, that the public will give sufficient encouragement to a performance, which exhibits a continued series of the most refined policy, and from which the historian may receive instruction, and the public minister innumerable important hints, by which he may regulate his conduct.

T H E
NEGOTIATIONS
O F
COUNT D'AVAUZ.

IN order to understand the reasons why the Dutch, since the treaty in 1684, departed from the interest of the King, as well as their ancient maxims, and were drawn into a greater dependence than ever on the Prince of Orange, 'tis necessary to know in what manner this treaty has been made, how the people stood then disposed, and what were the different parties in the republic since the peace of Nimeguen.

The States General of the United Provinces, since a certain time, and particularly since the peace of Nimeguen, have been divided into two, or rather three different parties; one consisting of the Prince of Orange, and those devoted to his interest; they are all, excepting five or six persons, such as he has raised from an obscure condition, to put into the administration, who have no influence but what is derived from their preferment, and having no other subsistence than the profits of their places, are consequently not a little interested to maintain the government of the State, in a dependence on the Prince of Orange.

The republicans form another party, which may properly be divided into two; one is com-
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posed of the remains of M. de Witt's faction, and some others, who though not originally of this faction, were nevertheless turned out in 1672. All these are such as openly declare their sentiments; they are looked upon as true republicans, and accounted to be the support and bulwark of the publick liberty. Their number is inconsiderable, but consisting of the best families in Holland; they are all strongly united together, and communicate their sentiments and designs to each other, by a sure and secret correspondence.

The other class of well-disposed republicans, is made up of those who remained in the government in 1672, or who being admitted at this time by the Prince of Orange, do still retain favourable sentiments for the commonwealth. All of this sort are extremely secret and reserved, and so cautious that they will not venture to act, but with the utmost security, or when pushed by necessity. They form not a party as the others, for every individual keeping his sentiments concealed, or communicating them only to particular friends, he in no shape declares himself openly. Nevertheless, as the first class of true republicans, are mostly persons of wisdom and understanding, and men of weight, they have great connections with the last mentioned; who, though upon the reserve with each other, yet they put a voluntary confidence in the former; so that this small number of true republicans, whom I have placed in the first class, receiving secret intelligence from the others, and communicating to each other what they have learnt separately, by this means acquire a general knowledge of the sentiments and dispositions which prevail in the different towns and provinces.

There are besides, the merchants and common people, who are obliged to follow the dictates of the Prince of Orange, or join themselves with the republicans.

republicans. In regard to the people, as they are generally carried away, either by zeal for religion, or something or other which dazzles and confounds their sight, they have always had a warm affection for the Prince of Orange, and in these latter times have been entirely devoted to his interest, by means of the clergy, who are wholly at his command; and the most implacable enemies of the republicans, the greatest part of whom are Arminians. As for the merchants, they have generally had great confidence in the true republicans; but they being swayed by interest, it will appear afterwards how the Prince of Orange found means to gain upon them, and to hurt the republicans, by representing to the merchants, that France, with whom the republicans desired to make an alliance, ruined their commerce: The merchants themselves were too apt to believe this, for lately they had come greatly short of the profits formerly made in France.

I must likewise take notice, that some incidents in the last months of the war in 1672, greatly altered the affection which the people in Holland had conceived for the King. It is certain, when his majesty offered them peace, there was scarce any one in the republic, who was not persuaded he could easily have continued the war, and that he stopt in the middle of his conquests, entirely from a regard to the States General. They were then of opinion, that the peace granted by his Majesty, was the pure result of his affection; and this had gained their hearts to such a degree, that his power was then no less at Amsterdam, than now at Paris. But when they were informed, that the King insisted the forts in the Low-Countries (which ought to have been restored to Spain) should remain in his possession, till the King of Sweden was re-established in the dominions he had lost

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in the war; and when the Prince of Orange had the art to render the King's sincerity suspected, as if his Majesty never intended to restore these forts: their affections then took a different turn, and instead, as before, of accounting the peace to be an act of generosity, they now considered it as a thing his Majesty was forced into, by the treaty concluded with England.

In this situation I found the States General when I arrived at the Hague; and as his Majesty had enjoined me to keep no other intercourse with the Prince of Orange, than what was unavoidable, and to regard him as a person with whom he was highly displeased. I thought I could not take a more effectual method, at once to serve my master, and obey his instructions, than to attach myself wholly to the republicans, and to preserve only outward civility with the Prince of Orange: for I conceived it would appear odious, if I should openly shew an intention, to make a division in the State, by separating the Prince of Orange and his dependents from the rest of the republic: moreover, that I should thereby render my employ more difficult, nay perhaps useless, there being scarce any one person, even of those the most sanguine to form a secret intercourse with me, who would venture to visit me, if I should make such a declaration against the Prince of Orange.

I spoke upon this subject to some persons of Amsterdam, who approved of my design, and encouraged me as much as possible, to proceed therein. I then, without any ceremony, waited on the Prince of Orange, before I had an audience of the States General, as is the custom of every ambassador, coming on any particular business, before he makes his entry; for in this case, being obliged to visit the president of the States General, and the pensionary of Holland, he cannot omit
paying

paying the same honour to the Prince of Orange, as the head of all councils in the republic: This step however was not approved of, for I was forbid to return to the Prince's house, after having paid the first visit of ceremony. This obliged me to resort to the houses of persons of the first rank, to acquire such connections as might serve to promote an intimacy with some considerable persons in the State: but I received letters from court, mentioning, that information had been received of my having been at Madame de Bederode's, cousin to the Prince of Orange, and Madame Sommerdyk's, whose husband was strongly attached to the Prince of Orange; and expressly forbidding me to frequent these houses. Being thus deprived of all such connections, I found myself in an irksome employment; for it is no easy matter to be informed of what passes in a state, when not allowed to keep up a free and open intercourse with all persons, which not only procures friends and acquaintances, from whom great intelligence may be drawn, but also gives opportunity to those who are desirous to reveal secrets, to resort to an ambassador's, without any apprehension; this could not be done any longer, since no person could come to my house, without becoming suspected, and thereby declaring himself an enemy to the Prince of Orange.

The Prince, in his turn, behaved in the same manner, in regard to the King, as I was willing to do towards him. He wanted not to break intirely with his Majesty, notwithstanding what he had done to his prejudice, by making a treaty with England to prolong the war, at the very time when the States General were upon the point of concluding peace; and afterwards attacking the King's troops near Mons, when the peace betwixt his Majesty and the States General was actually signed;

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signed. Nevertheless the Prince of Orange, signified to the King, he wished to have the honour of being re-instated in his good graces. To this his Majesty answered, that when he shewed by his conduct, such to be his real sentiments, then he should know what course to follow. If I may be permitted to declare what I thought of the intentions of the Prince of Orange, I will venture to say, there was strong reason to believe, he wanted neither to come to a rupture with the king, nor yet to be intirely well with him. In all probability, he thought it sufficient to keep the King from being his declared enemy, that he might not oppose his pretensions to England; but he was persuaded it would greatly hurt him, with the people as well as the parliament of England, if he formed a close union with his Majesty. Besides, 'tis evident, it was not the interest of one, who expected the crown of England, to make a strong alliance betwixt the States General and France. He often himself declared to a person, in whom he confided, that he would do every thing in his power, to preserve a good understanding with the King, but that there was little probability of succeeding therein, since such things would be required of him, as might break his union with England, but that he could not sacrifice his own interest for that of his Majesty.

I leave it to the judgment of others, whether in this situation, it was adviseable for the King to endeavour to gain the Prince of Orange, intirely to his interest, which seemed impossible, or to treat him as an irreconcilable enemy; and if it tended to his Majesty's service, merely to vex this Prince, since he could not be brought to such an attachment as was desired. It appeared to me at least, since it was resolved to treat him as a foe, that

that the affair ought not to have been half done, but he ought to have been utterly crushed; for it answered no manner of purpose, to shew him so much resentment, without making him feel the effects thereof. But they have exasperated, without hurting him; the true republicans have been stirred up against him, and not properly supported: so that he remains an avowed enemy to the King, and the republicans have been left exposed to his resentment, unable to defend themselves, or to do any service to France.

As to these two parties above mentioned, the republicans, and the adherents to the Prince of Orange, who disputed about the administration of affairs; their designs and interests were very different, or rather intirely opposite. The republicans wanted to preserve peace, and to be attached to France; the Prince of Orange was desirous to unite the States with England, and to form such a powerful league as to be able to make head against France, and to support a war if he could carry matters so far.

For this purpose the Prince of Orange had a scheme, as soon as the peace of Nimeguen was concluded, to make an alliance betwixt the States General and England, not doubting, when these two powers should be united, and the house of Austria joined thereto, that they should find means to bring over most of the Princes of the Empire.

But as the Prince of Orange knew the States General would be startled at the very name of a league with England, he therefore did not think proper to explain himself openly, but took care it should be secretly proposed to the leading men in the States, under the name of a simple guaranty of the treaty of Nimeguen. I received intelligence of these proceedings, and at the same time saw through the artifice: I informed the King thereof,

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who ordered the embassadors of the States General to be told, that he could indeed assign no reason, why every Prince might not make particular acts of guaranty, for treaties of peace; but that he should have great cause to complain, if they formed new leagues under such a pretext: Nevertheless, the Prince of Orange continuing still to solicit the States General to make this act of guaranty, his Majesty ordered such strong declarations to be made to the embassadors of the States, and by me, to the States themselves; that the Prince of Orange for some time, suspended his schemes, and the better to conceal himself, he fell upon a secret way of applying to the province of Holland, as will appear afterwards.

The Prince of Orange did not content himself with working upon the Dutch only; he was likewise carrying on his schemes in England, with the King and some of the principal members of parliament; and as he had formerly some particular connections with the latter, by means of one Frymans, who raised such cabals in the house of commons in 1674, that they obliged the King to make peace with the States General; he sent the same person a second time, to inform them of his design, not doubting to find them ready to embrace an alliance, which, by disengaging the King of England from the interest of his Christian Majesty, would throw him into an absolute dependence on his parliament. He took care to have represented to them all the advantages they could reap from such an alliance; and that it should be put to them, whether they could not assure the King of England, they would furnish him with sufficient supplies, in case the King of France should declare war; But as I received intelligence of his most secret intrigues, I was informed of these practices

practices with the English members. I spoke of it to one of the most considerable republicans in Holland: This man had an intimate correspondence with the leading men in the English parliament; and by his means, I signified to Colonel Sidney, a famous republican, who was afterwards beheaded; that as long as the Prince of Orange remained so powerful in the States General, nothing could be more prejudicial to the parliament of England, and the republic of Holland, than to allow the King of Great Britain, to make an alliance with the Prince of Orange, for it was certainly intended to hurt the common liberty; that the grandeur and power of the French Monarch, the pretext of this union, could not possibly be more hurtful to either state, than such an alliance, which they ought to endeavour to prevent, with all their strength and vigour. Colonel Sidney wrote to his friend, that he was strongly convinced by the reasons advanced, and that he had likewise communicated them with success, to the majority of the parliament. Nevertheless, he informed him at the same time, that the French King began to give powerful succour to the King of England; that he had sent him lately a considerable sum of money; and that if the King of England, by the assistance of his Christian Majesty, should be able to do without his parliament, in that case, he would become absolute sovereign; and this would oblige them to make an alliance with the States General. 'Tis unnecessary, to mention all the particulars. wrote to Colonel Sidney upon that head; let it suffice, to take notice, that the Colonel and his friends were so thoroughly gained, that after a negotiation of three months, the city of London, and the leading members in parliament, positively refused

to furnish such supplies as were necessary for the King of England, to support an alliance with the States General.

The Prince of Orange succeeded better with the King of England, who went so readily into his designs, that at the end of August 1679, he dispatched Mr. Sidney, brother to the Colonel at the Hague. This gentleman, after his first audience, demanded commissaries, to whom he signified that the King of England having always had a particular regard for the States General, was desirous to enter into a close alliance with them, and had therefore commanded him to propose, the making of a treaty of guaranty, to that of Nimeguen. He not only made this proposal, but he called upon the States to accept of it; to acquit themselves of the obligation they had laid themselves under, by their treaty in July 1678.

Sidney having made this declaration to the States General, the Prince of Orange tried every artifice to conclude the treaty. Mean while there happened an incident, which embarrassed the Prince of Orange, and gave rise to many intrigues. This Prince had made several feigned or real advances, since the peace of Nimeguen, to get in to the favour of his Majesty: He had not however been listened to, either because his conduct at the conclusion of the peace, had displeased the King, or because the court believed, there was a party in the republic, with whom they could take measures to form alliances, independent of the Prince of Orange. I had taken the liberty to represent to the King, that though there were a considerable party of the republicans, of sentiments opposite to those of the Prince of Orange; yet it must be acknowledged, nothing could be expected from them, for they had neither inclination nor power,
to

to do any thing against the Prince of Orange, and I was obliged, to observe in my letters, that I either found them too weak, to venture upon any undertaking, or not endowed with abilities to carry on any great affair. This was the character of the whole party, eight or ten persons excepted; these indeed, were capable of putting the rest in a proper way, and of preserving the fundamental laws of the republic free from violation; but they insisted on being powerfully succoured from abroad, by the arms of his Majesty.

I had orders at this time, which was in the month of ——— 1679, to listen to those who should offer any thing from the Prince of Orange; and to declare to them, as they demanded what conduct he ought to follow, as a proof of his sincerity, that I was instructed to tell them, he could not take a more effectual method to convince the King thereof, than by bringing about an alliance betwixt his Majesty and the States General. This answer, and the Prince of Orange's desire to conceal his sentiments, the better to gain his purposes, obliged him to declare, he would heartily contribute all in his power, to make an alliance betwixt France and the States. But as this was not his intention, he therefore did not express himself in such a manner as was requisite; he thought it sufficient, to make a promise in general terms, adding at the same time, certain conditions, which put it in his power to drop the affair, whenever it suited his purpose; and in the mean while he took care that I should be sounded, to know if the King would like that the States should renew the treaty of alliance in 1662; and also conclude a treaty of guaranty with England. I took care to have represented to him, the incompatibility of these two treaties; that it was to make one alliance

with France, and at the same time to form another against her. Nevertheless this did not hinder him, from being desirous of entering into a negotiation with me upon that head: But as I intirely distrusted him, and saw plainly he wanted only to spin out matters, to gain the proper opportunity, to conclude a league with England; I therefore took such measures with the republicans to bring things to a proper disposition, that the Prince of Orange found himself under a necessity to give full consent to this alliance, or to oppose it openly, which he could not do without making a breach of promise; at the same time I spoke so effectually, to the leading men at Amsterdam, that this city formed a resolution, not to allow the assembly of the States in September to break up, till they themselves had proposed an alliance with France.

Mean while, I failed not to have a conference with the Prince of Orange, as he had desired, and every thing turned out as I foresaw, to render my hopes of an alliance with France, more distant, when he had it in his power too, to have brought into this measure, such as were of themselves not inclined to it. At the same time he gave me to understand, that the act of guaranty with England, might very well be concluded; treating it as a matter of no consideration, as a thing permitted by the treaty of Nimeguen; and which could not be avoided. I needed not such sort of declarations to persuade me of his bad disposition, but I was indeed more convinced thereof after this interview, for I learnt that this Prince, having three days before, known the resolution of the magistrates of Amsterdam, to propose an alliance with France, at the assembly in September, had sent

Yent for the deputies of this city ; and after a conference of two hours, in which he endeavoured with the utmost strength of rhetoric, to convince them, there was no necessity for proposing an alliance with France in this assembly, nor any inconvenience in deferring the affair till November; he had insisted on putting it off till that time, and intreated them to go to Amsterdam, and in his name to request this of the regency. Van Buning returned to Amsterdam, with the deputies, and advanced so many plausible reasons in the council, to shew that the deferring the proposal of an alliance for six weeks, could be of no consequence, that at last the city of Amsterdam, agreed not to make the overture in this assembly, and only ordered the deputies to second such a proposal with all their strength, if it should happen to be made by any other city.

As I had with reason distrusted the Prince of Orange, I was therefore careful to inform myself, what conduct I should pursue, in case this Prince deviated from the rules of honour. I consulted several republicans, and it will not be foreign to my purpose, if I here insert what two or three of them, but particularly one of distinguished merit, said to me upon this head, because it will appear from thence, what conduct people of wisdom and penetration, were of opinion, ought to be followed, in order to force the States General, to act in spite of the Prince of Orange, as his Majesty desired. This person told me, he was persuaded we had brought things to such a situation, by means of his friends, and those to whom I had applied, that we might oblige the Prince of Orange to make the alliance, provided proper measures were taken. He often repeated to me, that the genius and temper of the people, who were naturally

naturally fearful and apprehensive, ought greatly to be considered; that whatever advantage the King gave them by the peace, they would never have accepted it, had not his Majesty offered it at the head of 60000 Men; for no sooner was their apprehension, of the continuance of the war removed, but they began to change their sentiments; that it might be easily perceived, what effect their fear of the Prince of Orange (though quite imaginary) had had upon their spirits; and that his Majesty could not dispel this apprehension, but by raising a greater. This appeared evident, from the treaty of a league with England, which had been obstructed, by the declarations made by his Majesty, at Paris and the Hague: that this was the only plan to be pursued; for so long as they remained free from the apprehensions of the war, so long would they dread the Prince of Orange: that there were certain threats to be used, which, without giving a pretext to the disaffected, to stir up the merchants and people, would frighten them to such a degree, as to oblige them, in spite of the Prince of Orange, to make an alliance. For this purpose, he thought it sufficient, only to repeat what had been already declared; that is, to make known the disposition of his Majesty for an alliance, and at the same time, give them to understand, if the States General acted contrary to the confidence placed in them, that his Majesty had it in his power to pursue other measures; and as what had been declared upon that head, at Paris and the Hague, remained in a manner unknown, it was therefore highly necessary to render it public, either in an audience, or by a memorial to the States General.

Mean while the Prince of Orange, who, as I mentioned above, durst not any longer address himself to the States General, in regard to the league

league with England, for fear of rendering it too publick, got Pensionary Fagel, to work underhand with the States of Holland, in order, if possible, to bring about the affair; and as I received intelligence, not only of every particular, which passed in the assembly of Holland, but even of the most secret transactions in the Prince of Orange's cabinet, betwixt him and the deputies of the towns; I was informed he had in vain solicited the magistrates of Amsterdam, to conclude a reciprocal act of guaranty with England, though he had given them to understand, the King of France did not oppose it. I at the same time received intelligence, that in the privy council of the towns, where very few persons are admitted, he had mentioned the same treaty, under pretext of a guaranty. I had notice however, that it was not a simple act of guaranty he aimed at, but a reciprocal and mutually binding act, couched in the strongest terms, in consequence of treaties before the peace; and I learned by another channel, that Pensionary Fagel designed next day, to propose this reciprocal act of guaranty, to the assembly of Holland; and that he would endeavour to persuade the towns, it was not contrary to his Majesty's inclinations. These three advices were followed by another, of no less importance in my opinion. I was informed Pensionary Fagel had used an ingenious device, to make the deputies of the towns agree to the act of guaranty: He told all of them separately, that he intended to propose an alliance with France, and gave them to understand, that his Majesty would nevertheless consent to the act of mutual guaranty, and thus these two treaties, made by mutual agreement, would establish the States General, in full tranquillity on both sides; but that it was necessary, the act of guaranty, should precede the alliance
with

with France; and I learnt likewise, that most of the deputies had been persuaded thereof, by Pensionary Fagel.

All this intelligence being conveyed to me, by the surest channels, and from persons of the first distinction, oblig'd me to form the resolution of taking an extraordinary step, which had never been before practised, to go to all the several deputies, of the eighteen towns of Holland, at their houses where they resided in the Hague, during the sitting of the States of that Province. I declared to them, that the King having been informed some months before, that the States General designed to make a sort of league, he had signified to their ambassadors, and by me to the deputies of the States General, that this was in a manner to unite again in peace, the same powers which had been confederated in war; that it was going beyond the guaranty permitted by treaties; and that his Majesty would have just cause to suspect the intentions of the States General, if he found them endeavouring, under the pretext of guaranties, to form a league against France; that I had proved to them that a treaty, which should contain reciprocal guaranties, and a treaty of league were the same; that, in consequence of these declarations, the States General had signified to me, and likewise assured the King by their ambassadors, that they had no thoughts of making a league, nor of taking any step which might displease him; that after having given such strong assurances to his Majesty, and to me in particular, that they desired nothing so much, as to preserve the honour of his friendship, I apprehended it to be my duty, to let them know they were upon the point of entering into engagements, which would break off this good understanding, and oblige the King to pursue such measures as in the end must give them cause to repent.

There

There was not one of the deputies, but who assured me, that it was not his intention in any shape, to displease his Majesty. I replied this was the very reason, why I had come to wait upon them; for as they were desirous to preserve the honour of his friendship, I imagined they would have had great cause to complain of me, if I had not, in proper time communicated to them, his Majesty's sentiments, (especially as it had been attempted to misrepresent them) and if I had not enabled them, to take whatever measures they thought proper, with an intire knowledge of what might ensue thereupon. I added likewise, many other particulars, according as the deputies to whom I spoke, happened to be attached to the Prince of Orange, or the republican party.

The Prince of Orange, and Pensionary Fagel, were not a little nettled at my having gone to inform the deputies of his Majesty's sentiments, and at my making such strong declarations; Pensionary Fagel spoke of it in the assembly next day, with great warmth, declaring that such proceedings were unprecedented; and if suffered, would be attended with the most dangerous consequences. These private visits to the deputies, did in effect, break through all the Prince of Orange's measures, as I was assured next day by the well-affected, for this Prince, and the Pensionary, met with a thorough opposition to their designs, from all the towns. The deputies, who had promised the foregoing night, to agree to the act of guaranty, declared next day, that they could not consent thereto, after what I had signified to them from his Majesty; and that they were under a necessity of returning to their respective towns, in order to know the sentiments of their constituents upon that matter.

But

But before the assembly broke up, Pensionary Fagel, and Van Buning, who wanted by any means, to bring about this affair, proposed that four deputies, of the four principal towns, should be dispatched, to assure me of the sincerity of their intentions, and to endeavour to convince me, that the act they wanted to pass, was intirely harmless; and that his Majesty, when he knew the particulars thereof, could not be dissatisfied. These four gentlemen, amongst whom was Van Buning, came to me after dinner: But as I suspected the design of this deputation, was only to make me enter into some sort of negotiation, and then to report to the assembly, that they had explained to me, the intentions of the States, that I had undertook to write to the King, and to procure his consent; and under this pretext, perhaps immediately to bring the league to a conclusion; this obliged me to continue firm in my declarations, and not to enter into any discussion, upon the form of the acts of guaranty; I signified only that I had neither instructions nor power, to enter into any negotiation upon the act of guaranty, that they might easily conceive, the King could not imagine they would consult his ambassador, upon a league against him; and that for my own part, I stuck to the declarations already made, so earnestly, that I took this opportunity to repeat them still more strongly.

The four deputies, having immediately returned to the States of Holland, made a report of this conference. Pensionary Fagel was obliged to break up the assembly, and send the deputies to their towns, to lay the affair before their constituents.

This same day, in the evening, I was informed that the Prince of Orange, Pensionary Fagel, and Van

Van Buning, before the deputies were sent to their respective towns, had entirely altered some articles of the plan of the treaty for a reciprocal guaranty; that they had softened others; and had then given them to the deputies of the towns, assuring them the articles were now drawn up, in such a manner, that the King had declared to their ambassadors, he was perfectly satisfied; and under this pretext, they solicited the deputies to return, with the consent of their respective towns.

I was afraid the magistrates of the towns might be drawn into this snare. This obliged me to redouble my diligence; I spoke to those who were best affected, and gave them memorials to send their friends. I wrote likewise to the magistrates of Amsterdam, representing the difficulties they were ready to fall into: I pretended even to have received that very day, a letter from my royal master; and I told them his Majesty expressed the greatest regard for the States; but at the same time gave me such strong injunctions, in case I saw them carry matters further, that I doubted not, but he would highly resent any engagement they should enter into against his interest, as what was then under deliberation, must certainly be accounted. And that the States would repent, of not having placed a proper confidence in his friendship, which would prove a stronger security to them than all the treaties they could make.

These steps were absolutely necessary, for Van Buning had recourse to all manner of artifice, to bring about this affair at Amsterdam. He assured some persons, that I had owned what I said to the deputies of the towns, to have been without orders; he told others, I had confessed to him, the affair was of no consequence; and that the
King

King would approve thereof. But what spurred me on to act with still greater zeal, was that I found means to procure copies of the two plans, of a league with England; I mean of the first, and of that also, which had been altered. I had even the original of the latter, with notes upon the margin, in Pensionary Fagel's hand: And as I saw plainly they were leagues against France, under the pretext of acts of guaranty, I therefore instantly dispatched them to the King. Mean while, as I had daily information of what passed in the towns, I learnt that the principal amongst them, continued favourably disposed, and had determined to refuse the act of guaranty.

I had likewise the satisfaction at this time, to receive assurances from the provinces of Friesland and Groningen, that though the province of Holland, should resolve to pass these acts of reciprocal guaranty, they would never assent thereto.

The Prince of Orange and Pensionary Fagel, who on their part, informed themselves of what passed in the council of the towns of Holland, found at the return of the deputies, that nine of the principal towns, with whom the more inconsiderable almost always conform, had determined to refuse the act of guaranty: This Prince therefore resolved to try once more, if he could gain somewhat upon me, in the way of negotiation, making as a pretence thereof, a conversation I had had with one of his friends two days before: he told him he was obliged to me, for my favourable sentiments towards him; and that in return, his disposition towards me, would always be agreeable to my wishes; he intreated me to have a conference with Pensionary Fagel, in order to explain ourselves fully to each other, with candour and sincerity.

sincerity. I consented to this, when the Pensionary assured me, the States would never have thought of making an act of guaranty, had they not been obliged to it. He added a number of other frivolous reasons to answer his purpose; but the most specious was, that he drew up this act, to facilitate the alliance with France; and that he looked upon it as a kind of preliminary, since it was necessary, to give the satisfaction due to the King of England; after which the States would be free to engage with his Catholick Majesty: and he informed me at last, as if by the bye, that the Prince of Orange that very morning, had been upon the point of proposing an alliance with France, at the same time, when the act of guaranty with England should have been concluded; but that he would know more particularly the sentiments of this Prince; and he proposed to wait upon me again, and inform me thereof. I said enough to shew Pensionary Fagel, that the States General were under no necessity to make the act of guaranty, proposed to them; and as to what I had to say, upon any other head, I reserved that till he should pay me the visit he promised.

The Prince of Orange, finding himself unable to gain any thing with me; and that he was equally unsuccessful with the States of Holland, ordered the assembly of this province to be broke up next day, and dispatched Pensionary Fagel to me, about three o'clock in the afternoon: He told me the Prince desired him to acquaint me, he had taken care to have the assembly dismissed that morning, without making mention of the act of guaranty with England; that he believed he thereby gave a proof of his desire to merit his Majesty's good graces; and that he assured me he would propose the alliance with France,
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the next assembly in November; adding, at the same time, that he hoped the King would be persuaded, the act of guaranty which had been proposed, was not prejudicial to his interest. As it seemed proper, this affair should be discussed in France, and the breaking up of the assembly gave sufficient time, I would not therefore enter upon the matter, and resolved only to make answer to his compliments. I accordingly pretended not to know, that the Prince of Orange broke up the assembly, because the deputies of the principal towns had orders to refuse the act of guaranty; and I signified to Pensionary Fagel, that I was persuaded the Prince of Orange could not do any thing more agreeable to his Majesty, more serviceable to the States General, and more advantageous to himself, than to renew the alliance with France: That without doubt the King would be highly pleased with the first step he had taken, in breaking up the assembly of Holland, without making any mention of the acts of reciprocal guaranty; that I would not fail to make it known to his Majesty, and to set it in such a light as he deserved. Pensionary Fagel upon this made some compliments to me, in the name of the Prince of Orange, which I repaid in the proper manner.

Thus the league which the Prince of Orange wanted to form betwixt the King of England and the States General, was broke off, nor could it be ever resumed, notwithstanding all the efforts made for that purpose. The King upon this, ordered me to be acquainted, that he was highly satisfied with the diligence I had used to defeat the schemes concerted to bring about the act of guaranty with England; and that he approved of my having privately waited upon the deputies, for in urgent affairs forms were not to be regarded; and it was

a mark of prudence, to use extraordinary means when ordinary ones were insufficient.

About this time an English merchant, who lived at Amsterdam, waited upon one of the zealous republicans, and told him he had orders from two of the leading members in the English Parliament, to enquire if it was true that the well-affected republicans, were without influence, and the Prince of Orange absolute master; for this was held as a certainty in England: if it was so, the English would be obliged to take measures accordingly, with the King of Great Britain; but if the republicans still retained credit, he advised them to oppose the league proposed betwixt England and the States General, as a thing prejudicial to both. The Hollanders desired him to write for answer, That it was true, the honest part of the republicans, for some time had had little share in the government; but he assured him nevertheless, that lately they had resumed courage, and re-united themselves in such a manner, that he believed he could positively affirm, they would be able to prevent the league; he entreated the English to stand firm, and gave orders to his son in England, narrowly to observe all their motions in this affair.

As I was informed that the magistrates of the principal towns, particularly those of Amsterdam, refused the act of guaranty, only from fear of displeasing the King, though persuaded they acted in this against the faith of treaties, and contrary to the obligation entered into with England, I apprehended it therefore to be of the utmost consequence, to undeceive them: one of the republicans accordingly undertook to go to some of the principal towns, and particularly to Amsterdam; he spoke to M. Valkenir, who entirely governed this town; and he convinced him of the truth: he
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made it appear evident, that there was no obligation to make an act of guaranty with England, in consequence of the treaty in July 1678, because this treaty not being to take place, but in case the peace betwixt France and the States General, was not signed the 11th of August; and the peace having been signed the 10th, it followed therefore, that the treaty was without force, as if it had never existed. The 5th article, cited on this occasion, could have no more effect, than the rest of the treaty, being in no ways binding till the 11th of August, and not then; except the peace should not be signed by that time.

Although I am unwilling to bring in any thing here, not relative to the negotiation of the league; yet I cannot forbear mentioning the connections, which the Prince of Orange formed with the English members of parliament, and the views he entertained from this time, of making himself King of England, in prejudice of the Duke of York. I must take notice then, that I confirmed to the King, by my letter October 19, 1679, the intelligences I had before given him, that the Prince of Orange had a design of getting himself named to the succession of England, by the exclusion of the Duke of York; that Sir William Temple encouraged him in this expectation; but that I did not yet know, whether Mr. Sidney, the King of England's envoy at the Hague, or one Maridet, managed this negotiation.

I ought likewise to take notice, that the well affected republicans, who wanted France to act with more vigour for their support, at the very time when they found themselves in a condition of re-establishing the republic, in her true interest; plainly foresaw, if five or six of the principal republicans in the government, as Paets, Slingland,

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Valkenir, and two or three others, should happen to drop off through age, or be removed by the Prince of Orange, in that case he might easily make himself absolute Master of the republic.

The Prince of Orange did not account sufficient the steps he had taken with the King of England and the States General, to bring about the alliance he intended, betwixt all the Princes of Europe against France, for I discovered the 26th of October, 1679, that he had dispatched M. Amerongue, to the Elector of Brandenburg (under pretence of getting payment of the subsidies) not only to prevent his making an alliance with France, but to propose also, an union with the States General. I was informed of this the very same day, although the instructions of Amerongue had been signified only by five persons, each of whom had taken an oath of secrecy; nor had they passed through the register office, being only copied by the agent for the States.

As the Prince of Orange had no other design, notwithstanding all his affirmations to me, than to break off the alliance with France, and conclude the league with England; he therefore used every expedient likely to attain his purpose, before the meeting of the assembly in November. I was well informed thereof, and I even knew he had told in confidence, to one of his friends, that the King of England was necessitated to conclude the league with the States General; for he wanted to assemble his Parliament, and deferred this only because the alliance was not concluded; for if he should summon them together, before this affair was finished, he feared he should lose his authority, and be obliged to acquiesce with every measure; it was therefore of the utmost consequence to him, that the Prince of Orange should

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conclude this alliance before the Parliament should be assembled, so that his Britannick Majesty might thereby render himself more considerable, and be enabled to bring his Parliament to a better understanding with him.

The Prince of Orange for this purpose, took care to have the assembly of Holland put off some days, and he sent in quest of Mr. Sidney, who had resolved to depart, and not return again; despairing of being ever able to conclude the league with England: he prevailed on this gentleman to embark with all expedition for England, to concert measures with the King, to bring about the league; and ordered him to return in three weeks. It may be supposed he failed not, to repeat the declaration he had already made to him; that so long as the King of England had a misunderstanding with his Parliament, not only the States General would be averse to an alliance with his Britannic Majesty; but the Prince of Orange would likewise drop the affair, and not even propose it. What the Prince of Orange aimed at was, that the King of England should intirely resign himself to his Parliament, not doubting but they would carry things to an extremity, in regard to the Duke of York; and that the King would find himself constrained to acquiesce, with whatever the Parliament should determine, in favour of the Prince of Orange. These particulars I had the honour of communicating to his Christian Majesty.

The Prince of Orange acted no less vigorously, with the States of Holland; he had recourse to three different expedients, to accomplish his design; the first was, as long as possible, to keep the towns of Holland from knowing the declarations of the King to their ambassadors, viz. that his Majesty would be highly displeased, with the
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the league they were about to make with England, under the name of a treaty of guaranty. The Prince of Orange's emissaries gave out, on the contrary, that the King was not so dissatisfied with the affair, as I had supposed: that this league could not offend a Prince, of too much justice, to hinder the States General from fulfilling an engagement, into which they had entered.

I failed not by every courier, to write to our ministry, representing with what industry the Prince of Orange endeavoured to prevent the towns of Holland from knowing the King's sentiments; but notwithstanding all I wrote, it was scarce believed, that his sentiments were so little known as I affirmed. At last however, they were persuaded of the truth, and the King found himself under a necessity to send M. Pomponne to the ambassadors of the States General, to declare in the plainest terms, he should have the strongest reason to complain of their proceedings, if the league should take place, betwixt England and the States General: Nor could he give the least credit, to the assurances they gave him, of being desirous to merit and cultivate his friendship, if, after such declarations, they should pursue measures diametrically opposite thereto. M. Pomponne added likewise, many strong remonstrances; and the ambassadors still shewing an inclination to excuse their masters, in regard to the act of guaranty with England, alledging it contained nothing prejudicial to the interest of his Majesty; he thereupon shewed them the two papers I had sent. This intirely silenced them, but produced a bad effect in Holland; for M. Dikfeld, made high complaints thereof to Pensionary Fagel, who spoke of this affair to the States of Holland, with great warmth; throwing out the most bitter reproaches, that

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amongst such a small number of the most considerable persons of the state, to whom alone he had communicated articles of the league, there should be some guilty of such perfidy; he inveighed against them, in the most violent manner, and said, if they could be discovered, they ought to be punished as traitors to the state.

But all this vehemence availed nothing; and he being obliged to read the letters of the ambassadors, wherein was set forth, in what a strong manner, M. Pomponne had explained himself; upon the acts of reciprocal guaranty; this confirmed the towns of Holland, in their resolution of rejecting the affair. Thus the Prince of Orange, finding always a formal opposition to the league with England, declared at length, on the 28th of November, that he would drop it intirely, and affected to declare this publicly, but in revenge he pursued more vigorously his design, of forming leagues with other princes; he entered into a scheme of concluding an alliance, betwixt the King of Spain and the King of England.

The other artifice the Prince made use of with the towns of Holland was, to endeavour to persuade them, they were engaged to England by a solemn treaty, to be mutual guarantees with his Britannic Majesty, of the treaties of Nimeguen; and that they could not avoid performing, what they were in equity bound to, without being guilty of a breach of justice to a great Prince, and even to themselves. But I found means to shew the falsity of this reasoning of the Prince of Orange's emissaries, as I have remarked above.

The third device, the Prince of Orange practised, to have the act of guaranty with England passed, was to make it believed, that an alliance was to be made with France, at the same time
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when the act of guaranty should be concluded. I was for a long time apprehensive, he would draw some advantage from this artifice: for people of little discernment were easily let into a belief, that this reconciled all things; and that the King of France, as well as the King of England, would be thereby both satisfied: at the same time, it is certain, if the Prince of Orange, under this pretence, had brought the league with England to a conclusion, he would never have allowed the alliance with France, to come under consideration; and though he had concluded these two treaties at the same time, (which was not his intention, for he only designed to make a feint, of proposing the one, till the other should be concluded,) the alliance with France must have become useless, by means of the league with England, which would have always in the end prevailed, Pensionary Fagel remaining at the head of affairs. The Prince of Orange saw likewise, if the States refused to conclude the treaty of guaranty, he should have it in his power, to get the alliance with France rejected, without openly appearing to have any hand therein.

I then exerted myself to the utmost, to give the principal deputies of the towns, proper information upon this head, and to point out the snare laid for them; but not to repeat here, all I represented, let it suffice to say, that the Prince of Orange finding his artifices ineffectual declared, as I have observed, that he dropt intirely the league with England; and he now wholly turned his thoughts, upon devising means, to evade the promise he had given, of making an alliance with France, and to prevent the conclusion thereof, without appearing directly to oppose it.

The King was fully persuaded of the Prince of Orange's intentions, for I communicated all I could discover, by means of his creatures. I at the same time sent intelligence, that one of his greatest confidants had assured me, this Prince could have nothing in view more considerable, than the Kingdom of England; and that it was not impossible, he might, very soon have pretensions thereto: but if it was discovered, that he had a strong and hearty attachment to the King of France, this would be sufficient, to raise against him, the Parliament and Commons of England; and in this case, it would be extremely difficult for his Christian Majesty, to assist him against a whole people, or to maintain him in possession of the crown.

This observation makes it appear, upon what principle the Prince of Orange acted, and what was to be expected from him; I was therefore apprehensive, he would allow the time, for the assembly of Holland, to elapse, without proposing the alliance with France, if I left it wholly to his management: but I was no less afraid, if I should present a memorial to the States General, he might then reproach the King, with mistrusting him; and say if the affair had been left to his discretion, he could have carried it; but now it was intirely marred, and there was at that juncture, no probability of success.

But what embarrass'd me still more was, that the magistrates of Amsterdam slackened already, in the resolution they had taken, to propose an alliance with France. 'Tis true indeed, in place thereof, I prevailed on them to come into a proposal, which would have been still more advantageous to the King, than the alliance, had they carried it into execution; that was to oppose the military establishment remaining upon the present footing,

footing, and to demand a reduction of the forces. I now discovered, they had no longer the boldness, to propose an alliance with France, because they dreaded too much, the Prince of Orange, and were not sufficiently afraid of France; this Prince having represented to them, and the other towns of Holland, that the States General had no reason to be afraid of a rupture; that the King meant only to intimidate them; but they might follow their own course, for his Majesty had no intention of declaring war against them.

I continued, notwithstanding all these obstacles, to work, as much as possible, upon the towns of Holland: and after having brought things to as favourable a situation as possible, I then applied to the Prince of Orange, and spoke likewise to Pensionary Fagel, to the same effect; the latter made answer, that the Prince of Orange, deferred making the proposal, till all obstacles from the towns should be removed. Nevertheless I was informed, that the towns would willingly consent thereto: and the republicans, as well as I, were sensible the affair would speedily be concluded, not only if the Prince of Orange should propose it, but even if he should do nothing else, than thwart it underhand; but I also knew, and often signified to the King, that it would be impossible to bring the affair to a happy issue, if the Prince of Orange should openly oppose it.

Before I proceed farther in what regards the alliance, it may not be improper, to mention what I wrote at this time, concerning the connections betwixt the Prince of Orange and Duke of Monmouth, as they were the foundation of the revolutions, which afterwards happened in England. I informed the King, in my letter October 5, 1679, that the Prince of Orange had new expectations in re-

gard to England; and as far as I could penetrate into the matter, flattered himself, the King of England would be obliged to resign his crown; and as the protestants would never suffer the Duke of York, he doubted not, but he should be called over shortly, as may be observed in the bill the parliament wanted to pass, against the Duke of York, wherein it was said, "in case the King should happen to die, or resign his dominions." The Prince of Orange had himself told one of my friends, that he would always preserve the respect he owed the King of England and the Duke of York, nor would he take the least steps to displease them; but if the Parliament of England should call him over, he could not possibly avoid going.

A week afterwards, I wrote that the Duke of Monmouth was arrived at the Hague; that he went to the house of Mr. Sidney, which much displeased the Prince of Orange; that the Duke, next day waited upon the Prince of Orange, who received him very coldly, and their conversation turned upon general topics; that he had been, in the evening, to visit the Princess of Orange, who contrived to be at play when he entered, and scarce condescended to rise, when he kissed her hand; that the Prince of Orange, about eight in the evening, retired to the Princess's chamber, according to custom, and in short, there could not be greater coldness than was betwixt him and the Duke of Monmouth; the latter, having signified he should depart next day, the Prince of Orange asked him if he would not dine with him before his departure, and the Duke made answer, he intended to do himself that honour; next day at rising from table, Monmouth whispering the Prince of Orange, desired he would give him a private audience for a moment, then went down to Bantink garden, and having disengaged themselves
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of Mr. Sidney, who was following them, the Duke of Monmouth shewed the Prince a letter he had just received from the King of England, wherein he assured him always of his friendship, and that his exile should not be of long continuance. The Prince of Orange asked him the cause of his disgrace; to which Monmouth replied, that the King of England was desirous the Duke of York should absent himself, who had refused to agree to this, unless Monmouth should also quit the Kingdom; he likewise informed the Prince of Orange, that it was not the Duke of York who had done him the most prejudice, he not having sufficient interest with the King of England for that purpose; but that the Countess of Portsmouth, the Lords Sunderland, Essex, and Halifax, had brought it about; and as to what the Prince of Orange asked him, if the King had told him the reason of his banishment, he made answer, that his Britannic Majesty had not explained himself upon that particular; adding, at the same time, that he knew some reports had been spread of his having set up pretensions during the King's illness; but that he was not so simple as to entertain such idle fancies. The Prince of Orange thence took occasion to enter into a serious discussion with the Duke of Monmouth, upon the pretended marriage of his mother; upon which Monmouth explained himself in a manner quite agreeable to the Prince of Orange. This Prince then asked him, if he could depend upon what he had said, because so long as he should maintain such pretensions as were given out, he could not be amongst the numbers of his friends; and Monmouth having assured him a-new, and having given him his word of honour, that he never had, nor ever should have, the least thoughts of such pretensions; the Prince of Orange told

him he was satisfied, as he looked upon him to be a man who would not break through such a tie of honour. Upon this they entered into mutual engagements to assist each other with all their interest, and thence was formed that union betwixt these two Princes, which gave rise to so many disorders, which cost the Duke of Monmouth his life, and soon after the Duke of York his Kingdom.

I informed the King, by my letter of November 23, 1679, that the Prince of Orange still continued to have views in regard to England, quite opposite to the interest of the Duke of York; that this was a strong motive to prevent him from entering into measures with France, because he believed his Christian Majesty would always protect the Duke of York, to his prejudice; thus despairing of any assistance from his Majesty, he would naturally seek to strengthen himself in the contrary party, by taking measures opposite to those of the Duke of York; and it was not to be doubted but with this view the Prince of Orange would use his utmost efforts, that the King of England should assemble his Parliament, and as he saw no method more likely to bring this about than to strengthen him by an alliance with the States General, being persuaded his Britannic Majesty would then appear with more authority in his Parliament, and that this would be the most likely way for him to obtain the necessary subsidies; he therefore made the last push to bring the alliance to a conclusion. And as he was not ignorant that, notwithstanding this alliance, the Parliament would never confide in their King, nor grant him supplies, unless he agreed to the exclusion bill, he hoped that, in this case, such a cabal, and the protestant league, would work strongly in his favour.

I sent intelligence by the same letter, that one of the Prince of Orange's friends, had assured an acquaintance of mine, that before three months, the Duke of York and all his party would be banished, and Monmouth recalled; In fine, I added that the chagrin and uneasiness which the Prince of Orange's creatures openly discovered, since the Duke of York appeared to have regained his former credit with the King his brother, left me no room to doubt, that I had penetrated into the true designs of the Prince of Orange, in regard to England.

I take upon me to say, I omitted nothing to make known the connections formed by the Prince of Orange, with the most abandoned persons in England. I sent intelligence the 21st of September, that Oates, who became afterwards so famous, Frimans, whom I mentioned before, and Moulins, a bold enterprizing villain, had arrived together in Holland some years ago, and the Prince of Orange had had long conferences with them. I gave notice afterwards, on the 23d of November, that the Prince of Orange knew there were certain Englishmen at Amsterdam, who had affairs of the utmost importance to reveal to the King of England, but would not declare them, till the Parliament should be assembled; that the Duke of Monmouth had brought Sidney into the Prince of Orange's interest; that this minister was intirely opposite to the Duke of York; and I was apprehensive, that a protestant league would be formed, during Monmouth's residence at the Hague.

And upon the Duke of Monmouth's sudden departure for England, I wrote to the King, that I strongly suspected this step was concerted with the Prince of Orange; that I had discovered my Lord

Shaftsbury, with some others, had advised the Duke of Monmouth to depart for England; that they were in a body, to present a petition to the King of Great Britain to entreat, he would call his Parliament; that this was done with the knowledge and approbation of the Prince of Orange, who was greatly surprized, when an Englishman asked him, if he knew it was forbid by the laws of England, to present a petition to the King, signed by more than twelve persons, on pain of being declared traitors: The Prince put many questions to him, upon this head, but this he did not think sufficient, for that same evening, he sent Benting to him, to make a thorough enquiry into the affair.

And now to resume the alliance; I received instructions from the King, to present a memorial, pressing it anew: but as I was obliged to see first, what Pensionary Fagel would do in the matter, I applied to him, and he himself undertook to make the proposition to the States of Holland. I had now placed my dependence on him, so that I was obliged to follow what course he thought proper, and leave the whole affair intirely to his management.

Nevertheless, Fagel did not make the proposition like a man of honour; he contented himself, with only mentioning the conversations, he and I had upon the subject, and desired the States to consider, whether it was adviseable, in the present situation of affairs, after having refused the act of guaranty with England, (which they were obliged to by treaties,) to make an alliance with France. This proposition was put, according to custom, into the hands of the commissaries; and though it was drawn up in such a manner, as it might not be accepted, the Prince of Orange still saw such a disposition

disposition thereto, that he was apprehensive the States of Holland would conclude the alliance. This obliged him the same day, about seven in the evening, to send for Mr. Sidney, whom he instructed, in all the steps necessary to be taken by the King of Great Britain, to break off this alliance; and Mr. Sidney immediately dispatched an express for England.

Application was likewise made to the Emperor's envoy, and Van Buning had long conferences with Sidney: I hereupon acquainted our court, that I could not form any other conjecture, from all these proceedings, than that the Prince of Orange would never consent to the alliance with France, as long as he could prevent it; and that by the management of Pensionary Fagel, he would always find means to elude this affair.

Although the well affected republicans, had consented, that Pensionary Fagel should propose the alliance with France, yet I failed not, after he had taken this step, to speak to them in such a manner, as to preserve always their confidence. I gave them to understand, it was with them chiefly, the King was desirous to form an alliance; that when it should be concluded, (and the Prince of Orange even heartily enter into it) the King, from affection as well as interest, would be willing to preserve the favourable sentiments, he had entertained towards them, since it was with the republic principally, he desired to form the most strict union.

As I had been always watchful of the secret understanding, betwixt the Prince of Orange and the Duke of Monmouth, and what regarded the alliance, I gave a long recital to the King, in my letter December 14, 1679, of what new discoveries I had made, concerning their intrigues; I
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mentioned my being strongly assured of an understanding betwixt them; that I had reason to suspect the Prince of Orange designed to make a tool of the Duke of Monmouth, to begin the destruction of the Duke of York, without exposing himself, and thereby have it in his power, to follow what course appeared most suited to his own interest; that the Prince of Orange and Monmouth had been at a house in the country, ten or twelve days, where they had had conferences together, of three or four hours continuance; that the Duke of Monmouth had afterwards gone to Amsterdam, to confer with the English there; that he then came back to the Hague, where he had received a letter from the King of England, forbidding him to return to England, as he expected; that he had carried this letter, together with some others from his party, to the Prince of Orange, and after a conference of three hours, he departed secretly for the Hague, having given out he was gone for Cologne: and the Prince of Orange had contributed to spread this report. That M. Dodiek had publickly looked for a house for the Duke of Monmouth, when he should return from his pretended journey; and the farce had been so well acted, that they imparted to the English, (in the Duke of York's interest,) letters from M. de Strasbourg, and communicated also the Duke of Monmouth's designs: that mean while Monmouth had passed over to England, with an intention certainly, to head some noblemen, who were to present a petition to the King of Great Britain, that he would call his parliament. I shall not repeat here many other circumstances, which served to discover the intercourse, betwixt the Prince of Orange and Duke of Monmouth. Notwithstanding all this, I could not help remarking,

ing, that if the Prince of Orange and Monmouth acted then in concert, it was because they had the same design in view, to have the Parliament of England assembled: but that I believed, this harmony would be of a short continuance, only till affairs should be near a crisis, for it was not likely the Duke of Monmouth would take so much pains for the Prince of Orange's interest; and that if indirect ways could be contrived, to convince the Prince of Orange, that the Duke of Monmouth had thoughts of establishing himself to his prejudice; this would make an irreparable breach betwixt them.

A few days afterwards, the King found the truth of what I had informed him; for the Duke of Monmouth no sooner arrived in England, than he presented a petition to his Majesty, to call his Parliament, and what followed, no less justified the opinion I had given of the sentiments of the Prince of Orange, and of the Duke of Monmouth, for this Prince assisted Monmouth in his revolt; and he, disregarding all the promises made to the Prince of Orange, got himself proclaimed King, as soon as a proper opportunity offered; hereupon the Prince of Orange with all expedition embarked the British troops in the service of the States General, which hastened the Duke of Monmouth's ruin.

The Prince of Orange, who raised all these broils intirely for his own advantage, and to render himself necessary, offered the King of England to come to London, as a Mediator betwixt him and his Parliament; but his Britannic Majesty only thanked him, without accepting his offer.

Mean while Mr. Sidney's courier returned. I had intelligence at his arrival, that the King of England charged him to go to M. Van Leuwen,
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and inform him, that the alliance talked of in Holland betwixt his Christian Majesty and the States gave him great umbrage; that he would shew the highest resentment if it was concluded; and that they must not, after such a transaction, any longer expect his friendship.

The Prince of Orange was extremely pleased the King of England had explained himself in such strong terms; and I was informed, he assured Mr. Sidney he would not give himself any further trouble; for the alliance of France would not take place.

I appeal to the judgment of every person, if after this the Republicans, to whom I applied, had not reason, and if I had not strong motives to urge that the States General should be spoke to in a higher style; and if fear was not the only thing which could force them into our measures, since the Prince of Orange, who knew so well the temper of the Dutch, advised the King of England to explain himself in that manner, altho' he was not in a condition to act on the offensive against the States General.

I was also informed at the same time that the commissaries, in whose hands the propositions for an alliance was lodged, were either persons of no ability, or attached to the Prince of Orange; this obliged me to take measures with the deputies of Friezland and Groningen, that they should explain themselves upon the alliance with France in the strongest terms; I at the same time dispatched a courier to the king, well knowing what I should of myself say to the States General, would have no effect against the King of England's menaces; it was necessary therefore the King himself should command his sentiments to be declared to them with some degree of strength. And as I knew the
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Prince of Orange endeavoured to insinuate, that in order to avoid incurring the displeasure of France as well as England, neither the one nor the other alliance ought to be concluded, I therefore informed our court it was necessary to point out the difference betwixt a simple defensive alliance, of which none had reason to complain, and a treaty of league. I explained myself in the same manner to the principal members of the States; I represented to them, that it was not surprising the King should remonstrate, when the States General, under a pretext of a guaranty, were about to make a league against his Majesty; but that I could not perceive upon what shadow of reason the King of England could take umbrage if the States made an alliance with his Majesty, which would form no other connection than what they preserved with all the Princes of Europe, with whom they had kept in friendly terms during the war, or in peace renewed their alliances; that his Majesty therefore could not imagine the King of England's declaration would have the least effect on any deputy of the States, or honest republican; that the league proposed by England was evidently intended as an offensive one against his Majesty; whereas the defensive alliance he offered tended neither to break with one power, nor to engage the States in any quarrel; but only more firmly to establish peace throughout all Europe, which was the sincere and only intention of his Majesty; that it could not produce the least bad effect against the King of England, if he intended to live in peace, and not wantonly attack the States General, as he had done in 1665; for in this case his Majesty would be obliged to defend them. I at the same time informed the King of my having accomplished, by means of the well affected

affected republicans, an affair of the utmost consequence, of which I have already made mention, relating to the army of the States; we had exerted ourselves so strenuously with the people of Amsterdam, that they insisted on disbanding 20000 men, wanting to reduce the forces to 25000 foot, 2000 horse, and 1000 dragoons.

Mean while the Prince of Orange acted various parts, according to the character of those to whom he applied. He endeavoured to intimidate the republicans who had any correspondence with me; he represented to the leading men of the towns, that the King could not take amiss the deferring the conclusion of the alliance to another time; and that this delay, which was of no consequence to his Majesty, would lessen the displeasure the King of England might shew if an alliance should be made with his Majesty, at a time when they refused to execute an engagement entered into with him.

The Prince of Orange did not depend so much on these remonstrances, nor the assurances he received that part of the commissaries to whom the proposition of alliance had been referred, would implicitly follow his dictates, but he would likewise be present when the affair came under deliberation; a thing never almost before practised. The deputy of the nobles to whom the Prince of Orange belongs, and most of those of the towns, failed not to deliver it as their opinion, that since they had just refused the league with England, an alliance with France ought not to be so soon concluded, but be deferred to another time.

Although not only the commissaries but also the councils of the towns had been obliged by the most solemn oaths of secrecy in this affair, yet I got intelligence of every particular; but as these persons

persons had given their opinions only as private individuals, this did not sufficiently satisfy the Prince of Orange, who remained still apprehensive that they might deliver themselves in a different manner when they came to speak in the name of their respective towns.

In effect, things were in such a situation that the Prince of Orange was a whole day in suspense whether he himself should not earnestly propose the alliance with France, and thereby assume the merit of a thing which he believed he could no longer prevent.

Van Buning and Pensionary Fagel advised him to wait for letters from their ambassadors, to see in what manner the King expressed himself.

They accordingly waited till they received the letter of January 3, 1680, which informed them, that the King had ordered they should be spoke to in the strongest terms concerning the alliance. Unluckily this letter at the same time signified that the strongest assurances had been given, that whatever steps they followed, the King would always adhere strictly to the articles of the treaty of peace; and that his Majesty would only exert all his power to promote the commerce of his subjects, in prejudice to that of the States. The Prince of Orange and his dependents resumed courage upon this, and the other party became greatly disheartened; so that the face of affairs was quite altered.

The republicans in our interest declared I ought to expect nothing from my negotiation, for after the late assurances received by the States, who were no ways inclined to act contrary to the will of the Prince of Orange, unless from the apprehension of a war, it could not be supposed any one would be willing to conclude the alliance with France. They complained we had engaged them to pursue such measures as they had taken,
and

and now abandoned them to the resentment of the Prince of Orange; that all they desired (and what I had also requested) was, that our court should explain themselves in such a manner as might strike a fear into the States General: and without denouncing against them any particular threat, which might engage the King to pursue violent measures, only to have left them room to fear every thing. Some of them hereupon retired from public affairs, and the rest, excepting M. Paets, no longer acted with the same spirit.

I wanted much to repair the damage done by this letter; I therefore made declarations to the magistrates of all the towns, much stronger than those in the letters of their ambassadors, or my own: but all availed nothing; they stuck to the letters of their ambassadors, believing them stronger than all I could say. I did not dissemble with his Majesty as to the bad effect his assurances to preserve peace had produced; and in order to add greater weight to what I had said, I sent him a copy of the letter Dikfeld had wrote to the States General, which I had found means to get into my possession, advising them to send different instructions to their ambassadors. I repeated again what I had often before mentioned, that the success of this affair depended upon raising in the towns such an apprehension of the King's resentment, as to force them into an alliance, in spite of the Prince of Orange: What I advanced was acknowledged to be founded on reason, and the ambassadors were again spoke to in the warmest terms. The proper time was now however passed, and all availed nothing; for Dikfeld wrote to his masters, that the King had indeed made strong declarations, but that his Majesty, upon my intelligence, had changed his style, without altering his sentiments;

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that they might rest assured the King would not disturb their quiet; for what his Majesty had at first declared, was his real sentiments; and what he at present urged, proceeded only from what I had represented.

Pensionary Fagel made me a visit about this time; he said he had orders from the Prince of Orange to assure me, the States General would pass such an act and declaration as would please the King; that they would form no new connection, nor enter into engagements with any power whatever, nor take any measure which could be prejudicial to the treaty of peace, or the friendship offered them by his Majesty: I replied, that in regard to Pensionary Fagel, the ratification of the peace, and the act proposed were the same thing: Nevertheless I dispatched a courier to give notice of what had been offered.

As the Prince of Orange and Pensionary Fagel perceived that the leading men in the towns of Holland were now made easy as to the apprehensions they had entertained of the King's resentment, and that the republicans were discouraged, they therefore endeavoured to spin out the time in deliberating upon the alliance with France. They proceeded however in this affair with great precaution, and the Prince of Orange was afraid, as I took care to disperse several memorials amongst the council of the towns; that the States would at last conclude the alliance, notwithstanding all the menaces of the King of England, the letters of Van Leuen, and the intrigues of Pensionary Fagel: He sent to the principal deputies of some of the towns, strongly soliciting them not to consent to the alliance with France. He likewise dispersed papers amongst private houses, by means of the protestant clergy, in order to turn the people against the

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the alliance, as a thing contrary to their religion.

In short, Pensionary Fagel having it in his power to propose matters for consideration, only laid before them the account he had given the States of the conversation we had concerning the alliance with France, and the opinion of the commissaries, which was, to defer treating about this affair to another time. He mentioned nothing of my memorials, nor the declarations the king had ordered to be made to the ambassador of the States: Thus it became easy for him to bring about a conclusion similar to the opinion of the commissaries, and to propose the act, whereby they should engage to make no treaty contrary to the friendship which had been established by the treaties of Nimeguen.

Altho' the Province of Holland had not deliberated upon all the papers they must needs have seen in regard to the alliance with France, and the resolution had been formed by the deputies, without consulting their superiors, having only undertaken to procure their approbation, yet hardly could any means be devised of making an alteration in this affair. 'Tis true, indeed, most of the towns disavowed the conduct of their deputies, but not one dared propose to consider the matter a-new. The magistrates of Amsterdam made high complaints, that the Prince of Orange having sent them the first letters of M. Dikfeld, had assured them his Majesty would not disturb their peace, even though they should not conclude the alliance; that nevertheless they found the contrary by my memorial publickly dispersed amongst the towns, which had never so much as been taken into consideration; yet they took no measures to defeat the late resolution, believing they should not be supported by any other town.

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The city of Amsterdam at this time thought of making a strong effort to renew their motion for reducing the troops, and to keep up only 25000 foot, 2000 horse, and 1000 dragoons.

As I continued to keep a watchful eye over the intrigues the Prince of Orange carried on in England, I found he had been informed from thence, that tho' every thing there appeared quiet, there would be a general insurrection in the counties as soon as opportunity served; that letters had been wrote, urging them to present new petitions to the King of England to call his parliament; that he could hardly now avoid taking this step, and they desired the Prince of Orange to wait the event. The Duke of Monmouth had also given him to understand, that in a little time he should be again in favour with the King of England.

I endeavoured to take advantage from the advices I received from England, not only to destroy all merit the Prince of Orange pretended to assume with his Britannick Majesty, that the States General had not made an alliance with France; but also to render him suspected to the King of England, by shewing him it was not from any regard to his Majesty, that the Prince of Orange stirred himself with so much vigour against the alliance, but intirely for his own interest, having no other view in all his conduct, than to bring him under the necessity of assembling his Parliament, for those reasons I have mentioned before.

I at the same time informed our court of my having discovered, about two days before, that the Prince of Orange had formed new connexions with the Duke of Monmouth, and several of the English parliament; that Rocourt, who was attached to Monmouth, had joined with M. Sidney; that the Prince of Orange, by means of Frimans,

was

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was renewing his secret practices ; that Mr. Sidney, the English envoy in Holland, being an enemy to the Duke of York, the Prince of Orange made use of him to carry on his purposes, and to oblige the King of England, to go farther than he inclined.

I had applied to the provinces of Friezland and Groningen, the only two which did not absolutely depend on the Prince of Orange ; and I engaged the first deputy of Groningen, to go himself to his province, to persuade them, to demand an alliance with France. This deputy accordingly went to Groningen, and returned with the resolution of the province, to require an alliance with France. Friezland also declared positively for an alliance, and sent to give me notice thereof. I likewise carried things so far, that these two provinces resolved to back Amsterdam, in the motion they had made for disbanding 20000 of the troops.

But as the Prince of Orange had a great advantage, in the discussion of affairs, and more from the direction of Pensionary Fagel, than his own private influence ; and as he was apprehensive the magistrates of Amsterdam, might carry a reduction of the troops, in the States of Holland ; he therefore took care, to prevent their entering upon the military establishment, although it ought to have been regulated, before the end of the preceding year, and it was then the 20th of February. By this means he gained his point, for the year always advancing, and the state of the army not being entered upon, the troops remained upon the old footing, and the States General were under a necessity of paying them.

This Prince, who was master of Guelderland, Zealand, Utrecht, and Overijssel, obliged them to follow

follow the same resolution, with that of the province of Holland, to decline an alliance with France; and he exerted himself to the utmost, to engage the States General, to follow the example of the five provinces: but the deputies of Friezland and Groningen warmly opposed it, declaring such a resolution could not be taken, without the unanimous consent of the seven provinces: whereas their provinces were of opinion, that the States General should make an alliance with France. 'Tis unnecessary to insert here, all that the Prince of Orange and Pensionary Fagel did on their side, and I on my part; they to oblige the States to take this resolution, which they were desirous to send his Majesty; and I to prevent such a step. Let it suffice to say, that after a month of threats and intrigues, they were unable to carry their point.

As I found Friezland and Groningen, were the only provinces that dared deliver their sentiments with freedom, and stand against the Prince of Orange, I took care to preserve as good an understanding with them as possible; and I sent a gentleman to these provinces, to keep them up in their sentiments, and form new connexions.

Mean while they were extremely uneasy, in the other provinces, that the deputies had not made an alliance with France; and they dreaded so much the arms of his Christian Majesty, that several papers were drawn up to be dispersed amongst the people. One was addressed to me, from some of the most considerable persons in Utrecht; and I was informed at the same time, that libels had been posted up on the doors of the town hall, bestowing the names of traitors, and sellers of the public liberty, on those who had signed the reso-

lution, whereby the province of Utrecht conformed to that of Holland. The persons who sent me this paper, told me also, that several people from Arnhem, Nimeguen, and Overysfel, had signified to them, that they were in the utmost despair, because the alliance was not concluded.

The Prince of Orange had still more success in England than in Holland; Godolphin was intirely in his interest, of which I gave notice to our court about this time. Two months afterwards, I sent likewise intelligence, that Hyde, Godolphin, and Sunderland, were wholly under his influence; that they communicated to him every particular, and received his orders, in regard to every step of their conduct. Nay, even the Duke of York contributed to forward his designs, from time to time taking such steps, as seemed to have been dictated to him, by the Prince of Orange; he thought to act the part of a profound politician, by entering into the views of the Prince of Orange, as if all this Prince schemed, had not been wholly for his destruction. He promised to promote his designs with the King of England, and to form new alliances against France; he strongly solicited his brother, who, for this purpose, sent a minister to the Elector of Brandenburg; this minister communicated his intentions to the Prince of Orange, for his approbation. What may seem extraordinary, is, that these instructions, were to propose to the Elector a protestant league, for security of the reformed religion, as the King of France seemed desirous to destroy it.

And to propose guarantees, of the treaties of peace, of Nimeguen, &c.

This envoy came very seasonably for the Prince of Orange: I was informed that the backwardness, which the towns of Holland shewed, to make

a league of guaranty with England, had obliged him to defer the orders, to have been given to M. Damerongue, to propose an alliance with the Elector of Brandenburg; the Prince at this time despairing, of being able to engage the States General, in new treaties; so that he had taken another course, to arrive at the same end, that is, to bring about a league of guaranty, betwixt the King of England, and the Princes of the empire: believing, when this was concluded, the States General would be obliged to enter into it, or even if they did not, it would be always sufficient, to prevent their taking any opposite measures; in this he was wonderfully assisted by the Duke of York; for the King of England sent likewise to the court of Lunenburg, to propose an alliance, and the Prince of Orange, for some months, used all his endeavours to make the negotiations of England, succeed at the courts of Brandenburg and Lunenburg.

The Prince of Orange at this time, resolved to send M. Paets, ambassador to Spain, in order to get rid of a man of such extraordinary abilities. Paets consulted me upon the affair, and we determined, he should refuse the embassy. He had the boldness to advance, as one of the principal reasons of this refusal, that as he believed nothing could tend to the good of the commonwealth, without the alliance with France, he was therefore a very improper person to go ambassador to Spain; and he was so courageous, as to go to the Prince of Orange, and tell him the reasons why he was persuaded, the alliance with France was absolutely necessary. He begged leave to have a conference on this affair, in his presence, with Pensionary Fagel, and Van Buning; and offered, if he did not give such reasons, as were unanswerable by them,

to sign the alliance with England. The Prince of Orange, however, never durst venture these two, though men of great parts, against M. Paets.

I was at this time lucky enough, to find means to engage one of the deputies in secret affairs, to communicate to me, all the most secret transactions, in the Prince of Orange's privy council.

The year was advanced to the 25th of April 1680, without their being able to make the magistrates of the towns of Holland agree to allow what was necessary, for the support of the milice. The difficulties started by them for six months, made it evident, they endeavoured as much as possible, to thwart the Prince of Orange's designs.

This Prince, who desired nothing so much, as to alienate the States General from the King's interest, took every possible method, by means of his tools, to give bad impressions to the States of all his Majesty's conduct. M. Dodick being president of the week in the States General, shewed them an edict, wherein the King commanded, there should be no midwives of the protestant religion. You see, gentlemen, said M. Dodick, in what manner the King of France treats those of our religion: He wants to abolish it, whereas the King of England endangers himself to support it, and yet there are some persons here, who want we should make an alliance with France.

Religion was the first expedient which the Prince of Orange used.

The demand which the King's deputies made at Courtray, furnished him with a second.

The Prince of Orange and Pensionary Fagel, failed not to exaggerate things in the highest manner; and the States General signified to me, the uneasiness they laboured under, since his Majesty's envoys at Courtray, had declared, if the King of Spain

Spain did not renounce the title of Duke of Burgundy, by the 15th of July, they would declare war against him.

The States at this time sent M. Ciffers into England. I found means to procure his instructions, which I sent to the King: I had also the instructions of M. Van Lewen, who was in England, and of M. Hemskerck, whom they sent to Spain; I was likewise promised those of M. de Staremburg, who was going embassador for France.

I repeated the information I had before given, of an alliance projected betwixt Spain and England; but at the same time, I had the pleasure of being able to inform our court, that the Princes of Lunenburg would form no alliance with England, so long as the States General, who ought to serve as the line of communication, were not engaged therein; that the Elector of Brandenburg refused also the King of England's proposals; alledging his Britannic Majesty was in so bad a footing with his subjects, as to be unable to support any alliance he should make.

The Prince of Orange finding at last, that he could not get sufficient funds to support the milice, unless he consented to have them levied, as the people of Amsterdam thought proper; he agreed to this, and they in return, acquiesced to the military establishment, without insisting on any reduction. Thus this affair, which ought to have been determined the foregoing December, 1680, was scarce finished by June.

As I was persuaded, I could not with too much attention, observe the designs of the Prince of Orange, especially those he formed against the Duke of York, which must certainly be attended with the most troublesome circumstances; I sent advice to our court for the tenth time, that the

Prince of Orange foresaw, he should certainly have broils with the Duke of York, for the crown of England; and as he knew whatever steps he should pursue, to gain the King's good graces, his Majesty would be always attached to the Duke of York, who was a catholic; this would effectually prevent his forming any connexions with his Majesty.

And as I saw the Duke of York was wholly deceived; I wrote to the King, August 29, 1680, what I had some time before, had the honour of communicating to him, that the King of England's ministers were not in the interest of the Duke of York, as this Prince imagined, but, on the contrary, intirely devoted to the Prince of Orange; that my Lord Sunderland acted as his wife directed him; and that his wife was under the government of Mr. Sidney, who was under the influence of the Prince of Orange, (the truth of which has been universally acknowledged, as soon as the Prince of Orange's designs appeared,) That my Lord Hyde took more concern for the interest of his niece the Princess of Orange, than what regarded the Duke of York; and as for Godolphin, that he had been always attached to the Prince of Orange. Thus these ministers conformed their conduct to his views, and acted in every thing as he dictated.

I received intelligence, on the 20th of June, that Borgomaniero, who came from England, and was going for Vienna, was arrived at the Hague. I endeavoured to discover what he came to do there; and I found he had communicated the treaty of league, in a manner resolved upon betwixt the King of Spain and the King of England: In effect, it was concluded at London, the 21st of June, and I procured a copy, the same day they had

had it at the Hague; and I dispatched it on the 27th to his Majesty.

All these leagues formed against the King's interest, obliged me more and more, to endeavour to form a party in the republic, to prevent their being executed; for this purpose I thought nothing could be more conducive to his Majesty's service, than to unite the provinces of Friesland and Groningen, with the city of Amsterdam; these two provinces, which are independent of the Prince of Orange, and this city, which is the most powerful in all the State, being able, if they acted in concert, easily to support themselves against the Prince of Orange. I endeavoured likewise, to unite to them the Prince of Nassau, governor of Friesland and Groningen; I employed a clergyman to transact this affair. Van Buning, on the contrary, used all his efforts to bring over the city of Amsterdam to the Prince of Orange, and to promote a good understanding betwixt him and Prince Nassau.

The Prince of Orange was not dispirited, by the difficulties he met with, at the courts of Brandenburg and Lunenburg, but resolved to go there himself: he gave notice to the States General, of his departure for Zell, and he alledged, as a pretext for going there, that the Duke had invited him during the war, and since the peace, to take the diversions of hunting in Zell. He mentioned nothing of his going to Magdenburg, though he had concerted it with the Duke of Brandenburg, to go there to see him. He got the States of Holland, to come to a resolution, on the day of his departure, to send Van Lewen to England. For this purpose he told them, that the King of Great Britain had resolved to assemble his Parliament, and that all things were in such a favourable situ-

ation in England, as to promise a perfect harmony again; but that nevertheless, he believed M. Van Lewen would still contribute more to promote this reconciliation, by the influence he had with the King of England, and his interest in the English Parliament.

As the clergyman had not taken such steps as I wished, to form an union betwixt the city of Amsterdam, and the provinces of Friezland and Groningen; I therefore applied to a republican of Utrecht, intreating him to speak to a certain Arminian clergyman, a man of excellent parts, who had great influence with the leading persons of Amsterdam. I recommended three things to this republican: first, to engage the clergyman to use his endeavours, to bring about a good understanding betwixt two or three of the principal people of Amsterdam, who had been in the government in 1672, and M. Valkenir, who entered into office this same year; he was a man of worth, a true republican, and in a manner, governed the city of Amsterdam.

Secondly, that he would prevail upon the clergyman if possible, to establish a strict union betwixt M. Valkenir, and the provinces of Friezland and Groningen.

And, in the third place, to know, if he would communicate such intelligence, as I should send him, to M. Valkenir, without discovering from what quarter it came. And, in order to shew the clergyman, this information was well grounded, and that he might derive some advantage from this correspondence, I thought it proper to let him know in confidence, that we had discovered the Prince of Orange's designs with the German Princes, and the engagements which this Prince
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and Pensionary Fagel, had entered into with the King of England.

The Arminian clergyman, willingly accepted the proposal of his friend; and even agreed, for this purpose, to have a direct correspondence with me; a few days after, I sent him a person in whom I confided. To this man he communicated the means he intended to employ, and those also which I ought to use, to reunite the two parties of Amsterdam, and next to engage them in the same interest, with the States of Friezland; this second affair depending in some manner upon the first; and the one as well as the other, being to be conducted with all possible prudence and precaution; for I was certain, as soon as it should be discovered, that I had any hand therein, all would be disconcerted; since it seemed highly improbable, that the two factions at Amsterdam would come to a coalition, or enter into measures with the provinces of Friezland and Groningen, by the mediation of an ambassador from France. As to the secret intelligence I desired to carry on with the ministry of Amsterdam, he sent me notice he had procured two of the leading men, who undertook to receive all the papers and memorials I should send; and to communicate them to the council of their town, and in such a manner, that those who were not in the secret, should not know whence they came. I was extremely pleased, that I had thus fallen upon a method of conveying into the privy council of Amsterdam every particular, which his Majesty desired they should be informed of.

The clergyman, in return for the intelligence I had communicated, let me into the knowledge of one material circumstance, viz. That the States General had gone into the Prince of Orange's

proposal, to send M. Van Lewen to England, especially since his commission was given out as only intended to prevent his Britannic Majesty from coming to a rupture with his parliament; that as to the States General themselves, the affair appeared quite harmless; but that Van Lewen had secret instructions from the Prince of Orange, which were the true purport of his embassy; namely, to keep up the appearance of friendship with the Duke of York, but underhand to carry on a secret intelligence with the Prince of Orange's friends; that as soon as the people became properly inflamed, and an opportunity offered for striking a blow, he was then to employ all his correspondences to strengthen the Prince of Orange's party, and openly act against the Duke of York, to get the Prince of Orange declared heir apparent to the crown, and even to have him called over at that time, if it was practicable; for the Prince of Orange was persuaded the Duke of Monmouth acted in his interest against the Duke of York; he did not once apprehend, if the Duke of Monmouth had a desire to deceive him, what trouble he might raise upon the Duke of York's exclusion, not having the least notion Monmouth would ever oppose him as a rival.

He was not content with having sent M. Van Lewen into England, for he dispatched likewise Frimans, a most desperate and abandoned villain, capable of undertaking the blackest actions.

I gave notice of all these particulars to the King; and I informed him, that this embassy of Van Lewen, and his private instructions, were conformable to a scheme the Prince had formed above a twelvemonth; and if the Duke of York had any person in England in whom he could confide, and at the same time not known to be in
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his interest, it was highly probable, if such a one would pretend to be in the Prince of Orange's party, the Duke of York would thereby soon perceive, that the Prince of Orange aimed at his destruction; and the King of England would likewise discover, he had pressed him to call his Parliament for his own purposes only; for, at the time when he believed the Prince of Orange had no other view than to bring him to a good understanding with his Parliament, and to procure an approbation of the treaty he had obliged him to make with Spain; this Prince made no other use of the Parliament, than to ruin the Duke of York, and to draw his Britannic Majesty's person into danger.

I wrote again upon this subject on the 3d of November, and informed our court, that the most zealous partizan of the Prince of Orange had told one of his friends, that the Parliament of England would not be satisfied with the Duke of York's retreat into Scotland; for they would insist he should not even be permitted to retire into France, the Spanish Netherlands, nor the United Provinces, but only into Italy, or Germany.

The Prince of Orange being desirous to have the family of Lunenburg intirely dependent on him, formed two projects to promote this design: to marry Prince Osnabruk to Princess Anne, Sister to the Princess of Orange: and if this marriage should succeed, to have that Prince named his successor in all his honours and preferments. By this means he reckoned he should have a brother in law at the head of the republic in Holland, who would certainly be in his interest, as he would have a view to the crown of England, the Prince of Orange having at this time no hopes of issue.

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Pensionary Fagel, and Van Buning entered likewise into this project.

At this time M. Valkenir died. The city of Amsterdam as well as the republic in general, suffered a great loss by his death, and I in a particular manner, because he was the only man who could reunite the well affected republicans, who were not of the De Witt faction, with those of this faction commonly reckoned of the government of 1672, because they were thrown out in this year; and he was the only person who could undertake to unite the city of Amsterdam with the provinces of Friesland and Groningen. The Arminian clergyman still persisted, notwithstanding this accident, to use his utmost efforts to reconcile the leading persons of Amsterdam; the republican of Amsterdam promised to give all possible assistance, and he managed matters so successfully in his journey to Amsterdam the 21st of November 1680, that he intirely united the two parties which divided that city.

The Prince of Orange soon perceived the effect of this reconciliation; for the council of Amsterdam unanimously insisted on a reduction of the troops. This Prince, and Pensionary Fagel on the other side, so far from wanting to disband any of the forces, were of opinion that new levies ought to be raised; that the storm being gathering, and about to fall, they ought therefore to put themselves in a condition to succour their neighbours. The republican waited on the ministry of Amsterdam, and so strongly represented to them that the King's friendship was their greatest security, and every other method ruinous to the state as well as dangerous to their liberty, that they remained intirely convinced thereof.

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As I had found means, by a deputy in secret affairs, to have a copy of the instructions the States General had given to Van Lewen, I discovered amongst other particulars, that he was ordered to address himself to the Duke of York; and tho' Pensionary Fagel had only added this by way of form, to conceal the secret designs of the Prince of Orange from the States General, I took care however to make a proper use thereof, as if meant in earnest: I prevailed on the republican to communicate it to his friends in the house of commons, who at the same time gave them to understand how they were deceived; and that notwithstanding what they were always made to believe, there was a secret intelligence kept up betwixt all the Royal Family of England. What induced me, if possible to procure their belief of this false intelligence, was, that I had discovered some time before, by a person concerned in managing the Prince of Orange's intrigues in England, that the most effectual way to prevent this Prince's success in his designs, was to create a belief that he was too much attached to the court; for he never could gain the affections of the people, till he should appear intirely detached from the Duke of York. Thus what I caused to be wrote, produced no bad effect.

The English informed this republican, they were sensible there was an intention to amuse them by turning them to foreign affairs: But if the King should even make a conquest of the Low Countries, they would not interfere; since what they had resolved for the security of their religion and the re-establishment of their ancient privileges, was not yet wholly finished.

I received intelligence at the same time relating to the negotiation of M. Van Lewen in England;

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I was informed he was little beloved there, and would be unable to carry any thing; that he was believed to be wholly in the King of Great Britain's interest, and the English therefore did not chuse he should intermeddle in their affairs; moreover, that the house of commons would not ratify the treaty with Spain, this treaty being, they said, not in favour of the English Nation, but wholly intended as an artful illusion to obtain certain promises, and chiefly to put the Duke of York on horseback (as the letter expressed it). That for their part, they were resolved to turn their thoughts on affairs within the Kingdom; and two in particular, they would finish before all other matters, namely, their religion, and liberty, in which they would exert themselves with the utmost vigour; and that it would not be so easy for the King of England, as he imagined, to prorogue his Parliament.

I had also the satisfaction of hearing the effect of what I had got represented to Colonel Sidney, concerning the mischievous consequences which would certainly attend an alliance of England with the States General, when the Prince of Orange would continue to be as powerful in Holland as before; for several of the English members wrote two persons in Amsterdam, that they were averse to an alliance with the States General, since it would serve only to aggrandize the Prince of Orange, and add to the authority of the King of England.

The famous republican, whom I have so often mentioned, and who wrote to Colonel Sidney, sent me likewise another piece of intelligence which he had of him; that the Parliament of England would not come to a reconciliation with the King of England, but upon these terms.

That

That his Britannic Majesty should renounce all right to prorogue his Parliament, by his sole authority; because they pretended this was a power usurped for some years.

That his Majesty should also give up to Parliament the right of choosing general officers by sea and land.

And, that he should likewise grant them the liberty of naming commissioners for the management of the treasury, and payment of the army.

I know not whether the Prince of Orange was fully apprized of all these designs of the house of Commons, which aimed at the intire subversion of the royal authority of a crown to which he aspired: but I am certain, that at this time he wrote more strongly to the King of England, representing it as absolutely necessary that he should by any means whatever, come to a good understanding with his Parliament, otherwise affairs in Holland were in so bad a situation, that he could no longer support them, nor oblige the towns to follow his sentiments; and he was therefore obliged to tell his Majesty, it would be impossible for him to prevent their taking other measures, unless a perfect harmony was restored betwixt him and his Parliament.

For tho' this Prince was sensible my Lord Sunderland and some others had too much flattered him in the hopes of turning to advantage, the exclusion of the Duke of York; yet he continued to pursue his design, and ventured every thing to attain his purpose, even so as to push things to the utmost extremity; for as he feared nothing from the Duke of Monmouth, he reckoned if the Princess of Orange was not called to the Crown, in consequence of the exclusion bill, she would at least not be excluded; and the worst
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that could befall him would be only to remain with the same right to England, which he had since his marriage, and in the mean time to have the pleasure of seeing the Duke of York removed out of the way, after which he would wait a more favourable juncture to execute his design.

Mr. Sidney used his utmost endeavours to cherish these hopes of the Prince of Orange, and tho' a minister of the King of England, declared publicly, that the English would never suffer a Roman Catholic Prince. He gave out every where, that the King of England would be forced by his Parliament to allow a pension to the Duke of York, and consent to his exclusion from the throne; otherwise things would be carried to the utmost extremity.

The Prince of Orange now resolved to make his last effort to ruin the Duke of York; for this purpose he got Pensionary Fagel to propose to the States General, that they should request the King of England, in the name of the republic, not to prorogue his Parliament, but to come to a good understanding with them: This proposal being rejected because the deputies of Friezland and Groningen would not consent thereto, Pensionary Fagel proposed, since they would not do any thing directly in the affair, that they would, by way of memorial, signify to Sidney the English envoy, that the States General interesting themselves greatly in the welfare of his Britannic Majesty and his Kingdom, begged him to consider (without pretending to offer him advice, or to put up any request) whether the continuation of his Parliament would not tend thereto. The States General acquiesced with this proposal, looking upon it as a thing which could no ways displease his Britannic Majesty.

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It was accordingly resolved that they should desire Mr. Sidney to be at the chamber of treaty at four o'clock, where the foreign envoys used to meet, upon any conference with the deputies of the States General: but Pensionary Fagel, intent upon his designs, sent to tell the deputies, the conference was not to hold, and he would next day tell them the reason thereof, viz. That Mr. Sidney being indisposed, it was inconsistent with the dignity of the States General, that all the deputies should go to an envoy's; he had therefore gone only with two deputies, to tell Mr. Sidney what the States General had resolved to have set forth to his Britannic Majesty. Fagel however acted quite contrary to what the States General resolved; for after having spoken in their name to Sidney, he gave them in writing that famous memorial, which made so great a noise in England.

The purport of this paper was, that the States General had with regret learnt, that the agreement betwixt his Majesty and the Parliament was not such as might be wished for the welfare of Christendom; that did not indeed belong to them to judge of the cause of so great a misfortune, and far less to point out the means for a remedy; they would therefore have waited with a respectful silence, tho' with great concern, till Providence had happily ended the affair, if their own danger had not obliged them to declare their sentiments.

That his Majesty knew what they had done to avoid his displeasure, and into what difficulties they had thereby drawn themselves; that he had promised, for their greater security, to assemble his Parliament; and they had confided in his royal word; but the misunderstanding betwixt him

him and his Parliament every day increasing, destroyed all their hopes of his assistance, especially as this animosity took rise from an affair so important, so delicate, and of such a domestic nature, that they durst not intermeddle.

Pensionary Fagel then made a long detail of all the preparations he supposed France to be making for the ensuing war; and he represented to the King of England, that the States only could hinder the King of France from conquering the Low Countries, and subjecting the States General; and after setting forth, or rather reproaching the King of England, that the misunderstanding betwixt him and his Parliament, would be the cause of all the misfortunes which should follow; he freely told his Majesty, he ought to have known that the prerogatives of Parliament had served only to inflame their spirits; for, that after the first session, the succeeding Parliament had followed the steps of the former, and persevered with more eagerness.

At last, he came to the point at which the whole memorial was chiefly aimed: He declared, the States General could hardly believe themselves so unfortunate, that an affair of so much uncertainty as a future succession, in which time often brings about considerable alterations and revolutions, quite contrary to what was determined, should be the cause of their ruin; or, that the interest of Europe, of all the protestant Princes, and especially of the States General, should be sacrificed for such an uncertain matter.

He endeavoured next, to shew the King of England, that tho' he should at this juncture consent to the exclusion of the Duke of York, it did not follow this act of Parliament must be put in execution; for his Majesty knew too well to be informed that several acts of exclusion from the
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succession, had been of no effect; those in particular, against Mary and Elizabeth, were too recent to be repeated.

And after having, in a threatening manner, represented to him, as a thing greatly to be feared, that a Parliament, composed of men of great abilities, well versed in the laws of the realm, furnished with considerable examples, and supported by the approbation of the great cities, and almost the whole nation, would remain unshaken, and thereby widen the present breach; he added, that the States General did not pretend to prescribe rules to the desires or inclinations of his Majesty; and that they would submit to whatever he should think most proper; but they intreated him, in case it unluckily happened, that he should chuse to sacrifice his Kingdom, his Royal person, and the harmony of his people for an affair so uncertain, and which would never perhaps happen; in that case they could have no hopes, of his assistance in their troubles, since the situation of his own affairs, in all probability, would not permit him; they therefore desired, he would at least, inform them properly; that they might cast about for some other means, to save their republic and the distressed people committed to their care.

That they would always remember the favourable intentions of his Majesty towards them; but it would give them the most extreme uneasiness, and cost them tears of blood, if they who were so well disposed to his Majesty, should fall the innocent victims, for an interest, which would never perhaps take place, or if it should, would in all probability, bring on that ruin and destruction, to which they saw themselves exposed.

The very reading of this memorial, addressed to a Prince, who had in a manner given up himself
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to the Prince of Orange, ever since the peace of Nimeguen, carries with it all the reflections necessary to be made: thus I shall think it sufficient (in all these extracts of my letters, which I have thrown together) to confine myself to what only regards my embassy.

It is evident, that notwithstanding this memorial was given in the name of the States General, they had no concern therein, and that the Prince of Orange taking advantage of Pensionary Fagel's high office, used their name for his own purposes.

It may not be improper to take notice, after what manner this memorial was conveyed to England, and what use was made thereof. Sidney sent it to my Lord Sunderland, and ordered twenty copies to be given amongst different persons in the house of Commons. Sunderland, who was then minister and secretary of State, ordered likewise several copies to be taken, which he took care to have dispersed by the tools of his party, before he mentioned the affair to his master; so that his Majesty received the first notice thereof, from public report, for he knew the affair only by the bad effect, which this memorial produced against him in Parliament. He sent in quest of Van Lewen, who avowed this paper in the name of his masters, endeavoured to excuse them, and even pressed the King of England to consent to what they requested. His Britannic Majesty, thought it sufficient at first, to declare to his Parliament, that he would do every thing in his power to preserve the protestant religion, without breaking through the lawful succession: but afterwards, finding this declaration insufficient, to stop the progress of that affair, he dissolved his Parliament, the beginning of February 1681, and turned

turned Sunderland out of the ministry. He resolved likewise, to have immediately recalled Sidney from his employ, but he somewhat relented upon this last article, for he did not order him home, till a considerable time afterwards.

I know not whether the King of England, seeing the Prince of Orange, with whom he acted in perfect concert, and with the utmost confidence, since the peace of Nimeguen, had pushed him on the brink of destruction, did not find himself necessitated, to enter into measures with his Christian Majesty. As it is a fact which has not come within my knowledge, I can only form a conjecture on such an occasion, and say that it appears to me, very likely.

I cannot, notwithstanding the resolution I have formed, refrain from making a reflection on the conduct which the Duke of York, when King of England, observed in regard to the Earl of Sunderland: I mean only to ask, if it was consistent with prudence to trust his secrets, his kingdom, and his person as he did, to a man, who had so long laboured to bring about, his exclusion to the Crown of England, who always kept up the same intercourse with Sidney, and the other abettors of this perfidy; and whether he could imagine that a person, who had been hitherto in confidence with the Prince of Orange, and intirely devoted to him, would not always pursue the same designs: These circumstances, in my opinion, ought at least to have induced him to take some pains, to inquire into the truth, of a piece of intelligence afterwards given him, that this same man was again acting the traitor, and betraying him to the Prince of Orange.

I took care that the deputies of Friezland and Groningen, as well as those of Amsterdam, should be

be informed of the artifice, lately practised by Pensionary Fagel: they were extremely nettled at it, and the former having spoke of it in the States General, the States reproached him very sharply. The deputies of Amsterdam spoke of it also, and with still greater warmth: but he was acquitted of the charge, although the ambassador had confessed it to be so in the instructions sent him: Fagel replied, that he knew not what Mr. Sidney could write; and that it belonged to this minister, to be answerable to his royal master, upon that account; that as to himself, he could not give him any memorial in writing, since he had no resolution of the States General for that purpose; and that he had said nothing to him, but what was agreeable to what they had resolved.

I was informed the Duke of Zell, had acquainted the Prince of Orange, that he had wrote to the Bishop of Munster, desiring leave to go in March, to hunt the stag in his territories; and it was upon this occasion, they met the April following at Humelin. It is evident, that the Prince of Orange designed only, to form alliances with the Princes of Lunenburg, for general affairs; for we have not found that any thing particular has been concluded on this occasion.

Though the Prince of Orange was not a little chagrined at the dissolution of the Parliament, and the disgrace of my Lord Sunderland, who being prime Minister and secretary of State, informed him of all the designs of his Britannic Majesty; yet he did not desist from his projects, and continued to believe, that the King of England would be at length, obliged to abandon the Duke of York; and he reckoned that in this case, he could not be excluded from the crown.

As for my part; I endeavoured to make a proper advantage of all the incidents which happened. I consulted with several persons of the State, and amongst others, with a certain republican who went to Amsterdam, to see what effect the troubles in England, had had upon the situation of affairs in Holland: what I discovered, may be reduced to three principal observations, which I mentioned to the King the 20th of February 1681.

The first was, that the present juncture was the most favourable, and perhaps the only one, which would for a considerable time occur, to forward his Majesty's affairs in Holland; since there was hardly any person, who did not perceive in what danger the States General were, not only because they had rejected an alliance with his Majesty, but on account of the just cause for resentment, given him by the conduct, which the Prince of Orange and Pensionary Fagel had so long pursued. Moreover, that every one saw plainly, the present circumstances of affairs gave his Majesty an opportunity of undertaking and executing, without difficulty or opposition, whatever he desired for his own satisfaction or glory.

The second was, that every one ought to be thoroughly convinced, whatever change may happen in the affairs of Europe, it would be fear only, which could operate upon the spirits of the Dutch, and oblige those to act, who were insensible to every other consideration. And as it was generally believed, there was a treaty betwixt France and England, and most persons were persuaded, that the King had thereby engaged, not to commit any hostilities in the Low Countries, for a year; he therefore imagined this prepossession, would infallibly prevent all the happy effects which might be produced, by so lucky a conjuncture, unless

less some pains were taken to remove that prejudice; all the well affected however, suspended their belief, of his Majesty's having taken such measures, till they should see whether he would make any advantage of the present favourable opportunity.

The third, which must be esteemed of the highest importance to his Majesty, was, if things should be brought so far, as an alliance to be on the point of being concluded betwixt his Majesty and the States General, that he should make it in such a manner, as would justify the conduct of the well affected republicans, and preserve their credit; for this was the greatest advantage which could accrue to his Majesty, from an alliance with the Dutch; and that a conclusion of the alliance at the present juncture, being sufficient to justify them wholly, and to add to their authority, the Prince of Orange would find himself obliged to take other measures, and to follow maxims more advantageous to the State, and more conformable to the interest of France; but that such an effect could not be expected from the alliance, if it should be afterwards made by the concurrence of the Prince of Orange, when he should be perhaps forced to it, by the bad situation of affairs in England; or when he should understand that his authority was not incompatible with an alliance with France, nor such an alliance inconsistent with his views to England. That an alliance made in this manner, would be useless to France as well as the republic, because the Prince of Orange would still remain at the head of affairs, nor would he retain more favourable sentiments: and having then nothing to fear from the well affected republicans, he would continue to sink their credit, and would remove them from the management of affairs; and

and notwithstanding the alliance with France, he would certainly turn the States General into the interest of England, as soon as a proper opportunity should present itself.

The conclusion which those persons with whom I conferred, and especially the republican, drew from these considerations, was, that seeing every body was sensible of the just cause given his Majesty to be offended, and how favourable the conjuncture was, for him to pursue what measures he pleased; and the republican having himself been informed by one of the principal men of Amsterdam, the last journey he made there; that the deputies of this city would strongly support any complaint, which might be made with great justice against the expressions in regard to France, inserted in the memorial given Mr. Sidney; it seemed therefore highly expedient, that this juncture should be laid hold of, to prevent a memorial to the States General, setting forth how little their conduct answered those proofs of affection, his Majesty had given the States on all occasions, and though the States General pretended, they had given no orders to their deputies to write or say such things, or to their ambassadors to avow them; it was nevertheless a matter of too great importance, not to undeceive his Majesty, and give him all proper satisfaction. And since his Majesty, when he reflected upon the conduct the States had observed towards him, since the foregoing year, had great reason to doubt the sincerity of their intentions, he therefore desired to have the affair once more explained, and that he could not better judge of their intentions, than by a categorical answer of the States, given by the determination of the whole provinces, in regard to what they had entered upon the year before, concerning the alliance.

This republican did not however pretend it was necessary his Majesty should oblige himself to make very great menaces, but he was of opinion, that as all the advantage which could be derived from the present conjuncture depended on the apprehension which should prevail in Holland of his Majesty's resentment, it was therefore absolutely necessary to keep the States in this apprehension; and to remove that mistake of his Majesty's being engaged to the King of England, to attempt nothing in the Low Countries; that as to this, though his Majesty did nothing directly, it would be sufficient if no ground was left them to give credit to that report industriously raised, that all the preparations in France were only intended for some expedition into Germany, or Italy, and that the marching or encampment of a considerable number of troops in the Low Countries, would have a sufficient effect.

I added to this, that the present opportunity ought not to be neglected, lest the Prince of Orange might afterwards have no cause to fear the well affected republicans, and find no other obstacle to his ambitious views, but a small number of republicans without any support, whom he might very easily remove intirely from the government.

I thought it not sufficient to have employed the Arminian minister to form an union betwixt the deputies of Amsterdam, and those of Friezland and Groningen. I applied likewise to two or three of the principal persons of Friezland, and with so much success, that this province made the first advances, and proposed to the citizens of Amsterdam, that they should act in concert for the mutual interest of each other: but M. Valkenir being dead, there was not one person of Amsterdam,

sterdam, who would undertake to propose this affair.

M. Van Lewen about this time returned from England.

I received intelligence at this time, that the King of Sweden, either through jealousy of his Christian Majesty's greatness, or some other motive, offered to make an alliance with the States General. I sent notice of this to our court. I received instructions to come to an explanation upon this matter, with the Swedish envoy, and I spoke to him upon it, as an affair to which I seemed to give no credit. He told me I had the strongest reason to believe it intirely groundless; that he was persuaded, nothing could tend so much to the solid advantage of his royal master, as to cultivate the friendship of his Christian Majesty; that for this reason he should have been extremely uneasy, had he received orders, which he was obliged to conceal from me; but on the contrary he could assure me, it was not so, and that he had orders to live with me, on the most amicable footing; that he was willing I should never look upon him as a man of honour, if they had any thoughts in Sweden, of making a treaty with the States, or if he had ever spoke to any person whatever, to that purpose.

Although this declaration wae so strong, that one could hardly doubt its sincerity; yet I did not omit some days after, to inquire of one of the first men of the State, whether this minister had proposed an alliance, and I found that this very person to whom I applied, was one of three to whom he had actually made the proposal, which had been rejected.

I informed this famous republican, what his Majesty had ordered me to tell him; he received with great respect what regarded himself in par-

ticular, and was highly satisfied, as to what concerned the well affected republicans in general. He insisted nevertheless upon what he had already said: and when I endeavoured to shew him, that the measures he advised, would be so far from promoting our interest, that the Prince of Orange would turn them to his advantage; he replied, that nothing else could be expected from the States General, till this apprehension of his Majesty should be greater, since the Prince of Orange would lead them on in this manner, till a favourable opportunity should present, when he might draw them into the interest of England.

I thought proper to consider this matter fully, with some of the most able persons in the republic, and such as had been in the government of 1672; they declared to me the weakness of the present government; how the Prince of Orange every day, usurped more and more authority; the little hopes they had of being able to check him, without his Majesty's assistance: the advantage of the present juncture, which would perhaps never again occur; the little appearance there was, whatever step his Majesty should take, that the Parliament of England would come to an agreement with the King of Great Britain, or that the States would enter into engagements with this crown; the probability on the contrary, that before a year or two at most, the affairs of England would be settled; and whether the King of England or the Parliament gained the superiority; the Prince of Orange would make an alliance with this crown; and conclude the league he had hitherto not been able to accomplish, that all the advances made by him to the King of England, were wholly owing to the hopes he had conceived, if the King of Great Britain should come to a good understanding

ing with his Parliament, that it would then be no difficult matter, to unite the States General to England, and that the well affected republicans, who had openly opposed this the foregoing year, would never perhaps dare to do so again, or would in vain attempt it at such a juncture.

I told his Majesty by letter, that notwithstanding these observations had been made to me by persons of great understanding, yet I had not hitherto thought there was any necessity for communicating them to him, because they were almost the same in substance as I had before the honour of writing to him, from the famous republican; but that now I thought myself obliged to do it, because two of the most rich and considerable merchants in Holland, one of whom intirely governed his town, had visited me the foregoing evening, and talked to the same effect which tho' contrary to the intentions of his Majesty, yet the affair appeared to me of such importance, that I looked upon myself in duty bound to give an account thereof: They signified to me, if his Majesty was desirous to form a close connection betwixt France and the States General, and to have commerce carried on betwixt his subjects and the Dutch, that he had no other method to accomplish this, but by changing the present administration; for so long as the Prince of Orange continued to be the ruling person, he would incline the States to the interest of England; and even when he could not do this, he would at least prevent their entering into any measures with France; and when his Majesty should happen to be engaged in war, the Prince would always have it in his power to force the States into whatever measures he pleased. That tho' the bad situation of affairs in England should for a

while abate the Prince of Orange's expectations, the worst that could befall him would be, that he must remain in his present situation, till a more favourable juncture should re-establish his hopes in England, or a new war oblige the States General to take part therein, and place him at the head of their forces.

Thus, whatever conduct his Majesty should pursue, or whatever war he should be engaged in, the particular interest of the Prince of Orange would always lead him to bias the States against France; and such was the weakness of the States, that it could not be expected they should act with any degree of vigour; at a time too, when they could hardly feel the effects of his Majesty's protection, when he would be involved in so many wars: It was true indeed, that all honest persons who wished well to their country, declared, they would not suffer things to go on at the Prince of Orange's pleasure; but that after the proofs given of their want of resolution, they were by no means to be depended upon. That his Majesty therefore had no other quicker or more certain means, than to make the republic again feel the effects of having displeased him. That the undertaking, so far from being more difficult than in 1672, was on the contrary, more easy. That the Prince of Orange had indeed more experienced troops, but that the people and all the merchants were now more irritated against him, than they had been against the government in 1672. At that time they had been made to believe, their ministers had betrayed them to France, and that under a new government they should not pay above half the usual taxes; but they were now sensible they had been greatly imposed upon, since they were loaded with heavier burthens, even since

since the peace, than ever before. That more than a hundred thousand families, who payed all the expences of the State, and who had no share in the government, wished for a change; and that if his Majesty would only begin the march of his troops, they would refuse to furnish the necessary subsidies.

That these persons plainly discovered from the bad management of the public finances since the peace, that the Prince of Orange intended to impoverish them, that he might the more easily become their master; and since they must have one, they chose rather to have a mighty King who would protect them, than to be under a petty tyrant, who oppressed them.

That provided his Majesty would convince them, that his intentions were only to restore them to liberty, and allow them to enjoy it, he might put them in such a situation for the future, that they would never swerve from his interest; he might then dispose of their naval forces as he thought proper, and have his subjects admitted to a share of the commerce of the States.

I added, that they had given me to understand they did not speak this of themselves, as a thing they had framed of their own imagination; but they knew the truth thereof, from their correspondences in all the towns of Holland. They said it might be urged as an objection against what they had advanced, that in 1672, (when his Majesty had made such considerable progress) the States General did not even then enter into such conditions of peace as those they now proposed to me; but they remarked this great difference, that the persons who then entered upon the government were attached to the Prince of Orange, that is, for war, and against France.

That M. Croot told one of these merchants, with whom he was intimately acquainted, that when he went envoy to his Majesty, he dreaded the consequence of his negotiation; for he dared not take any step of importance, notwithstanding the full power with which he was invested; because he doubted whether he should have this authority a quarter of an hour after his departure from the Hague; and he knew not, but at the very time when he should enter into any engagement with his Majesty, the States General might have altered their sentiments. But at present things were quite different; for no sooner should his Majesty have entered into the Low Countries, than those in the government would be expelled; and such as should succeed in the administration, depending intirely on his Majesty's protection, would sue for peace upon what terms he pleased. That if he would undertake this affair, they promised to procure him such intelligence as was necessary, in order to inform him exactly what happened within the republic, that he might be thereby enabled to take proper measures, and that they would pursue such a conduct in all the towns as should be agreeable to his Majesty's intentions.

These gentlemen pushed the matter so far as to say, if his Majesty would not undertake this war, from an apprehension that England might again unite with the Dutch, they should then for ever be deprived of all hopes of succour, because this reason would always subsist; nay, it must one day be much stronger than at this juncture; since whatever effort England should now make, the peace might be concluded with his Majesty before this Crown could do any thing effectual; that all their allies were dissatisfied with them; and even those who should be willing to assist them, could not be

be able to do it in proper time. That all their forts were in a bad situation; for they had not one, excepting Maestricht, properly provided. That the State was destitute of money, and those who possessed riches being all republicans, refused to give a supply. That the resentment they had conceived against the whole party of the Prince of Orange, who had been the author of all their misfortunes, would certainly push them on to a general revolt. That this Prince did not in the least suspect any attack on the States, and therefore turned all his thoughts to secure the Spanish Netherlands; but that his Majesty could not reap such advantages by beginning the attack on that quarter, for the alarm thence arising, not being sufficient to raise a general revolt against the Prince of Orange, or to bring about a change in the administration, the Prince of Orange would still remain sovereign, and no doubt prevail upon the States General to succour the Low Countries; and in the course of such a war, he would have time to deliberate coolly, and would not be without means to establish his authority, since he would not be troubled with the management of this war, on the contrary, it would wholly redound to his glory: But that which they solicited his Majesty to enter upon against the States General would be just, useful, and glorious; that all Europe must easily perceive, it did not proceed from an ambition to make conquests, but from an honest indignation against a particular faction, and a desire to restore a whole people to liberty.

They said farther, that the treatment which the Provinces of Guelderland, Overijssel, and especially Utrecht, had received, not only gave his Majesty a right, but even (if one may say so) obliged him to act in their favour; for in the articles of

treaty, which his Majesty had concluded with this province, he had promised to support them in all the rights they enjoyed before the war, and that their government and all other things should remain in the same situation. Nevertheless Pensionary Fagel, as commissary of the Prince of Orange, in virtue of the commission obtained from the States General, had turned out all the magistrates, under different pretences, as if the States General were absolute masters of all the particular Provinces; and tho' these alterations had been only demanded for a time, the Prince of Orange continued in his usurpation, treating this province and the other two almost as conquered countries.

I informed the King, that besides all the particular reasons I had advanced to these two men, the recital of which would be useless, I had replied in general, that I was assured of his Majesty's good intentions to the republic, and the well affected republicans; but that in all the instructions I had the honour to have received, I could find nothing but what convinced me, that his Majesty was far from being disposed to assist them by such means; and that I apprehended he would be displeased, if I should even mention to him such proposals; upon which they made answer, that they thought themselves obliged to make such overtures, because they saw no other remedy for their misfortunes; and without such measures were taken, in a few years the Prince of Orange would be absolute master of their liberty, and then they would be unable to second the designs of France, as they could at present.

Altho' the memorial had proved so unsuccessful, the Prince of Orange still continued to form new schemes against the Duke of York; he came to

a resolution with his party, to have it proposed to the King of England, that in case he died before the Duke of York, the Duke should be only titular King, and reside in the dominions of the Duke of Hanover; and his sons in law, the Prince of Orange and Duke of Hanover, be declared regents of the kingdom. My Lord Shaftsbury, who penetrated into the affair, said in a letter, that this scheme seemed to be much of a piece with the memorial, and would have the same fate.

I received information of this secret transaction; and I came likewise at the knowledge of another, which in the end might have proved very advantageous; that the Prince of Orange obliged my Lord Sunderland to make an appearance of deserting his interest, and to endeavour to get into an intimacy with the Duchess of Portsmouth, and by her means to work himself into the good graces of his master.

About this time the King having got possession of the county of Chiny, made great commotions in the States General.

As I took care to be punctually informed, not only of all the steps the Prince of Orange took against the King's interest, but also of his conversation, and the reasons he advanced to the States General to engage them against France, that his Majesty being apprized thereof, might be more enabled to give proper orders. I discovered that the Prince of Orange had then a design, which he intended to put immediately in execution, in case the States General should come to a rupture with his Majesty, viz: to prohibit the importation of corn, wine, salt, or any commodity from France: He imagined France would be thereby greatly distressed, and rendered unable to carry on a war of any continuance.

I informed our court also, that two of the principal persons in the State had acquainted me, that the injuries supposed to be done in France to the pretended reformed religion, was the chief thing which the Prince of Orange's party made a handle of to their advantage. I desired memorials might be sent to represent the fact in its true light, in order to destroy the many falsities advanced; this affair was pushed so far, that I wrote on the 24th of July 1681, I had been informed since the last express, that the edict of June 17th, in regard to the reformed religion, which was translated and printed in Flanders, had produced great alterations, especially in the province of Friesland; insomuch that M. de Haren, who had always been in the interest of France, and an avowed enemy to the Prince of Orange, declared in an assembly of the States General, that as they designed in France to extirpate their religion, he must now break with the French ministry, and think seriously of following different measures; in a private conference he afterwards signified to the deputies of Friesland and Groningen, that notwithstanding it was contrary to their interest to come under the subjection of England, and submit to the Prince of Orange, yet, as they seemed in France resolved to destroy the protestant religion, it would be better in the end to unite themselves with England; and he undertook in three weeks to bring the province of Friesland into this resolution, since it was absolutely necessary.

I received intelligence of this discourse and desertion of M. de Haren, from two deputies of Friesland and Groningen. This obliged me to wait upon him at his house. I brought into our discourse the topic of religion, and particularly
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what had been done in France relating thereto ; but notwithstanding all I said to convince him, that his Majesty had not acted contrary to the edict of Nantes ; and tho' I considered the thing in many different lights, in order to make him speak, yet I could get nothing else from him, than that the King was master of his own kingdom, and might do there what he pleased.

The well affected republicans, who are mostly Arminians, and indifferent about the interest of the pretended reformed religion, informed me, that the Prince of Orange's tools made an excellent handle of all that was said by the French Hugonots who had fled from France ; and that the provinces of Friezland and Groningen, who had always espoused the French party against the Prince of Orange, appeared so irritated by this affair, that Pensionary Fagel had conceived great hopes of success in the alliance with England, as soon as a proper opportunity offered for bringing it on the carpet.

The effect which this affair produced upon all the towns, and especially Amsterdam, appeared in a high degree ; mournful ballads were made upon the occasion, and sung in the streets. The resentment of the leading persons in the State was at first no less violent also.

When I signified to the States General, that the King, being unwilling to storm a little castle in the county of Chiny, containing about twenty men, had only commanded M. de Monbrun to declare to the Prince of Parma, if he did not immediately send orders to the commanding officers in the county of Chiny and its dependencies, to evacuate that country, and leave the free possession to his Majesty's troops, he would instantly order his forces to enter Flanders, and remain there at

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the expence of his Catholic Majesty's subjects, till the Duke of Parma should satisfy the King of France. M. de Haren spoke with great warmth upon this occasion, in the States General, and repeated all he had before mentioned in regard to religion. The States General almost unanimously acquiesced with his opinion, for they were extremely displeased about the affairs of religion, and not a little piqued at the declaration against the Duke of Parma. But what added still more to their uneasiness was, that some demands were made on the duchy of Limburg, and the county of Namur, by virtue of a new edict from the chamber of Metz, altho' it had been declared that the county of Chiny was the last article which should be insisted upon by virtue of any edicts from this chamber; so that now they feared there would be no end of such demands.

The Prince of Orange and Pensionary Fagel, who had not yet endeavoured to avail themselves of the complaints of the Spaniards, to induce the States General to come into their measures, (having indeed no prospect of success) now conceived great hopes, especially as the provinces of Friesland and Groningen had broke off from the interest of France; and they began to declare publicly, that nothing but war would be expected, and measures ought to be taken accordingly.

The Danish envoy at the same time told me, that M. Van Lewen had taken notice to him of the treatment which the Hugonots had received in France, saying, that they were not such an inconsiderable body, their numbers amounting to 1600000 souls, according to their printed memorials. He informed me likewise, that this gentleman greatly exaggerated the King's pretensions on the Spaniards; and said, it now remained no longer a doubt, that France wanted to break
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the peace, and since this was the case, that a treaty of guaranty ought to be instantly made with all the Princes willing to enter into such an alliance. Altho' this was the discourse of one who had been for some time attached to the Prince of Orange, yet it surprized me, because Van Lewen was in his heart a well disposed republican, and a man of good understanding; and therefore, surely he did not want by war to throw the republic into the hands of the Prince of Orange.

There was not even the famous republican so attached to France, who knew so well the domestic government in this republic, who took no particular interest in the affairs of the Hugonots of France, he being, as I remarked to the King, an Arminian, of a party quite opposite to the protestants. There was not even he, I say, but was disturbed at this juncture. He came post to the Hague to inform me, that the States General were fully persuaded we wanted to extirpate the protestant religion in France; and this notion was so deeply riveted in the minds of the people, that those who were concerned in the government, or who stood well affected to his Christian Majesty, would be in great danger, if they should but mention an alliance with France; in short, if they made such an union, it would be contrary to the inclinations of their allies, and must weaken the protestant party; and they would thereby render it more easy for his Majesty to extend the popish religion, as far as he carried the terror of his arms.

This man added likewise, that he could give no satisfactory answer to such persons as, excepting the article of religion, were otherwise well affected, when they maintained that the King acting at this juncture out of a principle of conscience,

science, there was little probability his zeal for the catholic religion would abate, when he should have it in his power to extend it without his kingdom, as well as within his realms.

He signified, at the same time, that the publication of these edicts gave him so much the more uneasiness, because the States were less disposed than ever to enter into the interest of the Spaniards, as might be perceived from their last resolutions, even since his Majesty's troops had entered the Duchy of Luxemburg; that if this affair could be any how softened, nothing would tend more to overturn the designs of the Prince of Orange, who endeavoured to take advantage of the present juncture; otherwise, he foresaw that he and all the well affected republicans would be exposed to the resentment of the Prince of Orange, who would in the end manage the States General according to his own pleasure.

This day the Prince of Orange embarked for England; the night before he gave notice thereof to the States General and the States of Holland, signifying to them, that the King of Great Britain desired to talk to him upon affairs of the utmost consequence; and that he hoped he should be able to take measures with his Britannic Majesty in order to form more close alliances. And what must appear extraordinary is, that this voyage was undertaken at the intercession of M. Sidney, tho' recalled from his employ; and the King of England did not himself dispatch a courier upon this affair, but left it wholly to the management of Sidney. I then informed our court, that the Prince of Orange had no other method to succeed in his design, but by means of my Lord Sunderland, who was restored to favour at court.

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M. Van Lewen came to see me the same day; he did not chuse to speak to me in the style he had used to the Danish envoy: But with great caution and reserve he signified to me the uneasiness of the States General, and hinted at the means of freeing them from it, which I had already so often repeated. After having mentioned the Prince of Orange's voyage, and the letter he had seen from the King of Great Britain, entreating him to come to England to talk upon some particular affairs; he turned the conversation upon Chiny, and the disposition of the States; he affirmed they never more sincerely desired to be on good terms with his Majesty; but that they were extremely apprehensive if he should set up new claims in Spain, he would at length be sovereign of all the Spanish Netherlands; and this was their only apprehension; however he assured me, if they knew the extent of his Majesty's pretensions on the Spaniards, they would then remain easy, and give themselves no trouble about all the complaints of the Spaniards. I told him the conferences at Courtray were held on purpose to settle these matters; this he replied was true, but as these pretensions were only explained one after another; it followed, that the States, not knowing what new pretensions might be formed, were therefore more apt to take the alarm; and he repeated to me again, that if they saw his Majesty did not intend to destroy intirely the Spanish Netherlands, and consequently the Barrier of the States, they would not make the least stir, notwithstanding all the King of Spain's complaints.

I did all in my power to encrease the apprehension of the States General, upon the Prince of Orange's voyage. All those who were not particularly attached to this Prince, saw the consequences

quences thereof; but they could do nothing of themselves alone; and as this voyage was undertaken at a time, when the spirits of the whole people were inflamed about the affairs of religion, and the new demands of the chamber of Metz was made, those of the deputies of Friezland and Groningen, who remained well affected, told me they were much afraid, if the Prince of Orange endeavoured to bring about an alliance with the King of England, they should not be able to hinder it, because of the general dissatisfaction amongst the people.

I thought it incumbent on me to apply again to the republican, to see if he could devise any measures proper to be taken; but he had no hopes from the well affected at this juncture; and he sent me word, that the inclinations of the people were quite altered since the edict of June 14. He confirmed what a deputy of Friezland had said to me a month before, that the province of Holland had then resolved to engage themselves in no shape, nor to take any steps in consequence of the complaints of the Spaniards, but to refer the determination thereof to the conferences at Courtray. He gave me to know likewise, that the city of Amsterdam was at that time determined not to make an alliance with England, upon any consideration whatever; but that he believed, if the Prince of Orange at his return should propose an alliance with that kingdom, they would be so far from opposing it, that not one person would dare to speak against it, for fear of being torn to pieces by the people; that there were about seven or eight, perhaps, who had not changed their sentiments, and who knew well that the republic was ruined, if this alliance took place; but not one durst open upon that subject,

subject, since it would be only sacrificing himself to the Prince of Orange's resentment, to no manner of purpose. He desired me to acquaint him whether it was true, that the children, who should renounce the pretended reformed religion at seven years of age, and resume it at ten or twelve, were to be executed as apostates, because he was so informed; and whether there was not some declaration to set forth the contrary.

As the Prince of Orange was always watchful to improve every opportunity, to kindle a war against France, he took care to form a design, before his departure, of making a religious war; and he gave orders to Pensionary Fagel, to lay the foundations thereof during his absence. He was persuaded that all other means having failed, he had now found an infallible method to engage the United Provinces. I was soon informed of this, and sent intelligence thereof to our court, August 14, 1681. It happened at this time, that the Parliament of England ardently wished for war upon another account. They wrote their friends in Holland, that they wished for nothing more, than to see the King of England engaged in war; for if he was once embarked in such an undertaking, they would not consent to furnish him with money, till he should submit to their conditions.

The Prince of Orange having returned from England, August 22d, told the States General, that the King of Great Britain had sent for him to consult measures about the late usurpations of his Christian Majesty in the Netherlands. He assured the States of the friendship of his Britannic Majesty, and that there was no collusion, nor secret understanding betwixt the Kings of France and England; that his Britannic Majesty was not

not a little uneasy at the progress of France in the Low Countries; but that the remedies he intended for this mischief were slow in operation, because of the divisions betwixt him and his Parliament. That nevertheless, the King of England had told him, all his endeavours proved ineffectual with his Christian Majesty, and France still continued to make re-unions, in that case he would declare against them, all the English nation being for war; that however he entreated the States to order their ambassador in France to join with his in making strong remonstrances to his Majesty. The Prince of Orange added of himself, that it was easy to be perceived, from the manner in which the King treated those of the reformed religion, how little regard he had for such as professed this religion, and consequently for the States General.

I was at this time likewise informed by one of the well affected republicans, that the disposition which formerly prevailed amongst the Dutch, to oppose the Prince of Orange's designs, no longer subsisted; and that if the Prince of Orange had taken measures for an alliance with England, he might at his return have disposed the States General for whatever he pleased. This man allowed that the King of England was highly displeased with the particular conduct of the Prince of Orange; but as he was of opinion his Britannic Majesty and the Prince of Orange were equally interested to bring about a more close alliance betwixt England, the States General, and the Protestant Powers; he said they would therefore act in concert to attain that end. And, indeed, I at this time informed our court, that the Prince of Orange was not upon such bad terms with the King of England, as had been reported; that they had both

both the same views in regard to the overgrown power of the King, and differed only in the measures they intended to pursue, in order to oppose it.

I received intelligence the same day, August 22, by a very sure and secret channel, that the deputies in secret affairs had had a private conference with the Swedish envoy, in regard to a treaty of guaranty. I took all possible care to be informed of the truth of this piece of intelligence, and to discover the event of this affair.

I was fully satisfied, the 7th of November, being informed that the Prince of Orange, when in England, had wrote to Pensionary Fagel, that he had found the King of England very well disposed, but he durst not yet declare himself openly; and he gave it as his opinion, that the alliance with Sweden, which had been before rejected, should now be taken under consideration. That Pensionary Fagel, after a conference with the Swedish envoy, had privately spoke to some of the deputies of the towns of Holland, and represented to them, that Sweden offered to make an alliance with the States; that the Princes of Brunswic strongly solicited the same thing; and that even the King of England would make a proposal to the same effect, if he thought the States would accept thereof; so that it was in their own power to hinder the King of France from making himself master of the Spanish Netherlands, and they had surely no room to doubt the little affection he had for the protestant religion. The Prince of Orange had privately the same discourse with many persons in the State; but in public he declared, great care ought to be taken not to do any thing which might displease the King of France; that they ought rather to contrive expedients to avoid the war;

war; and he proposed one which he said could not offend his Majesty, nor could any town refuse going into it; that was, to propose to all the Princes in Europe, and consequently to the King of France, to enter into an association to guaranty the treaties of Westphalia and Nimeguen, with these two principal clauses inserted, that if any of the Princes who entered into this treaty, should undertake any thing in violation of these treaties, he should be obliged to submit to the determination of the other confederate Princes; and in case he refused this, that the Allied Powers should unite their forces to reduce him to compliance: This clause was likewise to take effect against those who, tho' not entered into the confederacy, should disturb the peace of Christendom, and refuse to submit to the judgment of the Confederates.

'Tis easy to perceive, that the Prince of Orange imagined if the King entered into this treaty of association, he would thereby form a sort of engagement with the confederates; and if he should refuse, he would then give some cause to all the powers in Christendom, especially the States General, to believe, that he had designs which tended to disturb the peace of Europe.

This proposal was at first rejected by the deputies of Amsterdam, who said they could not enter into any treaty, after the declaration made two years before to the King, that the States General would not form any new alliance with any Prince whatever; but Pensionary Fagel having demonstrated to them that this affair was quite different; that he did not propose an alliance, nor even a treaty of guaranty, but only a treaty which the King of France might enter into as well as the rest of the Christian Powers, and therefore he could not conceive, his Majesty could complain in any manner;

manner; and having upon this laid before them what had been transacted in France, in regard to religion, they went into his proposal.

Pensionary Fagel having in this manner obtained the consent of the deputies of Amsterdam, sent the proposal to all the towns; and before it was examined before any of the private councils, solemn oaths were exacted of all the members, not to reveal any particulars relating to matters which should come under their deliberations; so that this affair was kept very secret. I was, however, informed thereof the day after the towns had given their consent, when the deputies, who were to be at the Hague within two days, had power given them to consent to the resolution which should be formed thereupon. Thus what I had wrote to our court three weeks before, proved now but too true. I sent letters likewise this same day, because the well affected republicans again declared to me upon this occasion, if the Prince of Orange should attempt any thing at such a juncture, the spirits of the people were so inflamed, that not one of the well affected would dare to oppose it, since a person would only thereby make a useless sacrifice of himself to the resentment of the Prince of Orange, and the rage of the people.

The Prince of Orange and Pensionary Fagel sent at the same time into Friezland and Groningen, to procure their consent to the treaties. The Prince of Orange ventured to take this step, from the discourse he had heard of M. de Haren and some other ruling men in Friezland, how much the principal persons in Friezland and Groningen had altered their sentiments, upon the account of religion. As for my part, I had now no hopes from these Provinces, and I informed our court, September 18, they were not in the least to depend

pend on them. I at the same time told them the reason of this change, imputing it wholly to that uneasiness they had expressed, in regard to the affairs of religion,

But tho' I expected nothing from these provinces, yet I did not omit sending persons of influence to speak to them; I took care likewise to represent to the deputies of Amsterdam, and some other towns, that the engagement they had been lately drawn into, was certainly against the interest of his Majesty, and consequently against their own advantage.

I thought it incumbent on me once more to speak to the Swedish envoy, in regard to the league he made with the States General. He made false oaths and protestations, according to his usual way; but I knew too much to give credit to his asseverations; for I had been informed of all the particulars of his negotiation. I had discovered that it was the King of Sweden, who pressed the States General to invite all the Princes in Europe to enter into a treaty of confederacy, for the preservation of peace, and the maintenance of the treaties of Westphalia and Nimeguen. 'Tis true, indeed, this envoy had taken such precautions, and Pensionary Fagel had kept the affair so secret, that the magistrates of Amsterdam and a few particular persons only, knew the King of Sweden was so deeply concerned; the rest only knew in general, that some King first proposed such a treaty.

As it seemed highly necessary, the King should be minutely informed of the dishonourable conduct of the envoy of a Prince, from whom he had reason to expect a different behaviour; I repeated in my letter of September 25, all I could discover, which it may be unnecessary here to insert. I

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mentioned also in this letter, that the treaty of confederacy having been resolved in Holland with great secrecy, they had desired the other six provinces to name each three deputies, with power to determine an affair which nearly concerned the welfare of all the provinces, and ought to be managed with the utmost secrecy. That the deputies named by Guelderland, Zealand, Friezland, and Utrecht, had consented; those of Friezland not only acquiesced therein, but strongly pressed the conclusion; that the town of Groningen had indeed warmly opposed it, but it was expected the Omelandes would come into the opinion of the other provinces; and that within two days the affair would, by some means or other, be concluded in the States General. I sent intelligence also, that I had been informed the house of Lunenburg had promised to enter into the treaty, and it was not doubted, but the King of England would become a party thereof, and there was great hopes of the Elector of Saxony also; but they were however extremely solicitous to palliate the affair in such a manner, that the treaty might give no umbrage to his Majesty: That the States General had no intention, nor indeed were they in a condition to declare war; but that the Prince of Orange had assured them the King of England had no design of coming to a rupture; and M. Dikfeld had persuaded them, he was sufficiently acquainted with the intentions of his Majesty to assure them, that all his threats were only intended to intimidate them; and if they would boldly conclude the treaty of alliance, the King would then change his style, nor would he venture to push his pretensions with so much vigour. But if it should unluckily happen, that his Majesty should declare war against them, the war could not do them any great damage,

when such a league was concluded. That Van Buning gave out every where, if things remained in their present situation, and the powers in Europe took no proper precautions, they might expect the war to be renewed in the spring; but on the contrary, if after the strongest expressions of regard to his Majesty, they should agree to form an alliance for the preservation of peace in Christendom, they might be assured his Majesty after such a confederacy, would not embark in a war, and they would thereby enjoy perfect tranquillity for a series of years. He had so far confounded the magistrates of Amsterdam with his arguments, that he intirely convinced them of two things, viz. that it was impossible his Majesty could really be offended at the treaties of confederacy; and, that the conclusion of these treaties was the only means to preserve the peace.

There is one circumstance in the management of this affair which appears somewhat extraordinary that during six months, that is, from the 13th of March when the first overture was made by the Swedish envoy, to the 28th of September when it was concluded, Sweden always disavowed having any intention to make an alliance with the States General. Oxenstern, the prime minister of Sweden, gave the strongest assurances in this respect to M. Feuquieres: and Bielke, embassador from this court at France, spoke upon the same affair to the King in so positive a manner, and with such an appearance of sincerity, that our court would hardly give credit to what I wrote.

Mean while I procured a copy of the treaty, which I dispatched to the King, September 28, before the provinces of Friezland and Groningen, had given their consent. His Majesty received it on the very day the Swedish embassador had made
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new protestations, of the sincere intentions of his master, to remain intirely attached to his Majesty's interest so that he was not a little surprized upon seeing my letter: but we must in justice to this gentleman declare, that the Swedish envoy at the Hague deceived him, which he never forgave.

I found means, by the interest of the first deputy of Groningen whom I had intirely at my disposal, to hinder this province from agreeing to the treaty of confederacy; for he strongly opposed the conclusion of this treaty in the name of his province; and Friezland, which had voluntarily consented to it, was now against its being signed, till Groningen should acquiesce therein.

Thus the treaty of confederacy was by his means, in a manner obstructed. The envoy of Sweden, and those of the allies complained loudly: this obliged me to wait upon some of the magistrates of the towns in Holland, and amongst the rest those of Amsterdam. I represented to them all his Majesty had done since the peace, to convince Europe of his desire to maintain the public tranquillity the particular regard he had expressed for the States General, and the strict fidelity with which he had kept his word, as not even to demand the possession of what belonged to him, within the barrier, but contenting himself with an equivalent in some other country, that he might create no jealousy. I gave them likewise to understand, that after such extraordinary instances of his Majesty's regard to them, if he saw they were not contented, but sought their safety by alliances with other Princes he would then take the necessary precautions against their malevolence, and against the new engagements they should enter into, in prejudice of his crown; that I looked upon myself, as obliged to remonstrate to them in

this manner, to prevent if possible, such inconveniences as might follow.

These gentlemen were somewhat moved by what I said, insomuch, that so far from pressing the provinces of Friezland and Groningen to sign the treaty of alliance, they complained of being deceived, and represented to the Prince of Orange, that this treaty was of more consequence than it at first appeared; and as I had declared the King would be greatly displeased, they intreated it might be again brought under consideration; but he replied, that the resolution being already taken, it could not be again resumed.

As the taking of Strasburg had greatly contributed to give strength to my remonstrances, and had given the Dutch a nearer prospect of the danger, into which they precipitated themselves the well affected amongst them, still assured me, there never was a finer opportunity, if properly used; that the States General would rather chuse to accept of reasonable conditions from his Majesty, than be obliged to support a war against him. They told me however, that notwithstanding the People in Holland had such an aversion to war, the Prince of Orange would certainly force them into such measures, unless his Majesty took the proper steps to prevent it, before the Prince of Orange could bring things to such a situation as he desired.

They assured me likewise, that M. Paets being perfectly acquainted with all the steps taken by the Prince of Orange to destroy their liberty, and subvert the fundamental laws of the republic, had offered to draw up a manifesto, as soon as the King should enter upon action; and that he who did not agree with them the last Spring, in regard to the measures they intended to pursue to bring about

about an inseparable union betwixt the States General and his Majesty, was now of opinion, that the means to be used would have the desired effect; that as he perceived many well meaning people, began to open their eyes, since the taking of Strasburg had given them some apprehension of a neighbouring war with France; he therefore wished such an opportunity might not be neglected, of applying to all the principal members of the republic; and that he thought it necessary, still to encrease their apprehension of war, because nothing could more assist those persons who did not yet despair of being able to oppose the designs of the Prince of Orange, than to make use of the present juncture; that for this purpose however, he thought nothing ought to be done, which might reduce the people of Holland to despair, or drive them to extremity, as it would do, if France turned her arms against them, and gave them room to believe she desired to reduce them under her subjection, but when his Majesty was about to make use of such powerful means, as seemed necessary, that he should then publickly declare, he desired nothing but to re-establish the proper government and liberty of the republic.

The Prince of Orange at this time sent over Van Buning to England, as envoy extraordinary from the States General, looking upon this man as the most proper he knew, to engage the States General, in the interest of the King of Great Britain.

As I saw the effect of what I had said in regard to the treaty of confederacy upon the minds of several persons in the government, I should have wished to have continued to speak to them in the same manner: but the King having given me to understand, that I had already sufficiently apprized

the States General, in what manner he should consider this new engagement, and that it was not necessary to make any more formal declaration, since it might tend more to precipitate them into some violent resolution, than to keep them in proper measures with his Majesty; I therefore stopped, and made answer to the King, that I would make no more application to the States General, to prevent the conclusion of the treaty of confederacy, till I should receive other instructions from his Majesty; that nevertheless I was persuaded he must have seen by my last dispatches, the good effects of what I had said upon this subject, which being strengthened by the reduction of Straßburg, had produced such an alteration in many persons of the province of Holland, that there was room to expect a total change in favour of his Majesty, if they still remained persuaded, that he would shew his resentment to the States General, if they should conclude the treaty of confederacy; that the Prince of Orange and Pensionary Fagel being sensible of this truth, had prevented the deputies in secret affairs from relating to the States General, and consequently to the Provinces, the conferences I had with them upon this subject; and tho' I had given these deputies a memorial relating to all I had said, agreeable to the custom sometimes practised by other ministers, nevertheless they entreated me to deliver them in writing all I had said upon this affair; that I had answered, if the States were desirous to conform themselves to the sentiments of his Majesty, they knew enough already for that purpose; but if they had resolved to act contrary thereto, it was unnecessary to give them memorials, or to put in writing what I had sufficiently explained.

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That the Prince of Orange and Pensionary Fagel took advantage from there being no public declaration of his Majesty in regard to this affair, saying, that I would have explained myself more publickly, if I had spoke by the command of his Majesty; and that it was easy to perceive from thence, that I had of myself made all these remonstrances; and they were surpris'd some persons should have been so much staggered by what I advanced; for they were positive his Majesty would have quite different sentiments, when he should be fully informed of the nature of the treaty they were about to conclude.

That all the well affected republicans were convinced if the King, amidst his other grand designs, would bestow a little thought on their republic, and make a proper use of the consternation they were thrown into by the departure of Van Buning for England, their uncertainty of the King's sentiments in regard to the treaty of confederacy, the reduction of Strasburg, and the possession of Casel; he might engage the States General to his interest in such a manner, that they could never again disengage themselves, and their naval forces be always at his Majesty's service.

I had a long conference upon this affair, October 28, with one of the old burgo-masters of 1672. This man had enjoyed his ease, and lived a philosophic life in the country, nor ever troubled himself with public affairs, since his expulsion from the government; and I could perceive no motive of his coming to talk with me, but a desire of becoming again an actor in public affairs. He told me that M. Paets, since his last interview, had conversed with several of his intimate friends in Amsterdam, and some other towns; and that he had found them all equally persuaded, that the

Prince of Orange thought only of rendering himself their absolute master, by means of the war in which he wanted to engage them; but if his Majesty would assist them, they could take such measures as would put the republic upon the footing he wished; that for this purpose (as others had mentioned) if the people in Holland were persuaded his Majesty did not take up arms to subdue them, he was convinced, if the King took care to keep up their apprehensions of his resentment, in case they pursued the measures they had taken, and if he thought proper, when his troops should have entered Alost, and taken possession of the town of Liege, as it was intended according to report, if his Majesty should then demand the States General to explain themselves, and at the same time desire their alliance, and insist upon pledges of their fidelity, they maintained, that by these means they could give his Majesty such strong sureties of the attachment of the States General to his interest, that it would be impossible for them to act repugnant thereto.

It would be too tedious to insert all the particulars this man mentioned, and all the replies he made to the following questions I put to him: Whether he thought, when his Majesty should march his troops into Alost and into Liege also (as he supposed was to be done) this would be sufficient to make the States explain themselves? or, if he meant that his Majesty should make still farther advances, to compleat the terror of the Dutch? If he was not apprehensive the Prince of Orange would turn this proceeding to his advantage, to induce the other Princes to enter into an alliance with the States General, since they might be interested to prevent the United Provinces from becoming dependent upon his Majesty? If the States
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General might not always have the same uneasiness in regard to the security of the barrier, even after such an alliance? and lastly, What were those sureties he pretended his Majesty might have?

I shall only mention, that this man was persuaded, the Prince of Orange could not bring the other Princes into the interest of the States General, because in less than a fortnight the face of affairs would be intirely changed in Holland, and the well affected taking courage thereupon, the authority of the Prince of Orange would be destroyed.

As to the barrier, M. Paets and his friends were convinced, this would be a perpetual subject of jealousy and uneasiness, which the Prince of Orange would always turn to his advantage: That it would be better for the States to live in peace as neighbours to his Majesty, without diffidence or alarms; to render their commerce more flourishing, and to enjoy their liberty, than to ruin themselves by keeping up troops which were useless, and might serve the Prince of Orange to subdue them, under a pretext of keeping the State in a condition to defend this barrier against France; that he had convinced them, their true and solid barrier was in the King's friendship, for, that his Majesty had in six weeks penetrated to the gates of Amsterdam, when the Spaniards and they were in possession of thirty more garrisons than at present.

As to the sureties they pretended to give his Majesty of their fidelity, they meant to give up the frontier towns into his possession; and he said; if affairs turned out as might be expected, supposing his Majesty took the proper measures, M. Paets would then in all probability be sent to France by the States General, and he would certainly act agreeably to what he had declared to

me; for he had no other way to deliver himself from the oppression of the Prince of Orange. And as this man, in the name of the well affected, intreated me to lay all these particulars before the King, I asked him, what assurances he could give me of success in so great an enterprize? He replied, that M. Paets and two or three others of his friends having spoke about the present state of affairs, to those in whom they could confide, they had found them disposed in such a manner, as made them hope for success in their design; but that M. Paets did not think proper to explain himself more openly to several persons in Amsterdam, till he knew his Majesty's intentions; for if he chose not to pursue such measures, Paets would only ruin himself if he went any farther; but as soon as he knew his Majesty resolved to act in the manner proposed, he would then employ all his interest to make matters succeed according to his wishes. He repeated, in the strongest terms, that if this opportunity was neglected, such would never again occur; that six weeks would be sufficient to execute this project, and to finish it intirely; that after this, the King needed not to give himself any trouble about England, since the States General would then assist his Majesty with their fleets, to support their common interest against that Kingdom; on the contrary, if things were allowed to remain in the situation they were at present in Holland, the Prince of Orange, sooner or later, would unite the States General with England, and thereby induce many of the European Powers to come into the alliance.

As for my part, I took the liberty to write to the King, that tho' I could not take upon me to say how far the terror of his arms might work upon the people of Holland, yet I could assure him,

him, it would be a certain and powerful motive, to make the States General change their conduct; for I had found by experience what an effect my only telling them of his Majesty's being displeased at the treaty of alliance had produced; and this being followed immediately by the news of the reduction of Strasburg, they were seized with such a panic, that the actions not only fell 10 per cent. but many persons in Amsterdam sold off their government securities: his Majesty might from thence judge what was to be expected, when they should see he was in earnest, not thro' a design to conquer them, but to make them observe a more equitable conduct in respect to his Majesty, who would always be ready to receive them into his friendship, as soon as they should alter their measures.

The King made answer, that such steps as I proposed, would in all appearance produce effects more favourable to the designs of the Prince of Orange, than to those which the well affected had formed to recover their liberty; he ordered me however to present a memorial to the States General, which was sent me drawn up in proper terms, to hinder the treaty of confederacy. The purport of this memorial was, that his Majesty chose thereby to inform the States General, that the means used to engage them insensibly, under pretext of preserving the last treaties, to support the deceitful interpretations which were artfully wrested, in prejudice of his Majesty's rights, would certainly involve them in a new war, which, perhaps, would prove more destructive than the foregoing.

That his Majesty doubted not but they would avoid this misfortune, by the resolutions they should take, and he would be glad to be informed thereof as soon as possible, that he might know he ought to consider them as friends for the future; or, if

notwithstanding the friendship he had always shewn them, he must now shew a just resentment against a State, ready to imbrace every party opposite to his interest.

'Tis likely, if this memorial had been presented before Pensionary Fagel had got the affair determined in the States General by the deputies of the five provinces, it would have prevented the conclusion, since it retarded the final completion above a month.

I was informed, October 30, by a burgo-master of Amsterdam, that the principal expedient on which the Prince of Orange and the King of England depended, was a scheme they had formed of cutting out work for the King within his own dominions, by means of the Hugonots, who were reported to be cruelly used.

I wrote to our court, November 17, that the Prince of Orange had at that time suspended the motion he intended to make, for augmenting the forces twenty men each company; and that in all probability he deferred this proposal, till the province of Holland should consent to the ratification of the treaty of Amsterdam.

That M. D'Odick had publicly declared at the Spanish envoy's, that the King of England had received positive assurances the King would not carry his arms into Flanders, and that his Britannic Majesty had sent for Don Ronquillo to declare this to him; that this report was propagated by the Prince of Orange's agents, as a thing advantageous to their interest; and his Majesty might judge from thence, that the Prince of Orange believed there was not a surer way to accomplish his designs, than by removing the apprehension the people of Holland lay under of a war.

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The Swedish envoy importuned the Prince of Orange and Pensionary Fagel, to exchange ratifications of the treaty of alliance, the time appointed for that purpose being now elapsed. Pensionary Fagel used his utmost efforts to obtain the consent of the States General; but I had engaged the Omelandes to join with the town of Groningen, so that I had now the Voice of the whole province to oppose it; and as I had likewise found means to have it determined in Friezland, that their deputy should conform to that of Groningen; the Prince of Orange found now two provinces against the exchange of ratifications. Pensionary Fagel carried them to the States General four times in one week, but all his labours proved ineffectual.

On the 25th of December, he undertook to have the affair concluded by the voices of the five provinces, a thing directly contrary to the fundamental laws of the republic. This made a great noise, but it soon subsided; the well affected, who might have taken great advantage from such a proceeding, not daring to act because they were not supported from abroad, and the apprehension of his Majesty's arms no longer subsisted.

The Prince of Orange had no sooner procured an exchange of ratifications for the treaty of alliance, than he made a proposal in the council of State, to augment the cavalry twenty two in each troop, and sixteen additional men to each company of infantry. On the 1st of January, 1682, the council of State presented a petition for this purpose to the province of Holland, who consented thereto after a slight opposition. This augmentation amounted to 12000 men, but it was only for six months.

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The whole of this proceeding gives us an insight into the temper and genius of the Prince of Orange, who acted always upon the same principles. He persuaded the States General, that the measures he advised them to pursue tended to preserve peace; and as soon as such were taken, he took care to have it represented as absolutely necessary to arm themselves to support what they had done. The majority were drawn into such measures, not knowing what they did, and those who had sufficient sagacity to discover his artifices, and courage enough to oppose them, durst not undertake any thing, not being backed from abroad, as I have already observed: On the contrary, the affairs of religion had put them out of a condition of being able to declare their sentiments.

Besides, every thing from England not a little assisted the Prince of Orange in bringing the States General to pursue these false steps. On the 25th of December, 1681, his Britannic Majesty sent to the Hague the copy of a memorial which he desired might be presented to the King in regard to the pretensions of *****; and he intreated the States General to order their ambassador to join his endeavours to those of his envoy, that they might mutually support this memorial, which was couched in the strongest terms.

Moreover, Van Buning wrote letters which produced very bad effects. I sent the King a copy of one, the 8th of January, 1682. In this he told the States General, that the King of England had signified to M. de Barillon, that he could not press the Spaniards to give an equivalent for Alost, not being convinced of the equity of his Majesty's pretensions; that he had likewise spoke very strongly concerning the blockade of Luxemburg, and had told M. de Barillon, that he begged

ged the King would consider this affair, whilst things remained in their present situation; for if he was obliged to assemble his Parliament, it would be out of his power to prevent things being carried to an extremity. That the King of England had informed him and M. Citters of this conversation, telling them at the same time, he had made this declaration to M. de Barillon, that the King might be informed thereof before he received the memorial, and that he might be persuaded his Britannic Majesty was in earnest; and unless a satisfactory answer was given, he would pursue different measures. 'Tis easy to perceive what effect such letters would produce in all the towns and provinces; for they made every one believe, the King of England was against the Spaniards giving an equivalent for Alost; and on the contrary, that he was ready to make an alliance with the States General, in case the blockade of Luxemburg continued, as Van Buning had, indeed, mentioned in another letter I sent my royal master; that the King of England had given his word of honour, he would assemble his Parliament, and enter into the treaty of alliance, if his Christian Majesty did not immediately raise the blockade of Luxemburg. These things gave great authority to the Prince of Orange, and justified the steps he had taken; and he never failed to take advantage from such opportunities, either by procuring an augmentation of the forces, or engaging the States General in new treaties.

Mean while, the magistrates of the province of Friezland having by degrees, recovered from their first transports in regard to religion, now resumed their ancient maxims; and having joined the province of Groningen, these two provinces together insisted, that the differences betwixt the
Kings

Kings of France and Spain, should be terminated in an amicable manner.

The Prince of Orange was not astonished at this, and on his part used his utmost efforts to send 8000 men to the Spaniards. As I had been informed he was to propose this to the States General, the 24th of February, 1682, I prepared a billet of four lines only, which I sent them at the time they began to assemble, begging them to come to my house that I might communicate to them something relating to the Low Countries. This prevented the Prince of Orange's tools from making any mention of the 8000 men; and after my conference with several of the members, they thought proper to drop it intirely for that time.

The Prince of Orange did not imagine these 8000 men would much avail the Spaniards; I told our court, he expected they would be defeated; but this he accounted as nothing, as he would also the taking of Luxemburg, when it should happen; but what he chiefly aimed at was, that the war should be commenced.

About this time, the King of England having reflected on the consequence of the engagements he had entered into with the Prince of Orange, sent Mr. Chudley to the Hague, to persuade the States General to settle things in an amicable manner: But the King of England being himself not quite determined in his resolutions, and his ministers being attached to the Prince of Orange, this negotiation did more mischief than service, as will appear in the sequel.

All the artifices the Prince of Orange practised to prevail on the States General to send 8000 men to assist the Spaniards proving ineffectual, he sent for one of the burgo masters of the greatest influence in Amsterdam, and told him he desired peace
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more than any of the States General; that he saw they were not in a condition to declare war, being deserted by England and all the Princes of the empire; but that they ought to endeavour to make better conditions for the Spaniards; that he knew the King would abate in many things, if the States General shewed an inclination to assist the Spaniards; that it was therefore their interest as well as honour, to act with some vigour; and that such a conduct would be so far from drawing a war on them, that on the contrary, it would procure them a more sure and advantageous peace; that the King could not break with the States for sending the 8000 men, and the States having it in their power to send them, without being obliged to enter into a war with his Majesty till the end of three months, they would then have sufficient time to determine what course to take; and whatever they should do in favour of Spain, the King would receive them with open arms, if they afterwards used their endeavours to bring things to a friendly accommodation with Spain.

I was informed of all that passed at this conference of the Prince of Orange with the burgo master of Amsterdam. This obliged me to wait upon the leading persons of that city, and to represent things in a quite different light from what the Prince of Orange had done. I shewed on one side a sure and lasting peace, which nothing could disturb, on the other, a renewal of the war, which was prejudicial to their interest, and contrary to their intentions; and I took care in this interview to make them properly acquainted with the orders which the King had given to M. Marshal d'Humieres, that I might thereby render them more cautious in their resolutions.

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I acted still more vigorously with the well affected republicans ; this induced one of the most famous amongst them to ask me if I could assure them the King would not abate in his pretensions, if the States General should send 8000 men, because the well affected republicans having always opposed this proposal, as a thing which would be attended with mischievous consequences, and the Prince of Orange having on the contrary maintained it to be the only way to procure better terms for the Spaniards, they should be intirely discredited and rendered incapable of ever supporting the interest of the King, if, after the States General sent succour to the Spaniards, contrary to the opinion of the well affected, his Majesty should drop his pretensions, and raise the blockade of Luxemburg.

These steps I took, for some time obstructed the Prince of Orange's designs ; for, notwithstanding he went himself to the States of Holland, and proposed sending 8000 men to the Spaniards, yet the majority of the towns opposed it, and he was obliged to send home the deputies to consult their constituents.

Besides what he had already advanced to the States General, to induce them to send the 8000 men, he added every thing which could furnish him with the least pretext, particularly the march of M. Marshal de Crequy, who then entered into the Duchy of Luxemburg, representing this as a declaration of war. This march indeed made a great noise : But the Prince of Orange could not make any advantage thereof ; for I had previously informed the magistrates of Amsterdam of the King's design in sending Marshal de Crequy, so that they remained firm in their resolution of following

lowing mild measures, and refusing the 8000 men.

I had likewise the satisfaction of being informed that one of the well affected republicans made use of this march of the troops to shew the States into what dangers they were about to precipitate themselves, if they should think of sending 8000 men. As for my part, I remained always in the same sentiments, being persuaded nothing could tend more to draw the States General into such resolutions as were agreeable to their own interest and the inclinations of his Majesty, than to shew them on one side, a positive assurance of peace, and on the other, an evident danger of involving themselves in a troublesome war, by sending succour in so precipitate a manner.

The Prince of Orange, from the same motive, spoke in a quite different style. He told the deputies, he agreed they should lay the whole blame upon him, if the King made war when they should send the troops; whereas, if they did not, they would be guilty of a breach of honour, and their credit greatly hurt. Dikfeld added, that it was not to be doubted but the King had some great design; and if he should ever be in a condition to put it in execution, he would carry it on, even tho' Luxemburg should be yielded to him; but if the proper juncture was not yet arrived, he would not make a rupture, nor undertake a war on account of sending 8000 men.

This affair was a considerable time under agitation in the province of Holland: The Prince of Orange, who was always present at the assemblies, brought it on the carpet above twenty times; and when any deputy differed in opinion, he sent him back to his town, to deliberate upon the matter a-new; in fine, there was not one town which he did

did not tamper with in this manner, and send back their deputies above ten times.

Notwithstanding all these efforts of the Prince of Orange, there prevailed three different opinions in the province of Holland, one was to grant the 8000 men; another, that the time for giving such a supply was not yet arrived; the third, for refusing them, without entering into any discussion. At last, the magistrates of Amsterdam, being warmly solicited by the Prince of Orange, delivered a fourth opinion, declaring the proper time for furnishing the 8000 men was come; but that peace being always preferable to war, it was advisable to try mild measures before they furnished the 8000 men; for this purpose, it was necessary first to know, whether the Spaniards would give an equivalent for the King's pretensions; or, if they remained fixed to the declaration they had made, not to give up one inch of ground; because if they continued inflexible in this resolution, the States General should absolutely refuse the 8000 men; and if they agreed to give an equivalent, in that case, it must be insisted on that his Majesty allow provisions to be carried into Luxemburg during the accommodation; and if he refused this (which was very unlikely after a declaration that he had no pretensions to the town of Luxemburg, and after the proposition of the King of England on this subject) they would immediately grant the 8000 men to the Spaniards.

As the Prince of Orange, had no way more effectual to engage the States General to send the 8000 men, than by assuring them this resolution could by no means draw upon them the King's resentment; his Majesty therefore desired to know my opinion, whether it would be necessary to order me, to declare to the States General, that
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if after he had on his part, taken every step necessary to maintain peace, and to determine all differences in an amicable manner, they should allow themselves to be carried away by the persuasions, of such as wanted them to break off all correspondence with his Majesty; and should march a body of troops, to strengthen the obstinacy which the Spaniards shewed in refusing what belonged to his Majesty, or to give any just satisfaction; he would consider this act as an open rupture, and would immediately seize all their ships in his harbours, which should be condemned if they pushed their hostilities farther, or be detained from the proprietors till they should withdraw their troops, and shew a real disposition to have peace established.

I took the liberty to tell his Majesty, that I was of opinion, such a declaration ought not to be made to the States General, for the Prince of Orange would profit thereby; that he would say I only used threats of no consequence, and that he had already said, in regard to the report which the magistrates had made of my visit, that I had endeavoured on other occasions, to strike a panic into them; but would they only remain steady, my menaces would appear of as little consequence now as formerly. That it was therefore necessary to know, if the King resolved to push this affair to an extremity, in case the States did not regard his threats; for if this should happen, nothing could be more destructive to his Majesty's interest, than relaxing in his demands; that besides, it was certain the Dutch were apprehensive of having a war, as soon as they should send the 8000 men; so that nothing seemed more for the interest of his Majesty, than to leave them every thing to fear, neither

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neither threatening them, nor assuring them of any one particular.

The Prince finding so many different opinions, in the States of Holland, offered one to bring the rest to an agreement, viz. that the States should order the 8000 men to advance to Maestricht, and the countries beyond the Meuse; this, he said, could not offend the King, and the Spaniards would be satisfied; for this purpose, he made a handle of a letter from M. de Staremburg, the substance of which was, that upon the report which prevailed in France, of the States General being about to furnish the Spaniards with 8000 men, they had dropt their schemes, and would soon desist from their attempt on Luxemburg. I found means however, to baffle this false intelligence; for having received a letter which informed me, that besides the body of troops commanded by Marshal de Crequy, there was likewise another of infantry and cavalry, assembled at Dinant, under the conduct of M. Marshal d'Humieres: I took care to send notice of this, to the magistrates of Amsterdam, by a billet wrote by the person whom I generally employed to write to them. This proved of great service, for I was informed by a deputy of the States of Holland, that the letters of M. de Staremburg had produced such an effect in the assembly, and so far encouraged them, that the Prince of Orange had very nigh obtained the 8000 men; but the magistrates of Amsterdam having produced this letter, informed them that Marshal d'Humieres had assembled another army at Dinant, with orders to march as soon as the States General should grant the 8000 men, they had given more credit to this letter, than to those of M. de Staremburg; that the States themselves had complained loudly of a scheme formed to impose on them;

them; and that the Prince of Orange had demanded a sight of this letter, and had kept it to try if he could discover the hand.

I was informed that the ill will of the Prince of Orange towards the King of England still subsisted; and I wrote our court, that I had discovered the Spaniards were about to make a declaration, to prohibit all commerce with England; in this it was mentioned, that they should always with great pleasure, keep up a friendly commerce with the English nation; that it was with the utmost regret they were obliged to break it off, but that his Britannic Majesty, not choosing to assemble his Parliament, that he might be in a condition to give them the succour promised by their treaty, they could not dispense with this particular behaviour; protesting however, that they were ready to re-establish the commerce betwixt the two nations, as soon as the King should call a Parliament. This declaration was concerted with the Prince of Orange, though he pretended to be quite ignorant of the matter, and was not to be published, till the States General should send the 8000 men, in order, if possible, to make the King of England enter into the war, and to engage the States General more firmly.

And though for ten years, no affair in the States of Holland was carried on with more secrecy, and the precaution of so many oaths, I was nevertheless punctually informed, of what passed every day, in the council of towns, and the assembly of Holland; by this means, the King was enabled to follow such measures as were necessary.

I was also informed, that at the time when the Spaniards pressed the States General to send 8000 men, the Prince of Orange and Pensionary Fagel demanded of the Swedish envoy, what troops the
King

King his master would furnish, according to the treaty of alliance, in case they should come to a rupture; and that the envoy offered 20000 men, provided subsidies were given. That this envoy having entered into a conference on the same subject, with the Spanish envoy and the Emperor's resident, the latter declared his Imperial Majesty did not pretend to furnish Sweden with subsidies; and he afterwards signified to the Prince of Orange in particular, that his master would be greatly dissatisfied, if the King of Sweden should have such a number of forces in the empire. That the Spanish envoy, not having such a regard for the empire, demanded of the Prince of Orange, that the States General should furnish Sweden with subsidies. That this Prince communicated the affair to certain persons in Amsterdam, and some other towns, and though he spoke of this affair, only to such as were devoted to his interest, yet even these assured him, the States General could not grant the subsidies. I gave notice of these particulars to M. de Feuquieres, that he might be able to shew the court of Sweden, how little was to be depended upon her new allies.

The Duke of Hanover; at the same time, engaged himself to the Prince of Orange, to send 10000 men to the Spaniards, and the Prince of Orange had the money he gave to the Duke of Hanover, negotiated in his own name.

I wrote the King, March 24, that I was sufficiently persuaded he was well informed of the King of England's sentiments; yet nevertheless, that I thought it my duty to send him the extract of a letter from a burgo-master of Amsterdam to the States General, in which he gave them to understand, that Van Buning had assured him, the King of England wanted to have the treaties of the empire

pire concluded at the same time with that of Spain; and that his Britannic Majesty would readily guaranty such treaties.

This information in regard to the King of England's sentiments induced the States General three days afterwards to come to a resolution which they sent me; in this they entreated the King to settle the differences with Spain in an amicable manner; and in order to render the peace more general, and consequently more sure, they desired the King at the same time, to bring things to a friendly accommodation with the Emperor. They likewise entreated of his Majesty, that during the negotiation of the affair, he would allow provisions to be carried into Luxemburg, assuring him this was the opinion of the King of England as well as theirs; they at the same time offered themselves and the King of England as mediators.

I undertook to send this proposal to the King, and I told them, that tho' I knew not his intentions in regard to an overture which could not be foreseen; yet I could venture to tell them, that the measures they took were not proper to attain what they desired, since it was much more easy to determine differences separately which were not in common, than to join them all together, and make them depend on each other. I then asked them, if they had a promise of the Spaniards that they would accommodate matters; because I believed it to be to no manner of purpose to enter upon such questions, if they remained determined not to give up an inch of ground to his Majesty; the deputies appeared confounded at this, and made no answer.

As they signified to me, that the King having no pretension on Luxemburg, could not in justice hinder access to that place; I told them that the

King had pretensions upon Alost and some other places, which he had not taken possession of, out of regard to the King of England and the States General; and that it was not reasonable, after having received such usage, that he should give up a surety in his hands. I added, that we wanted not a precedent for keeping sureties on less lawful pretensions, and which could not be compared with those his Majesty had upon whole provinces; I said enough to make them understand I spoke of Maestricht which they kept contrary to treaty for the security of a debt of three millions:

But the resolution which the King took at this time, finished the whole affair; for before he received this memorial from the States General, which was on the 23d of March, he had determined to raise the blockade of Luxemburg, and had ordered M. Marshal de Crequy to withdraw his forces; and he agreed to refer all the differences which remained yet undecided with the Spaniards to the arbitration of the King of England; his Majesty having dropt all thoughts of recovering his rights as soon as he received intelligence that the Grand Signior was about to attack Hungary with all his forces.

When the Prince of Orange became acquainted with his Majesty's resolution, he was extremely nettled that the 8000 men had not been sent, for in that case he would have imputed the raising the blockade at Luxemburg to their marching: on the contrary, I strongly assured my friends, who published it every where, that if the States had sent the 8000 men, the King would never have raised the blockade at Luxemburg.

Pensionary Fagel took care at this time to send papers to all the clergy, which they were obliged to read in their pulpits. The contents were, that the

the discreet, steady, and vigorous behaviour of the States General in these times, had preserved the State from a bloody war; and one of the deputies to the States General told his province, by command of the Prince of Orange, that the resolution they had taken of accepting the proposal of an alliance with Sweden, had given courage to several Princes of Europe, and that the continuance of such a conduct must certainly produce good effects. M. Dikfeld declared likewise in the States General, that if they continued to shew resolution, they could run no risque, as was easy to perceive, and would obtain whatever they desired. That the King of England having seen the firmness of the States, began now to talk in another style. In a word, they put every thing in practice to persuade the States General, that they had nothing to fear if they formed alliances with as many Princes of the empire as possible, for this was the only means to preserve peace in the Low Countries.

I was informed that the Prince of Orange strongly pressed the King of England in the name of the States General, to put himself in a condition that his sollicitation might have more influence with the King; and that for this purpose nothing could be more effectual than calling his Parliament; and at the same time he urged the Spaniards to insist upon the States General being arbitrators with the King of England.

I wrote M. de Barillon, that he must use all possible means to prevent the King of England from agreeing to this; for if this took place, his negotiation would be difficult and unsuccessful; because in such an affair the Prince of Orange would be sole master of the States General, who would hardly be acquainted with an affair which

would be communicated only to the deputies in secret affairs, and the provinces not in the least consulted.

The Emperor's resident this same day received ratifications of the treaty of alliance betwixt the Emperor and States General; and another deed also, wherein the Emperor and Sweden entered into the same obligations with each other. He had likewise orders to assure the States General, that some Electors and other Princes of the empire would soon accede to the same treaty. Amongst these it was pretended there were the Electors of Bavaria and Saxony.

The King no sooner raised the blockade of Luxemburg, than he ordered conditions of pacification to be proposed, and several Princes of the empire consented to treat thereupon.

I made new discoveries of several secret practices of the Prince of Orange, which left no room to doubt that his intention was to take advantage of the time, to put the allies in a condition to carry on war, and in the mean while to seek some pretext for breaking the peace.

He had procured a ratification of the treaty of alliance with the Emperor's envoy, without paying any regard to the opposition of Friezland and Groningen.

He had employed Mr. Dikfeld and another deputy equally subservient to his purposes, to bring about a treaty with the Spanish envoy, and there was to be in this, as in that of the emperor, a separate league betwixt Spain and Sweden.

He had conveyed two hundred thousand crowns to the Duke of Hanover.

He had likewise a scheme, but it was carried on secretly (Pensionary Fagel and another person being only privy thereto) of drawing up articles of

a new treaty betwixt Sweden and the States General, wherein, under the pretext of executing an article in the treaty of alliance, they were to stipulate what number of troops they would furnish upon any emergency.

And he always pressed the King of England to use his endeavours that the States General should be joint arbitrators with him.

I informed the magistrates of Amsterdam, May 28, of the design the Prince of Orange had formed of making a new treaty with Sweden, and they assured me they would never consent to it. I took care likewise to have the province of Friesland apprized thereof, who were so averse to this scheme, that they declared they would never acquiesce with the province of Holland, in regard to the treaty of alliance, notwithstanding all the efforts of the Prince of Orange to engage them in it.

I dispatched a courier to the King, to acquaint him, that the Prince of Orange having, by the raising the blockade of Luxemburg, lost all hopes of being able to kindle a war in the Low Countries, wanted now to engage the States General in affairs wherein they had hitherto taken no concern; that he intended to represent to the States of Holland, that their being put into a state of security on the side of the Spanish Netherlands would avail nothing, when they were always exposed to be harassed on the side of Germany; that whilst the King continued so powerful on the Rhine, it could not but be greatly detrimental to their interest; and that he could undertake whatever he pleased, so long as he remained master of Strasburg; that he therefore entreated them to think on the remedy for this evil, to get that place restored to the empire.

They hardly believed at court, there could be any foundation for this intelligence : But it proved so true, that Pensionary Fagel five days after proposed the affair to the States of Holland. He was not content with simply proposing that they should consider of having this place restored to the empire ; for he likewise proposed the expedients, that they should make a treaty with the Emperor, and the other allied Princes, to engage themselves to force his Majesty to a restitution of all such places as he held in his possession, without any claim thereto in virtue of the treaties of Westphalia and Nimeguen. This proposal met with a bad reception, and the deputies of Dort, Amsterdam, and some other towns, begged Pensionary Fagel to dissuade the Prince of Orange from such a scheme. They told him, Strasburg was at too great a distance for them to interest themselves so warmly ; and that they ought to account it sufficient, if tranquillity was established in their neighbourhood.

Pensionary Fagel did not however desist : He spoke of it again, and used all possible methods with his friends to induce them to enter into the design of getting Strasburg restored : But the deputies of the towns having remained firm in their resolution, he for a while dropped his scheme.

I informed his Majesty April 23, that Pensionary Fagel was endeavouring underhand to obtain the equipment of twenty four ships of war ; and in order to induce the States thereto, he proposed that part should be sent to the Mediterranean to convoy the merchant ships, part to the Baltick, and the remainder to other places for the protection of commerce ; but that his real design was, as I knew from good authority, to send them all to the King of Sweden, to support his ships, in
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case that Denmark should pretend to hinder the Swedish troops from passing into Pomerania.

As I apprehended it to be of great importance to inform the King of the intention of the States in regard to the present state of affairs; that is, concerning his Majesty's pretensions in the Low Countries, a general peace, and the treaties of alliance; I therefore made it my business to procure the secret instructions which the States had given to their ministers in England, upon these three points.

I informed our court, that the Swedish envoy had concerted articles for a new treaty with Pensionary Fagel, in consequence of that of the alliance, agreeable to what I had wrote formerly of their intention.

Pensionary Fagel still represented, at several times, the necessity of equipping a fleet: But notwithstanding the city of Amsterdam was greatly interested in having ships at sea for the protection of their commerce, yet they opposed this motion, so much were they apprehensive of giving any occasion for declaring war; and notwithstanding he assured them that the King of Denmark was about to send to sea eight ships of war, which were to be joined by five from Brandenburg, yet they would not consent to make any naval preparations. Nevertheless Pensionary Fagel told the Danish envoy, they would not suffer the King of Denmark to make himself master of the Baltick; and that if the King of France should send ships to his succour, the States General would dispatch a fleet to assist the King of Sweden.

I acquainted his Majesty, that the Prince of Orange's party being under no apprehension that any thing would be undertaken directly against the States General, they seemed to be under no

uneasiness at what France could do ; on the contrary, they said with a haughty air, that a foreign war could be to them but little burthensome ; that indeed they wanted money, but not one Prince demanded subsidies of them ; and such was the disposition of the Princes throughout all Europe, that if the war was once kindled upon whatever cause, all would unite against France. So that the States had nothing to fear ; on the contrary, they might hope to see the war concluded by a peace much more for their advantage, than any agreement which his Majesty would at present make with the Spaniards.

Pensionary Fagel made another effort for the restitution of Strasburg ; but the deputies not only refused to consent thereto, but would not so much as lay the affair before their towns, so that the Pensionary was at last obliged to drop this matter.

The Prince of Orange at this time too gave up his design of making the States General enter into arbitration : But he wrote to the King of Spain, and entreated him in the name of the States General, not to accept of the King of England as arbitrator, unless the King of France should first agree to put an end to the differences he had with Spain and the empire, by a general pacification.

The King of England about this time sent over to Holland, a person in the interest of the Prince of Orange, to invite him to England, to bring about a reconciliation betwixt him and the Duke of York, and to declare publicly they were in perfect amity. The Prince of Orange, who would have been highly pleased to go to England upon any other occasion, was so desirous to shew his aversion to the Duke of York, that he refused to

to make this voyage. This confirmed what I took notice of above, that a person whom the Prince made a confident in regard to the affairs of England told me, that this prince was persuaded he should never have the affection of the people of England, till they should see he was entirely detached from the Duke of York.

I discovered that Pensionary Fagel had a copy of the treaty and secret articles betwixt his Majesty and the King of Denmark.

The Emperor's resident gave notice, May 14, to the foreign ministers at the Hague, that the treaty betwixt his master and the Duke of Bavaria was signed.

Pensionary Fagel for the fourth time pressed the States of Holland to fit out a fleet, and again met with a refusal.

Mean while the States General began to be alarmed at a piece of intelligence received from their envoy at Denmark on the 4th of June 1682, that his Danish Majesty had ordered a fleet to be equiped to cruize on their coasts. The Prince of Orange being willing to take advantage thereof, got Pensionary Fagel for the sixth time to propose fitting out a fleet. The magistrates of Amsterdam still opposed it: But as there came fresh advices from their envoy at Hamburg, assuring them the Elector of Brandenburg would join his ships to those of the King of Denmark, I wrote our court, that I began to be apprehensive the States General might at last think themselves obliged to equip a fleet.

The Prince of Orange and Pensionary Fagel spoke in particular to all their friends in the government of the towns of Holland, to obtain their consent to a new levy of troops; but all of them replied, they durst not agree to such a proposal.

I will not say much upon the design the Prince of Nassau had, of marrying Mademoiselle the King's niece; for tho' he came to Paris on purpose to visit her, yet as it was not thought proper to grant what was necessary for this marriage, it took no effect.

The Prince of Nassau was likewise on the point of espousing the Princess of Zell.

The Prince of Orange was in the utmost despair; but this affair proved also unsuccessful, for want of being properly supported.

The Prince of Orange finding he could not procure a new levy, endeavoured at least to have the recruits kept up which he had obtained, partly by artifice and partly by force, till the beginning of the year, tho' they were to have been maintained only for six months.

He attempted likewise to stir up the States in regard to his private concerns, complaining loudly of his ill treatment from France, where they had set up to sale his lands in Burgundy. However he received but little satisfaction; they allowed his complaints to be just, but did not so much as offer to assist him by their good offices, at which he was greatly chagrined. For tho' the treaty was concluded betwixt the Emperor and the Duke of Hanover, and there remained only one difficulty that the Duke wanted a surety of his enjoying the territories assigned him by the Emperor, and tho' they were willing to give him the sum for which he took them in payment, and tho' the Prince of Orange hoped the college of Princes would soon resolve for war, yet such he found the disposition of the States General to be, that he wrote to the Marquis of Grana, July 27, that if a rupture commenced on the side of Spain, the Dutch would take no concern therein, and it would be in vain

to expect that the danger of the Low-Countries would force the States General to enter into a war; that he had sufficiently sounded the leading men in the State upon this matter, and had found, that though he exerted all his credit and influence, he would not be able at such a juncture to prevail on the States General to furnish the eight thousand troops.

On the other side, the ambassador of the States General at Madrid, having acquainted them, that the Emperor had wrote to the King of Spain, entreating him to grant the half of 450000 livres, which the Swedes stood in need of, to transport 15000 men into Germany; and at the same time desiring him to use his interest with the States General, that they might furnish the other half: Pensionary Fagel brought this affair immediately on the carpet, and it was resolved to inform the ambassador, that the States General could not promise subsidies to any Prince, and that they neither intended, nor indeed had it in their power to do so.

This readiness to make a reply to Mr. Hemskirk, did not, as it then appeared to me, so much point out the chagrin of Pensionary Fagel, and his small hopes of kindling the war, as it served to shew, that he was unwilling the States General should believe he had taken any measures with Sweden, which engaged them to take any step that would involve them in expence. For this reason he took care this letter should appear no where in the provinces, without the answer at the same time.

The King having ordered his troops to march to Orange, and to remain there till the walls which the Prince of Orange had rebuilt, should be demolished; Pensionary Fagel came to me, and told me, that the inhabitants of Orange had only built a slender wall without fortifications; nevertheless, M. le

Marquis de Montanegre had been there to have it demolished, and threatned to send his troops against them; that the Prince of Orange would be highly pleased to have this affair accommodated, and especially without making any public noise. I had already endeavoured to take measures with the Prince of Orange to prevent these orders; for as I knew him, I foresaw his temper and disposition upon such an occasion, that this affair would render him irreconcilable; and though the time he employed in consulting the King of England prevented him from doing what I advised, yet he always expressed his satisfaction of the advice I gave him at this juncture; and notwithstanding he might have cause to be uneasy in regard to some conferences afterwards, yet he always assured me he would retain the remembrance of my intended favour. I undertook to inform the King of what Pensionary Fagel had told me, but it availed nothing; the King refused to suspend the execution of his orders given to march the troops to the town of Orange, and commanded them to remain there, till not only the walls which had been lately built, but also those which had been of the most ancient standing, should be entirely razed.

This obliged the Prince of Orange to engage the States General to demand an audience of me. They told me they had wrote upon this subject to their ambassador from the concern they took in what regarded the Prince of Orange; and they entreated me to join my good offices thereto. I explained this affair in a manner agreeable to the instructions I had the honour of receiving from my royal master; and I signified to them, that they could do nothing more for the service of the Prince of Orange, than to use their endeavours that the walls of Orange should be immediately demolished.

The

The Spanish envoy thought this was now a favourable juncture to declare, that the marquis of Grana had orders from the King of Spain to make reprisals: but he was deceived, for the States General complained loudly of this proceeding, and delivered their sentiments to him with great freedom.

As for Pensionary Fagel, who had made the loudest complaints to the States General, in regard to the affair of Orange, he did not stop here, but summoned an assembly of the States of Holland upon this affair, that the deputies might have the instructions of their towns, when they appeared in the States General. They were accordingly assembled for this purpose, and Pensionary Fagel spoke there with such a vehemence as can hardly be expressed; and said, that it would be to declare himself a personal enemy of the Prince of Orange, not to support his interest upon such an occasion. Most of the deputies allowed it to be an affair of the utmost consequence, and what must give great uneasiness to the Prince of Orange. They said they would serve him as much as lay in their power; but in order to do this effectually, it was necessary to see what the King of England would do in consequence of the letter wrote to him by the States.

The Prince of Orange on his part gave way to the utmost transports of passion; he declared publicly, that he had hitherto kept terms with me, and that we had maintained a sort of intercourse by the visits I made at the Princess of Orange's, where he entertained me; but that this correspondence should be henceforth broke off, and that he would disown for his friends all such as should frequent my house. This declaration of the Prince of Orange obliged me to ask his Majesty, whether he thought it proper I should continue my visits at the Princess of Orange's; for I was apprehensive I might not meet
with

with such treatment there as was agreeable to the dignity of an ambassador.

The Spaniards failed not to embrace this opportunity of paying their court to the Prince of Orange, by pursuing a quite different conduct. They declared they were ready to satisfy him as to what they stood indebted to him since the peace of Munster; and at Brussels they began to settle his claims, which were not inconsiderable, since they amounted to six or seven millions of florins. The Prince of Orange did not send a gentleman to congratulate the Duke of York on the birth of his daughter, but only sent a letter.

As he had no other expedient to prevent affairs being brought to an accommodation, than by getting that concerning the Empire, as well as Spain, to be treated upon at the same time and place, hoping by this means neither would be concluded; he therefore procured the States General to write to the King of England; and he obliged the English envoy at the Hague, to go to his master, and endeavour to prevail on him to get these two affairs taken into consideration at the same time.

Mean while they lost no opportunity of bringing as many Princes as possible into the alliance. The Circles of Franconia and the Upper Rhine entered into it, and sent his Majesty the treaty they had concluded with the Emperor.

The King ordered to be declared to his Britannic Majesty, that he would till November abide by the terms on which he proposed to settle the differences betwixt him and the King of Spain, with the King of England as mediator; but if they were not accepted by that time, he did not then pretend to adhere to them, but would take such measures as he thought most advisable.

The

The King of England having given a favourable answer, though in general terms, in regard to razing the walls of Orange, the Prince of Orange took an opportunity of speaking again to the States of Holland. He harangued them in a studied speech, wherein he thanked them for the good offices they intended for his service; he told them it was evident his Christian Majesty was offended at him, and that he had drawn upon himself the resentment of this monarch, for no other reason but because he had always served the States faithfully; that he might have played the politician as well as another, and found his interest therein; but this he had not done hitherto, nor ever would, but would rather suffer still in their service. His dependents hereupon called out, that they would spend their blood in his service; and some others made the same declaration, upon which it was thought necessary to send deputies to consult the towns.

The answer with which they returned did not please the Prince of Orange, so that he was obliged to harangue the States anew. He represented to them the care and anxiety he had undergone for their welfare; he enlarged upon his toils and fatigue in their service; and he intreated they would now shew a grateful sense thereof, and grant him assistance. He durst not however ask the States to make reprisals; but he said enough to induce them thereto, if they had been the least disposed that way. But all the intreaties he was obliged to make, much against his humour, produced no effect as to making reprisals. They appeared not to understand him upon that head. The magistrates of Amsterdam told some of their friends, they would not refuse their good offices to the Prince of Orange; but as for doing any thing which might involve them in trouble, they never would consent thereto; they signified

nified also to the States, that it would be sufficient to charge their ambassador with their remonstrances, being unwilling any deputation should be named for that purpose. However, they at length with great difficulty consented to this last article, and not till the Prince of Orange had strongly importuned them; but they continued obstinately to refuse choosing a person from their city to go to France in his behalf, notwithstanding all the pressing solicitations of the Prince of Orange, who wanted to draw them insensibly into his quarrel.

As for his part, he continued to speak with great bitterness about what was done at Orange: he said once at table, that he was extremely pleased with my conduct upon this occasion, and that he should be glad to separate the idea of M. d'Avaux from that of the French ambassador; but this was impossible. He declared still, however, that those who were desirous to be accounted his friends, should not resort to my house. Several hasty expressions escaped him, contrary to his usual custom; amongst others, that France should see what it was to have treated a Prince of Orange in such a manner.

I received intelligence, October 8, 1682, that the Electors of Saxony and Bavaria had entered into the treaty of alliance; and that the Emperor's resident at the Hague had received full power from the Circles of Franconia and the Upper Rhine for the same purpose, and that the Prince of Orange, in pursuance of his ancient project, intended to form an alliance with the house of Lunenburg, not doubting but the Duke of Hanover would draw the Duke of Zell into the same measures.

He resumed also the design he had formed on the fifth of June, to make a new levy; and he made particular applications to the deputies of the towns, to persuade their constituents to agree that they should

should come to a resolution in the assembly of November for raising 16000 men. I informed our court, October 22, that notwithstanding the finances of the States General were very low, he would nevertheless press them to such a resolution; for the ruin of particular provinces would augment his power, and those who saw their destruction by this means inevitable, were not in a condition to prevent it; that even those who were well-disposed, that is, neither particularly attached to the Prince of Orange, nor declaredly against him, whom I had always pointed out to his Majesty as men of honest sentiments without ability, that these had hitherto followed the Prince of Orange's measures with reluctance, believing them destructive to the republic; but that most of them began now to think that the conduct this Prince obliged them to pursue, was the only way whereby they could obtain advantageous terms for the Spaniards. They imputed to this what his Majesty had already done for the tranquillity of Christendom; and they flattered themselves, if they continued to shew resolution, the Spaniards and all their party would receive great advantage; on the contrary, if they relaxed never so little, war would be immediately commenced; thus the very persons who were lately contented with the blockade of Luxemburg being raised, appeared now not to be satisfied with an accommodation only with Spain; for nothing less would now content them, than settling the whole affairs of Europe at the same time.

I informed our court also, of its being given out at Amsterdam, that the declarations made by M. de Barillon to the King of England, would have no effect, and that the States General remaining firm with the Emperor, together with Spain and her allies, his Majesty would consent to a general pacification;

cation; that this prepossession, from whatever quarter it proceeded, rendered these persons firm in their resolution, from which they apprehended nothing of bad consequence; but on the contrary, expected very good effects.

I sent notice, October 30, that my lord Shaftsbury was arrived in Amsterdam, where he concealed himself. I gave information also, December 31, that Oates was come there after him, together with William Waller, one of the most noted amongst the English rebels.

Pensionary Fagel at this time used his utmost endeavours to settle matters betwixt the Prince of Orange, and Prince Nassau.

The Pensionary held several private assemblies, whither he brought only the deputies of two or three towns, to persuade them to the raising of 16000 men, and Dikfeld went for this purpose to Amsterdam. He easily convinced M. Heude, the principal burgomaster, of the necessity thereof, for Heude was persuaded the States General would have been already involved in a war, had they acted with less vigour, and that nothing but a steady pursuit of the same conduct could secure them for the future.

But notwithstanding the influence of M. Heude, in the council of Amsterdam, I was informed by a member, that they had determined to refuse the Prince of Orange's request for raising 16000 men; and on the contrary, had resolved to press the Spaniards to accept of the mediation of the King of England.

On the 12th of November I wrote his Majesty, that it might be easily seen from this resolution of Amsterdam, that when that city perceived she was likely in good earnest of being engaged in a war, she then laid aside all complaisance to the Prince of Orange; and if this Prince should prevail on that
city

city to alter her sentiments, as he had done the preceding year, in regard to sending the 8000 men, it must be by that argument, which the Prince, as I had always told his Majesty, used; viz. that the States General had no other means but that of arming themselves, to hinder his Majesty from undertaking any thing against Spain.

We may be still more enabled to judge of their sentiments, by the joy they expressed at a report which prevailed, that his Majesty intended to seize upon certain forts in the Milanese, till Spain should give him satisfaction: this made it apparent they took no concern about Spain, when their own interest was not affected; and it likewise pointed out the effectual method to bring Spain to a proper compliance, by making an attack in Catalonia.

It was carried by a majority of voices, that a person should be dispatched to France upon the affairs of Orange. All the leading men in Amsterdam, and several other persons of distinction, refused this commission.

Pensionary Fagel believing he had taken effectual measures for raising the 16000 men, proposed it in the assembly of Holland, but the proposal was unanimously rejected; and the deputies of the towns alledging their inability as one of the principal reasons, the Prince of Orange offered to give up the revenue of all his places and appointments, to help to defray the expence, in raising such a number of troops.

But finding he could not gain this point, he altered his scheme, and in order to save the expence of appointing new officers in the army, and take off somewhat of his Majesty's resentment, he got Fagel to propose that there should be only 16000 recruits raised: but the same reasons which weighed with

with the citizens of Amsterdam against the levy, determined them also against this reinforcement.

The deputies of Amsterdam made a proposal, which they communicated to me in confidence, that only the differences which subsisted betwixt his Majesty and Spain, without considering those of the Empire, should be referred to the King of England's arbitration. The Prince of Orange and Pensionary Fagel said, that the gentlemen of Amsterdam could have no other motive in advancing such a proposal, than the desire of preserving peace; but that the true means to maintain tranquillity was, by following the same maxims they had hitherto pursued, as appeared evident from what had already passed. They affirmed that the King of England was under a necessity, for his own interest, to prevent his Majesty from entering into a war; and they also averred, that his Britannic Majesty had therefore determined to desire the King, to defer for some time all hostilities; and thus, without doing any thing against their allies, but on the contrary, shewing a strong desire to execute their treaties, they should procure a respite, and be in a condition to promote the public tranquillity, agreeable to the inclinations of the gentlemen of Amsterdam. It happened unluckily before three days passed, the Prince of Orange and Pensionary Fagel were justified in their assertion; for the King sent me notice the 26th of November 1682, that he agreed to a cessation of hostilities till the first of January, to see if conditions of peace could be agreed upon. This circumstance wonderfully increased the Prince of Orange's authority; and contributed not a little to sink the interest of the well affected republicans.

This also gave considerable weight to the arguments which the Prince of Orange and Pensionary Fagel used to the principal persons in the State, whom

whom they endeavoured to convince that the interest of the King of England would never permit him to allow the King to wage war in the Spanish Netherlands; and if his Britannic Majesty should even at first acquiesce, he would at length be obliged, whether he would or not, to embark in a war to defend the Low Countries.

Van Buning began now to write in a style quite different from what he had usually done; which not a little displeased the Prince of Orange, and made it apparent to those who were endowed with the least degree of penetration, that if they would assume the same spirit as he, they might soon recover their antient liberty. It is certain, this minister had imagined all Europe would unite in war against his Majesty, and for this purpose he had contributed to promote the Prince of Orange's designs; but finding this scheme ineffectual, he appeared now to be in good earnest for peace, and wrote to Holland in the strongest terms upon this subject.

For four months past they had made an incessant clamour in Holland about what passed in France in regard to the Huguenots; there came every day fresh letters, and fresh complaints. These letters, which were frequently filled with falsehoods, were still more exaggerated by the Prince of Orange and his party. Pensionary Fagel at length resolved on the third of December 1682, to propose to the States of Holland a general collection for the French Protestants who should take refuge in Holland. This was immediately agreed to, and carried into execution. They at the same time wrote to those who remained in France, telling them, they would reserve some part of those collections for those who should afterwards fly into Holland. I informed his Majesty, that I knew not how; nor from what part of the Kingdom they were to come; but that I knew great numbers were

were expected, who were to take advantage of the ice: and that minister Claude's son who had been upon a tour in France, was now returned to settle in Holland.

The King ordered me to be acquainted, he was desirous the King of England should send the Earl of Sunderland into Holland; and as he was assured of that Nobleman's friendly intentions, he thought it expedient that I should preserve a secret understanding with him in all affairs, as a testimony of his Majesty's confidence in his friendship. He acquainted me at the same time, that he consented to grant the request of the King of England, viz. to adhere to the proposal he had offered of referring the differences subsisting with Spain to his mediation, till the 15th of January.

His Majesty also informed me, that he permitted me to visit now and then at the Princess of Orange's, if I thought it conducive to promote my correspondence or interest where I resided. But as this was left to my own discretion, and as I knew the declarations the Prince of Orange had made in regard to destroying the walls of Orange; I thought proper therefore to make him acquainted with what I had been informed, as an affair to which I at first gave no credit; but that I had since entertained some doubt, as these declarations which had become so public, had not been disclaimed by him, as he had done formerly when some things of the same nature had been imputed to him. The Prince of Orange replied, that he had before disavowed such a kind of language which had been fathered upon him; but that things were not now in the same situation; that he had not said precisely all that was imputed to him, but yet he would disavow nothing, and the public might believe whatever they pleased; that he would be glad to serve me as a private person when an opportunity offered, but would shew me no civility

as an ambassador of France, for if he should, it would even render him ridiculous to the French Court. The King having heard this answer, commanded me to leave off my visits to the Princess of Orange.

Pensionary Fagel laid before the States General the resolution he had drawn the Province of Holland into, to represent to the King of England the strongest reasons why the affairs of Spain should not be adjusted separately from those of the Empire. I will not repeat all the arguments advanced, but the principal were, that the allies would at first entertain a diffidence of each other; that the King would not fail to turn his arms against those who should be the last in coming to an accommodation, and these could not be succoured by the others; so that the treaty which had been made for their common defence would thus become ineffectual.

The Prince of Orange still persisted in declaring, that the States would hazard nothing by remaining in their former sentiments; that the King would not upon that account attack the Spanish Netherlands; that his Britannic Majesty was even more afraid of this than the States General, and if his Majesty attacked the Low Countries, the King of England could not avoid calling his Parliament, and entering upon a war with France; and that the States would soon perceive the King would relax, if they continued firm in their resolutions. And what proved unlucky was, that the delays granted from time to time, at the request of the King of England, seemed to prove the truth of what the Prince of Orange advanced to the States General.

It is certain, these delays greatly assisted the Prince of Orange to persuade several persons in Amsterdam, particularly Mr. Heude, the most powerful of the burgomasters, that the measures they pursued would procure more advantageous terms to the Emperor as well

well as Spain ; and even if that should not happen, and things be brought to an extremity, they would always have it in their power to enter into a war or not as they thought proper. Moreover, though they plainly perceived the Prince of Orange was not so sincerely disposed for a peace as he would have them believe, nay, on the contrary, wished for nothing so much as to see a war kindled in Europe, yet they believed he would not be able to engage them in such an affair ; and they imagined such a complaisance to him must tend to the advantage of their allies, without being prejudicial to themselves.

Pensionary Fagel, who took care to have all kind of expedients practised as much as possible to alienate the people of Holland from France, was not contented with having made public collections for the French Huguenots ; he likewise ordered all the clergy in Holland from their pulpits to set forth in the strongest manner how those of the reformed religion were persecuted in France ; he enjoined them also to remind the States of the danger they ran in 1672 of falling into the same distress in which the protestants of France were now involved ; that Providence had delivered them, and they ought to exert their utmost efforts to put themselves in such a condition, that the like calamity might not happen to them a second time ; for their enemies chiefly aimed at the destruction of their religion. One of the Dutch preachers told this in confidence to a friend of mine.

The deputies of Amsterdam having shewn no degree of courage to support their opinion concerning the arbitration, and having contented themselves with only delivering their sentiments, and then leaving the Prince of Orange and Pensionary Fagel to do whatever they pleased ; I wrote his Majesty, December 31, that I had several times taken the liberty

berty to tell him, that I believed, if they ever intended to speak with spirit in the assembly of Holland, it would not be till the last extremity, when they should find themselves on the point of being involved in a war; that what had lately happened confirmed this opinion, which I not only gave, but all the most wise and sensible persons in the Republic, who had always affirmed, that nothing was to be expected from Amsterdam, nor the magistrates of any of the towns, till they should be filled with a greater apprehension than what they yet entertained for the Prince of Orange; since, if they were not forced by somewhat of this nature, to assume courage, they would never be able to oppose the Prince of Orange and Pensionary Fagel.

The Prince of Orange endeavoured to prevail upon the Emperor to come to an accommodation with Tekely, and the States General wrote to Tekely, pressing him to make up matters with the Emperor.

The residents from the States General at Copenhagen and Hamburgh, having wrote so often in the strongest terms, that the King of Denmark was fitting out a considerable fleet, and the affairs of Holstein being in such a situation as shewed that Denmark had a design of attempting somewhat; the States General at length came to a resolution on the 5th of January 1683, immediately to fit out a fleet of twenty-four sail.

They were at this time worked up to such a fury in Holland by the false reports which the French Huguenots spread of the hard treatment they received in France, that I was informed they held a privy council to banish the Roman catholicks from the Province of Holland, and all priests in general, not natives of that Province. Pensionary Fagel, however, would not consent to this measure; he

contented himself with taking advantage of the accounts from France, to do all in his power against his Majesty's interest; but he always opposed any proceedings against the catholics in Holland, either because the interest of the Prince of Orange, who had no desire to exasperate the English catholics, so required it, or because he was apprehensive of an insurrection in Holland, where the catholics are very numerous, and had equally contributed with the protestants to the establishment of the Republic, having at first had the principal places of trust, especially in Amsterdam.

Pensionary Fagel desired the Emperor's resident to acquaint his master, that a motion was about to be made in Holland for raising 16,000 recruits; and that this was expected to be carried, since the council of the principal towns seemed disposed to it.

I had sent notice the foregoing December, that the Prince of Orange's party were in great hopes of bringing the Elector of Brandenburg into their interest. I also gave our court to understand, the beginning of January 1683, that the Prince of Orange now flattered himself more than ever, that this Elector would soon alter his sentiments; that M. Damerongue had dispatched a courier to Pensionary Fagel, and immediately upon his return, had himself set out from Berlin for the Hague; and that Dickfeld had shewn one of his intimate friends a letter from M. Damerongue, which gave great hopes of the Elector of Brandenburg.

The Swedish envoy about this time used his utmost endeavours, that the States General should interest themselves in the affairs of Holstein; he exerted himself in this with the more earnestness, as it was his interest they should do somewhat in favour of Sweden to soften the King his master, who was highly dissatisfied with him, because he had given him

him hopes the States General would assist him with money and ships.

This minister was no less earnest in pressing the Duke of Hanover's envoy at the Hague to enter into the treaty of alliance.

About this time Pensionary Fagel made a great clamour in the States of Holland; for Van Buning had wrote him, that M. Barillon had had a copy of the answer from the States General to the King of England (which I mentioned the 24th of December 1684) and that the King of England had been informed thereof before Van Buning himself had communicated it to his Majesty. Fagel proposed, that another should be administered to all the members in the States of Holland, that they had communicated no secret papers for the four preceding years. Such a proposal from an inferior to his masters appeared highly insolent. He proposed next, that 10,000 livres should be offered to the person who should discover from whom I had these papers; but notwithstanding all his vehemence, no such measures were taken.

Although I found myself obliged to act in every thing against the Prince of Orange, I did not however fail from time to time to have his inclinations sounded. I got an intimate friend of Dickfeld to speak to him in confidence, concerning the measures the Prince of Orange pursued against the King. Dickfeld replied, that the Prince of Orange was not yet without hopes of seeing either a general pacification, or a general war; and even, if neither the one nor the other should happen, he had only to wait patiently, for application would be always made to him when there was occasion; and though he had done ten times more against France, all that had passed would be forgot when he was wanted, or

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when he should be willing to enter into his Majesty's interest.

Notwithstanding all the efforts of the Prince of Orange, and the intrigues of Pensionary Fagel, the military establishment was settled for the year 1683 by the province of Holland, without any new levy.

The King having commanded me to represent to the principal persons amongst the well affected, that the Prince of Orange was insensibly rendering himself absolute master of the republic; I made answer to his Majesty, that I omitted no opportunity of shewing them how this Prince oppressed their liberty; that some of those persons who would have had courage to act had they been supported, had been to talk with me only a night before; but that I had not hitherto mentioned this to his Majesty, because they had only repeated what they all along so often affirmed, that they were not in a condition to do any thing themselves; that there was too much cowardice in their countrymen; and that they should find themselves deceived as Van Buning continued to be to this hour, so long as they should believe the city of Amsterdam would act for the liberty of the republic; that, in order to animate them, an alarm must be raised from abroad; that the Prince of Orange exercising a violent and unlawful power, would soon be deserted, when the States should see that his Majesty offered (by the means he formerly proposed) to re-establish their government; that this could not take up above two months, when his Majesty's affairs would permit it, though indeed what had passed in France, in regard to the protestants, would perhaps render the matter more difficult. That his Majesty by this means keeping the States in dependence, would ever afterwards exempt himself from many great expences, for he might

might use their fleets as his own, and thus with great ease give law by sea, as he did already by land; otherwise it would always happen as they had formerly told me, that notwithstanding the general inclination of the Republic for peace, and notwithstanding it was so much the interest of the city of Amsterdam to be well with his Majesty, yet the Prince of Orange would always remain so much master of the States as to make them break all measures with his Majesty, and oblige them to declare war against him, when it suited his purpose.

The King of England at this time declared, if the States would persuade the Spaniards to accept of arbitration, he would not act as arbitrator, but as mediator, and would take the advice of the States General. The Prince of Orange, on the other hand, pressed the Spaniards to refuse the mediation of the King of England, hoping that the King, tired with their shameful behaviour, would enter into action; and that he should then find means to engage the States General in a war.

I informed our court, I had discovered that the Prince of Orange and Pensionary Fagel, after having forced the States of Holland to take a new oath of secrecy, had proposed certain treaties, whereby it was to be stipulated amongst the allies what supplies each should furnish, in case of a rupture. I represented it might be easily perceived from this affair alone, how little was to be expected from the city of Amsterdam, who allowed, under the pretext of a treaty of alliance, which they at first accounted so harmless, that the States General should enter into leagues, which might be attended with such mischievous consequences.

I sent intelligence by the next post, that the Deputies of Amsterdam and some other cities had been at first alarmed at this proposal, but after a contest

of two days, they had acquiesced, and consented that the States General should settle the number of troops each power should furnish; that I imagined they would follow the plan the Prince of Orange had concerted with the Austrian and Swedish ministers, viz. that the Emperor should furnish six thousand men, Spain and the States General each eight thousand, Sweden six thousand, and the Elector of Saxony, with the Dukes of Zell and Hanover, eight thousand amongst them.

The States of Holland had likewise agreed, that the States General should enter into engagements with Spain and Sweden to assist each other by sea, on condition, if necessary, that Spain and Sweden should succour the States, and that they should have the liberty to demand this supply, either in money or ships. The number each was to furnish being twelve ships each, and the Spaniards required they might be allowed to furnish their contingent in money.

This resolution of the Province of Holland was kept very secret, and even when I sent notice thereof, it had not then been carried before the States General, for they thought by this means to keep it from my knowledge. The treaty was concluded and signed about a fortnight afterwards. I sent a copy of it, with the secret articles, to the King, the 11th of February 1683.

Although the Duke of Hanover declared all these treaties were but empty trifles, and that others of a different nature ought to be concluded, whereby the States should furnish money, yet nevertheless he failed not to enter into negotiation; but the Province of Holland refused to make a treaty with the Duke of Hanover alone, unless the whole house of Lunenburg should engage therein.

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Van Buning, finding some of his letters had displeased the Prince of Orange, wrote him, that he had always imagined they might have made a peace without a general assembly; but since, notwithstanding the reasons he had advanced, the States had been of a different opinion, he cheerfully acquiesced: but, nevertheless he petitioned for leave to return home, which was granted. He wrote some more letters before his departure from England, which contradicted all his former; and after having altered his opinion two or three times, he at length returned to the Prince of Orange's sentiments.

I sent notice, January 28, that the Prince of Orange and the Marquis of Grana had secretly agreed, if the King's troops should enter upon the Spanish territories, that the Marquis should immediately order the Spanish troops to march, and though he had only two hundred men to head, he should command them to attack, that there might be a war opened, and the States General thereby obliged to commence hostilities.

The Earl of Shaftsbury died of the gout of his stomach at Amsterdam on the 3d of February, 1683. Thus the protection which the citizens of Amsterdam gave him, served only to shew the little regard they had for his Britannic Majesty.

As the States had resolved to fit out twenty-four ships, I was therefore desirous to know the state of their navy; for this purpose I sent to Zealand, and I was informed they had but a very few ships, and these in exceeding bad order, and as for those in Holland, I knew they were in a sorry condition. However, that I might procure full information, I took care to have persons to write to all the five admiralities.

M. Damerongue, envoy from the States General at Berlin, being arrived at the Hague, had se-

veral conferences with the Prince of Orange and Pensionary Fagel, but he communicated nothing to the States General. I discovered only, by means of a Burgomaster of Amsterdam, that he had been in their city, and having dined with two or three of their Burgomasters, who had the chief management of affairs, amongst whom was he who gave me this intelligence, after a good deal of talk upon other matters he had assured them, the Elector of Brandenburg would enter into every measure conducive to the interest of the Republic, if they would promise that Prince Lewis, the Elector of Brandenburg's second son by his first wife, should be successor to the Prince of Orange in his honours and preferments; but these gentlemen rejecting this proposal with great indignation, the affair was pushed no farther. The Prince of Orange expected such a repulse would be given, and this was what induced him to consent that Damerongue should take such a step, knowing he should thereby make a shew of friendship to the Elector of Brandenburg, without any detriment to himself.

M. Damerongue, who had only made this overture for form's sake, now pursued his real negotiation; I received intelligence from a person in whom I could confide, that he assured the Prince of Orange and the magistrates of Amsterdam, that he had the Elector of Brandenburg's promise that he would make a treaty of neutrality with the States General, and even enter into the treaty of alliance, provided they would satisfy him for the damage the dutchy of Cleves had sustained from the King's army, which the States were obliged to by treaty; and also grant him the payment of the remainder of the subsidies which he pretended due to him till the day wherein he had signed his particular peace: the States, however, being willing to give it only to the

the day they had ratified theirs. The Prince of Orange not a little exerted himself in this affair, and the Province of Holland at last resolved to satisfy the Elector in his demand, which amounted to nine hundred thousand crowns; but they consented upon condition he should enter into the treaty of alliance, or at least make a treaty of neutrality. They did not however determine whether they should pay the whole or part, having only instructed Damerongue to enter upon the composition of this affair. The negotiation was for a considerable time protracted, the Elector of Brandenburg and the Prince of Orange rising or falling in their demands according as they had occasion for each other. At length, in August 1683, they agreed upon four hundred thousand crowns for all the Elector's claims upon the States General, who engaged to pay fifty thousand in one year, fifty more in two years afterwards, and the remaining three hundred thousand in the space of ten years, at three hundred thousand each year.

This treaty, however, was not signed in August, nor was it wholly concluded till the year 1685; but as there was no alterations made from that agreed upon in 1683, I will not repeat all the advices I sent the King from the end of 1682 to 1685, relating to the secret correspondence carried on betwixt the Elector of Brandenburg and the Prince of Orange, notwithstanding all the declarations this Elector continued to make, of being entirely in his Majesty's interest. The Elector of Brandenburg did not abide by the treaty wherein the States had made a composition in regard to the subsidy and the damage suffered in Cleves. In 1685 he performed the promise he had so long before made to the Prince of Orange, to make a more close alliance with the States General; for, under pretext of prolonging

for twelve years the treaty of 1678, which was to expire in 1688, he formed new engagements with them in 1685, as I shall shew hereafter.

The Prince of Orange having been unable to obtain new levies or recruits, was at length obliged to consent, that the regulation of the army, which had been settled the preceeding January for the year 1683, should take place; thus it remained on the footing of the year 1682, which with-held the twelve thousand recruits which had been raised the beginning of this year.

I wrote the King, that I could not believe but the Prince of Orange was sensible, that in the present situation of affairs he was not in a condition to resist his Majesty: that he was under no uneasiness about the Spaniards having lost four of their garrisons, or the allies being defeated, provided the war was begun again. He imagined it could not continue long before the King of England would find himself obliged by his own subjects to break with his Majesty; and in expectation of this, he wanted to hazard all for all: That he hoped the King of England, even contrary to his own inclination, would assist him to carry on the war to advantage, or that this Prince would ruin himself; and this would be a short and easy way for him to ascend a throne he had had always in view, ever since he married the presumptive heir.

M. Heinsius, Pensionary of Delft, after having a considerable time refused to go to France about demolishing the walls of Orange, was at length obliged to accept of this employ: and when he came to visit me before his departure, I told him I was sorry a person of his honour and good disposition should be charged with such a commission; for I made no question but his journey would prove in vain; and as he was Pensionary of Delft, which had opposed
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the Prince of Orange with more firmness than any other town, I signified to him, that the King was sensible of his merit and good disposition, and I entreated him not to be chagrined if he met with little satisfaction in his employ; and that he should wholly impute this to the nature of his commission, for he himself must know he could not succeed therein; and as he could feel no concern in the refusal he ought to expect, I entreated him not to regard the uneasiness the Prince would shew upon this account. He seemed to agree to what I said, and promised not to be uneasy at what should happen, as he expected the affair could not succeed. Nevertheless, he returned from his employment as much an enemy to France, and as much attached to the Prince of Orange, as he had before his departure been against this Prince, and attached to his Majesty; and thus we lost a man who is at present Pensionary of the States.

As for the Prince of Orange, when he was informed at Diren, where he was taking the diversion of hunting, of the King's answer to M. Heinsius, and when he found the King of England did not support him in this affair, he could not command his passion, and for two days was so uneasy in his mind, that nobody, not even the Princess of Orange, durst approach him. At this juncture he repeated several times, what he had said before, that the King of France should one day feel what it was to have exasperated a Prince of Orange.

Van Buning about this time arrived from England.

The States General resolved to send to sea only sixteen of the ships they had equipped, and to keep the remainder to a more advanced season. I sent an exact account of the state of their navy.

I told the King, if we seriously considered the conduct of the citizens of Amsterdam, we should find, that so far from doing any service to the Republic by their shewing so often favourable inclinations, that on the contrary they did a deal of mischief; because they proposed almost all that could be suggested for the public good, and then desisted; so that they took away from others all hopes of being able to succeed in proposals which had miscarried in the hands of the most powerful town of the States. Thus it appeared, that those who were in the government of Amsterdam only made such motions to be conformable to their ancient maxims, and to satisfy the people whom they in some shape pleased, by shewing them it was not their fault, if the States followed bad measures.

Several of the well affected Republicans no longer kept up a correspondence with me as formerly, especially those who had any post, not that they had altered their sentiments, but because they could not foresee any possibility of assisting their country, if they were not supported from abroad; and as they perceived the present state of affairs in Europe would not permit this, and had no hopes, even in a more favourable situation, of being assisted in the manner necessary, they thought it would answer no manner of purpose any longer to endanger and expose themselves to the resentment of the Prince of Orange and his party.

I must moreover add, that those of the well affected, to whom I still sometimes applied, said to me nothing else but what they had so often repeated; that they were more than ever persuaded, when peace should be concluded betwixt the King and the Emperor, his Majesty would easily accomplish what they had formerly proposed; I thought it unnecessary to communicate this to my master, because

cause there was nothing new in it: but I thought myself obliged to acquaint him with what the deputy of Friesland, and the President from Munster had lately said to me on the same subject. The former had repeated for two years successively, that if his Majesty commenced hostilities in the neighbourhood of the States, he would thereby afford the Prince of Orange an opportunity of doing whatever he pleased in Holland; that there was no other safety for the Republic, but that his Majesty should attempt nothing; that the States were not inclined to war, and the Prince of Orange would never be able to persuade them thereto; that he ought to leave the citizens of Amsterdam to themselves, since their own interest, that of the Provinces of Frizland and Groningen, as well as all the Provinces in general, would oblige them at length to put things again on their natural footing. That the President from Munster had often spoke to me much to the same purpose; that he was as much afraid of war as possible, because of his employment, and still more, because being married in Holland, a war would ruin him; but both one and the other having visited me separately, had declared the contrary, and acknowledged their error; affirming, that if his Majesty, when it suited his convenience, came with a powerful army, and declared to the States, that having reason to be dissatisfied with their government, and being informed of the little liberty they had in their votes, he only advanced his troops to restore the Provinces to their ancient privileges; that he demanded the States General should assemble (for they had not assembled for forty years, being at this present time only the simple deputies of the Provinces) and that he insisted they should have the power of deliberating, with a full and entire liberty, upon whatever was judged for the interest of the Republic:

Republic: they both assured me, that considering the general discontent which prevailed in regard to the Prince of Orange, who governed in an arbitrary manner, contrary to the fundamental laws of the Republic, the States would be highly pleased to be delivered from such a slavery, and would readily comply with his Majesty's wishes. I desired to know why they had altered their sentiments, and what foundation they had for what they advanced. The Deputy of Friezland told me, he had found by experience, that all his Majesty had done to avoid giving umbrage to the States General, had given the Prince of Orange an opportunity of pushing them upon bad measures; that in all their secret deliberations, he had found that fear alone operated on their spirits; and as soon as this was dissipated, they had boldly taken their resolutions for a twelve-month. The resident of Munster told me, he delivered his opinion upon the strength of what he had heard from several of the deputies of Holland, that is, from those in the present government. In effect, this had been the subject of conversation amongst some of the leading men in the State; and it appeared, that the violent means which the Prince and Pensionary Fagel had all along used to extort from the States whatever they wanted, had opened the eyes of several people, and made them discover a truth only known before to persons of penetration. I endeavoured thereby to make it apparent to his Majesty, that this was a certain and evident truth, since persons of a timorous disposition, and with whose interest it was inconsistent to have such sentiments, were yet so fully persuaded thereof.

I wrote the 29th of March, that I had discovered the beginning of a very secret negotiation, which the Swedish envoy was carrying on with Pensionary Fagel; that he had at first demanded of him subsidies,

fidies, and that he afterwards came down to a sum, once paid, for the passage of a number of Swedish troops into Germany; and that the Pensionary refused it, not daring to make such a proposal to the States.

I will not here insert all the different proposals made betwixt the envoys of Sweden and Hanover, the States General, and the Elector of Saxony, each of them seeking their own particular interest in this common alliance; for this would be tedious, and unnecessary for the connection of these memoirs.

On the 15th of April, the deputies of Amsterdam made a motion to urge the Spaniards to accept of the arbitration; the Prince of Orange was highly inflamed against them, and vigorously exerted himself with the States of Holland, that they should oppose such a proposal. He requested the deputies of the towns to keep this negotiation secret, especially from the French embassador, for fear he should inform the King his master of the division amongst them. The Prince of Orange's party were indeed greatly apprehensive their allies should be discouraged, if they found the magistracy of Amsterdam to be of such sentiments: it must however be acknowledged, that they supported their sentiments very weakly, as had indeed been the case in all their resolutions.

It was this that obliged the magistrates of Delft, when they reproached them with having abandoned them on this occasion, to make answer, that they never dared trust to them, since, after they had mutually promised upon the blockade of Luxemburg, that they would never consent to give 8000 men, the city of Amsterdam had deserted that of Delft, which had persisted alone for three weeks to refuse giving any assistance to the Spaniards. This reply of the magistrates of Delft, gives me occasion to
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mention in this place the reason, which the reader will certainly be desirous to know, why such a powerful city as Amsterdam, and which consequently ought to have drawn many others into her sentiments, found herself frequently alone in her opinion, and was almost always deserted by the others, even in affairs where she contended for the interest of the Republic. It arose from this, that ever since the death of Messrs. Hoofst and Valkenir, burgomasters of Amsterdam, and zealous staunch republicans, the government of this city was fallen into very weak hands. Thus, though the interest of the people of Amsterdam continued the same, they were no longer supported with the same vigour; so that the other towns having on some occasions adhered to the sentiments of Amsterdam, they had been deserted, and left exposed to the resentment of the Prince of Orange, who could easily revenge himself, since he chose burgomasters of all the towns in Holland, excepting Amsterdam.

I received information, about this time, that the States General had sent secret orders to the five admiralties to take an exact survey of all the ships belonging to the republic; that the purport of all the accounts received was, that there was not one ship in a condition to hold out above two months at sea; for they were all so decayed, that the ship-wrights offered to build new ones at the same expence they would repair the old, and that they should be over and above furnished with all the iron necessary.

The Prince of Orange and Pensionary Fagel had designedly neglected the marine of the States General, because they thereby weakened the maritime power of the Republic, and rendered it inferior to that of England, which the Prince of Orange already accounted as his own: besides, it was his interest to strengthen himself by an army, and it was
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not an easy matter for him at once to raise two such expences.

And as I thought it would be of service to his Majesty to be particularly informed of the state of the navy of the States General, I found means to procure an exact list of all the ships in the five admiralities, with their bulk, the year of their construction, their condition, and the complement of men and arms which each carried.

Mean while the Swedish envoy incessantly demanded ships of the States, and four hundred and fifty thousand livres, which was once paid to procure a passage for the Swedish troops into Germany.

M. Witsendorf, the Hanoverian envoy, left the Hague the 3d of May, 1683, without signing the treaty with the States General, because they would not grant him subsidies. He said, in his last conferences, that the King would laugh at all their treaties of alliance, when they were not accompanied with a sufficient force; that it was not a quantity of papers or treaties which they ought to oppose to his Majesty, but powerful armies; and that as soon as they should agree upon something of this nature, his master would then heartily enter into the treaty.

The envoy from Saxony refused also to come to any conclusion, saying, that his instructions were not to sign the treaty before the envoy from Hanover had done it.

Mean while I was watchful to see whether the States would furnish ships to transport the Swedish troops into Germany, or to convoy them; for the steps which the count de Roy then took, in the service of Denmark, made it more to be believed than ever before, that they were going to attack Sweden.

The affair of Bantam happened about this time: but as the negotiations upon it were unsuccessful, I shall drop it in silence; let it suffice to say, that the
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States General gave no satisfaction to the King of England, and that he suffered it patiently.

On the 13th of May the Spanish envoy, in concert with the Prince of Orange, proposed to the States General to have a general assembly at the Hague, to settle all differences which the King had with the Empire, as well as Spain; and the Prince of Orange, with Pensionary Fagel, proposed moreover, that they should request the King to be mediator.

Van Buning now again changed his sentiments for the sixth time; and signified to the Prince of Orange, that he was perfectly convinced he was in the right, and that no more mention ought to be made of the arbitration of the King of England, in regard to the differences of the Spaniards, but of a general assembly, with the mediation of this Prince. I wrote to the King, and informed him, that as I had suspected there was a trick in this design, which had been only half trusted to the magistrates of Amsterdam, I thought there was no less subtilty in a proposal which one Morlot, a man attached to the Prince of Orange, had lately made me; he told me I had always appeared to wish that the Prince of Orange would enter into a good understanding with his Majesty; that he had hitherto seen great difficulty to bring this about; but M. Dickfeld having acquainted him they were going to settle all differences by a general assembly, he was of opinion the Prince of Orange would thereby find an opportunity, without failing in duty to his allies, of giving his Majesty proper satisfaction; that he did not say this without foundation, nor without being informed that this Prince could not, consistent with his honour or interest, make the first advances; but when he knew his Majesty's intentions, he could conform to them in certain particulars; that this was

was not an urgent affair, but that I took it into consideration, in order to make use of it at a proper time and opportunity. I asked his Majesty how I should behave in this matter.

On the 20th of May, one of the council of Amsterdam sent me notice, that they had come to a resolution not only not to consent to any thing which might disturb the peace, but that they had also delivered written memorials to the States of Holland, declaring, if the States General involved themselves in a war, by not accepting the arbitration, or refusing the proposals of his Majesty, they would not contribute to the expences of the war. I told our court it would be adviseable to have these memorials dispersed in foreign courts, to shew them there could be no great hopes of assistance from the States General, if a war was kindled; but this was all the advantage to be expected, there being no foundation for greater hopes, since the citizens of Amsterdam, under the specious pretext of peace, allowed themselves to be drawn into measures which directly led to war.

I sent the King the particular state of their navy, as it had been reported to the States General. The Prince of Orange and Pensionary Fagel went to all the admiralties, to hasten the naval preparations. The King of Denmark's preparations, and the language of the Danes in general, chiefly induced the States to agree to this motion. It is certain that Denmark, finding herself supported by France, talked of a war as unavoidable; nay, in reality, she greatly wished for it: this had alarmed the States General, upon which I took the liberty to write the King, that nothing would make the magistrates of Amsterdam strenuous for peace, but the violent apprehension of a neighbouring war; and at the same time, that a way must be pointed out, whereby they may escape
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this danger; which, though not very honourable, they would embrace; but to make them believe war was absolutely determined against their allies and themselves, as had been given out in Denmark, would serve only to make them arm more powerfully.

Mean while the province of Friesland had declared they would not consent to this equipment, unless some other province would advance their proportion, as they were at that juncture deficient in money. The provinces of Groningen and Zealand positively refused it: and as for Holland, after six months, this province came to no determination. These circumstances, of which I apprized our court, made it apparent the provinces acted in many things by constraint, and contrary to inclination. Nevertheless, the Prince of Orange, about a week after, being on the 31st of May, gave orders that all hands should work with the utmost expedition to fit out the fleet.

I sent notice likewise, that the Prince of Orange had not mentioned whither the ships were destined: but as soon as ready, I apprehended he would endeavour to send them to Sweden; I therefore used all possible precautions with the well affected republicans, and the magistrates of Amsterdam, to prevent such a step; I represented the fatal consequences of sending this fleet to the Baltic, and they positively assured me they would never allow it to go to Sweden to facilitate the passage of the troops; nay, the Prince of Orange durst not even make the proposal.

This Prince was very desirous Van Buning should return to England, but he did not chuse to send him till he should find him confirmed in certain sentiments, wherein he had hitherto found him wavering, not only through a natural fickleness of temper, but also because Van Buning, though he would
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have been willing to come to a good understanding with the Prince of Orange, yet he did not care to imbroil himself with the magistrates of Amsterdam.

I went at this time to Amsterdam, under pretence of seeing goods from India; and I spoke to one of the burgomasters, with whom I kept a correspondence: he told me the city of Amsterdam had done more than could have been imagined; for they had stopt short in the resolutions they were about to take, which would have unavoidably engaged the States in a war, and that affairs had taken quite a different turn. He mentioned also the Prince of Orange's having received instructions from the States General to declare to the marquis of Grana, that they would not embarrass themselves in the affairs of all Europe; and as they thought themselves highly interested in what regarded the Spanish Netherlands, they wished the Spaniards would think seriously of coming to an accommodation, and not obstinately persist in keeping their interest inseparably united to that of the Empire: the marquis of Grana replied, that the King of Spain would sooner lose the Netherlands than detach himself from the Emperor. This same person told me likewise, that the Prince of Orange had had orders also to tell the marquis of Grana, since the Spaniards would not accept the conditions offered by his Majesty, the States General neither could nor would enter into war, though he should even attack the Spanish Netherlands; and though they were so much interested in the preservation of this barrier, they would give no other succour than the 8000 Men; the marquis of Grana made answer, that the King of Spain was in a condition to defend the Spanish Netherlands with 8000 men. The burgomaster knew very well the true meaning of this answer, and he owned the Prince of Orange was a bad negotiator of peace; but

but he had desired to go in place of the Pensionary of Amsterdam, who ought to have had the commission. I told my friend that the declaration made to the Spaniards availed nothing, since the King was not informed of it by the States; for his Majesty not knowing their good dispositions, would act upon the supposition of what he had reason to believe, that the Prince of Orange would always engage the States to espouse the interest of the Spaniards; besides, it was likely the Spaniards knew these threats of the Prince of Orange were not meant in earnest, and that he himself had removed all their apprehension; but if the States General sincerely desired to hinder a war, instead of a secret and silent threat, they should have made a formal authentic declaration to the Spaniards, signifying, that if after this they did not come to an accommodation, the States would then declare their resolution to his Majesty, that they might not wantonly involve themselves in a war, which the Spaniards only had in their power to prevent. He approved of this expedient, and promised he would impart it to M. Heude, as a thing he had himself conceived; but that he was apprehensive the Prince of Orange would prevent the execution of such a design. He told me also, it had been resolved, in case Sweden was attacked, to try friendly offices, and then to send the succour stipulated by the alliance, but without coming to a rupture.

In a letter to his Majesty, June 4, I humbly entreated he would permit me to represent to him, that it was wholly owing to the violent apprehensions of a war, that the ministry of Amsterdam had lately taken such extraordinary steps; that these would never have come to any firm resolution, had they not believed our threats to be in earnest; that the council of Amsterdam had been persuaded the

war was resolved against Sweden the 15th of June, and against them too, in case they should intermeddle; that the first thing they had done, in consequence thereof, was to make the above declaration to Spain, and to form that resolution in regard to Sweden, which I had the honour of communicating to his Majesty.

Tromp about this time had a quarrel with the Prince of Orange, about the choice of some sea-officers, whom he had solicited to have under him; and the animosity was carried so far, that he did not command the fleet, nor ever after served the Republic; for he came not to a reconciliation with the Prince of Orange, till six weeks before his death.

Tromp being turned out only made the Prince of Orange redouble his diligence to have the fleet equipt; he made the men work day and night with the most incredible application; and he went himself to all the admiralties to inspect the ships: but though he took care to have guards placed that no stranger should go aboard, yet I discovered, by the ship-wrights and sea-officers, that they had only repaired the outsides with as much expedition as possible, and that there were a great number much decayed within, and some even in such a leaky condition, that the pumps were frequently obliged to be used.

The Prince of Orange had not yet however mentioned the particular destination of this fleet, nor had it been spoke of in the council of the towns of Holland. Nevertheless, there was some probability he intended it for Sweden, though the magistracy of Amsterdam had declared they would never consent to it; and I was apprehensive he would carry his design on this occasion, as he had on many others; especially as it would be much easier for him

him to settle this affair when the ships should be in the Texel, than it had been to get the fleet equipt.

But whilst they were busied in Holland about fitting out the fleet, it created not a little surprize there, to hear that M. de Barillon had declared to his Britannic Majesty, that the King intended to send fourteen sail of ships to the Baltic. This determined Pensionary Fagel to propose to the next assembly in Holland, on the 13th of July, that they should augment their land forces, and make a further addition to their navy.

The emperor was no less pressing than the Prince of Orange for the departure of the fleet; he wrote to the States, entreating they would send out their Ships to transport the Swedes into Germany; for the Duke of Hanover, refused to engage with the allies till he was assured of the embarkation of the Swedes. As for the Duke of Zell, he had a particular reason, which I will not mention, why he did not yet declare himself.

On the 15th of July, information was received, by a letter from England, that there had been a conspiracy to murder the King of England and the Duke of York. The Prince of Orange not only shewed great indifference at receiving this news; but he even ordered M. d'Odyck and some others of his confidants to give out that this conspiracy was only a sham affair, trumped up to ruin some of the worst persons in England, and to destroy those who stood up for liberty of conscience, and the rights of their country.

The States of Holland having assembled the 13th of July, Pensionary Fagel proposed they should fit out twelve men of war to reinforce the fleet about to put to sea; he did not think proper as yet to mention any thing about the augmentation of the land forces.

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When the States General were informed that the King's fleet had passed the Sound, they ordered their embassadors to tell the King of England he had it entirely in his power to ward off the war, by preventing the King of Denmark and his Swedish Majesty from entering into action against each other. This shews the truth of what I had before asserted, that their fleet was not in a condition of undertaking any thing; but it served still more to justify the principle I had continually laid down as the foundation of all measures; viz. that nothing but the apprehension of war could bring these people to reason.

Morlot waited upon me also from the Prince of Orange, and spoke to me more particularly than he had some months before, as if the Prince of Orange was really inclined to come to a good understanding with his Majesty. I answered him candidly, and gave notice thereof to my master, who wrote me that there was no great probability of this Prince being in earnest; for he was apt to believe he wanted only to bring on a negotiation with me, in order to raise a report, as before, that advantageous terms were offered him by his Majesty; and thus not only to make new merit with the States General, but also by this means to cut off all hopes from those who were still desirous to preserve the little remains of their liberty; so that I had no other answer to give to whatever should be proposed from the Prince of Orange, but that he would shew the effects of his friendly disposition, and he might believe his Majesty would not prove insensible; for that there was occasion for much stronger proofs than empty words, from a man in whom his Majesty had hitherto so little reason to confide.

A few days afterwards the Prince of Orange thought it adviseable to congratulate the King of

England on the discovery of the conspiracy, and he sent Benting for that purpose. His creatures told some persons, he had given this commission to Benting, because he had many friends involved in the conspiracy; that though he was persuaded the King of England and the Duke of York could not entertain the least thought upon this affair to his disadvantage, yet he thought proper, nevertheless, to send a person in whom he could confide, who could answer properly any unjust insinuations, which should perhaps be advanced.

But I discovered by another channel, that the strongest, and in all probability, the only reason of Benting's sudden departure was, that the Prince of Orange having heard of the death of the Princess Electoral of Brandenburg, was desirous that Benting might arrive in England before Prince George of Denmark; or even if this Prince should get there before him, he had still hopes of being able to prevent his marriage, by proposing the Prince Elector for the Princess Annë, and promising to nominate the Elector heir to all his possessions, if such a marriage should take place.

The Prince of Orange made use of a kind of menace to force the King of England into his measures: he ordered Benting to declare to his Britannic Majesty, if he did not alter his conduct in regard to the States General, they would be obliged to make terms with France. I sent information thereof to his Majesty, who returned for answer, that this only confirmed him in the opinion he had before, how little sincerity there was in the overture made me by Morlot, and also gave fresh reason to believe, that the Prince of Orange had only endeavoured to bring on a negotiation with me, to give uneasiness to the King of England, and those

of

of the United Provinces, who had shewed themselves the best affected.

As soon as it was known in Holland that some ships had sailed from England, they immediately came to a resolution, that the fleet of the States should put to sea, and lay off the Meuse.

I informed our court, that the Imperialists complained to the Prince of Orange of the bad situation of their affairs, in July 1683, saying, that he had always promised the Emperor should have a body of troops on the Rhine, and that he would not have hearkened to the treaty of alliance, but upon this condition.

I was informed, by a particular friend, that a certain pilot had told him in confidence, that he had orders secretly to look out for pilots who were acquainted with the Baltic, and to send them to the fleet, which lay near the isle of Goree. Yet nothing was ever mentioned in the States of Holland about making use of these ships to transport the Swedish troops into Germany: but the Prince of Orange had given secret instructions, which were unknown to the States General.

The envoy from Saxony, who had been a considerable time at the Hague departed highly dissatisfied, without having concluded any thing; he wanted subsidies, and besides, he could not agree upon the place where the troops of Saxony should act, in case there was occasion.

The Emperor's resident received a letter from his master, commanding him to acquaint the States General, that he hoped providence would preserve Vienna in his possession; but whatever might be the case, he would not accept of the terms proposed by his Majesty, and he only offered to enter into a general accommodation.

The Prince of Orange certainly looked upon Van Buning to be a man according to his wishes, for he sent him over again to England in August 1683.

I sent a letter to our court the 12th of this month, informing them the Dutch fleet was to sail this day for the north, and that no body could come at the knowledge of the secret instructions; that they had only about a week before resolved to keep the fleet at sea till the end of October. Their first design was to have ordered it to return the first of September.

The person who had before waited on me from the Prince of Orange, came to me again, and assured me the Prince had expressed a stronger desire than ever of getting into his Majesty's good graces; but that he was afraid in the present situation of affairs, his offers would be altogether rejected, or such things insisted on from the Spaniards, as in honour he could not solicit them to consent to. I had some discourse with Dickfeld upon this head, but it would be tedious and useless to insert it here. The most remarkable part of it was, that the Prince of Orange was to promise he would press the Spaniards to give an equivalent for Alost, &c. in some other part than in the Spanish Netherlands; that this would be gaining a considerable point, since the States had not hitherto come to a decision, whether the Spaniards were indebted an equivalent for the King's pretensions; but that he could not act to any purpose, till he should know what would satisfy his Majesty.

I sent an account of this to the King, and I added, that in whatever manner the Prince of Orange might have expressed his desire of procuring his Majesty's friendship; yet he did not seem to me disposed to demand such an equivalent of the Spaniards as would satisfy his Majesty.

On the third of September the States General received information, by a courier from the marquis of Grana, that the King's troops had entered upon the King of Spain's territories; and that his Majesty had ordered it to be declared to him, that marshal d'Humieres should remain with his army on the Spanish possessions, and maintain them at the expence of the Spaniards, till they should satisfy the King as to his claims.

The King having commanded me to give him an account of what should be said upon the entrance of his troops into the Spanish Netherlands, I told him that the most sensible persons seemed to wish he would at once seize beyond what he claimed as an equivalent, because the affair would then soon be adjusted, provided he had no other design; and that the magistrates of Amsterdam had ordered me to be informed they wished his Majesty would take Luxemburg, and then declare himself satisfied; for they would be highly pleased that all differences should by this means be terminated.

I likewise acquainted his Majesty of all the different discourses of every one as they stood affected, which would be useless to repeat here. I shall only take notice, that I informed his Majesty of the bad effect of what the King of England had lately declared, that the Spaniards could not give up Luxemburg to his Majesty, nor any other place in the Netherlands, without weakening themselves in such a manner as to be unable ever after to depend upon their own strength.

As for the Prince of Orange, as he knew that the magistrates of Amsterdam, ever since the blockade of Luxemburg, had been of opinion the Spaniards should yield it up as an equivalent for the King's pretensions, from that time he never ceased representing the absolute necessity of keeping this place

place for the defence of the Spanish Netherlands; and as soon as he heard of marshal d'Humieres march, he ordered the troops of the States General to advance to Lecluse, Hulst, Le Sas-de-Gand, Bergen-op-Zoom, and he formed a camp at Bois-le-Duc, of the troops in garrison at Campen, Zwol, Deventer, and other places.

The Prince of Orange went still further, for I discovered, by a sure intelligence, that he intended Pensionary Fagel should propose to the States of Holland to send 8000 men to the Spaniards; and that he was likewise to represent to them, as war must be expected, it would be necessary to make a new levy of 16000 men. Pensionary Fagel was also to endeavour to persuade them it would be requisite to order the fleet, after having convoyed the ships from India, to go to Gottenburg to take in 15000 men, which the King of Sweden had engaged to furnish for Germany; and notwithstanding this, they might be assured of all the family of Lunenburg. But I was informed, by a secret intelligence, which I had in the council of Amsterdam, that the deputies of this city had orders directly contrary to the intentions of the Prince of Orange.

I received intelligence likewise, that the Prince of Orange had spoke to the two principal burgo-masters of Amsterdam, half an hour before the States of Holland assembled; and that he had assigned three reasons as the most weighty for the 8000 men. The first was, that the King did not design to have war, for he had not raised such a number of recruits as he would have done had he been so disposed; and as soon as the 8000 men should be delivered, he would heartily agree that they should endeavour to fall upon expedients to settle affairs in an amicable manner, without entring into a war. The second was, that he knew they were persuaded at his Majesty's

jeſty's court, the city of Amſterdam would not conſent to give the 8000 men. He told them that his Maſteſty having ſuited his meaſures to that ſuppoſition, would conſequently alter his ſchemes when Amſterdam ſhould act contrary to what was expected in France. The third argument he advanced was, that the King of England would never ſuffer his Maſteſty to make conqueſts in the Netherlands, nor to carry on war againſt Spain or Holland, and this though not from a principle of friendſhip to the Spaniards or States General, yet from a motive of intereſt, and a regard to the welfare of his own kingdom; that the King of England knew very well how far his Chriſtian Maſteſty would proceed; and this being the caſe, they ought not to be afraid of giving the 8000 men, ſince after they ſhould be granted, the King of England would always be equally intereſted to hinder the war.

This intelligence determined me to take all poſſible meaſures to diſcover what paſſed this day in the aſſembly of the States of Holland; and I was informed, a quarter of an hour after they broke up, that Penſionary Fagel had propoſed to furniſh the Spaniards with 8000 men, according to treaty; and amongſt ſeveral arguments advanced by him for this meaſure, he had aſſured them, that as ſoon as they ſhould ſend the 8000 men to the Spaniards, the King's troops would advance no farther in the Spaniſh Netherlands. But notwithstanding all his remonſtrances, that the cities of Delft, Amſterdam, and Leyden had oppoſed it; and the deputies of ſome other towns had declared they were not empowered by their ſuperiors to conſent to ſuch a propoſal. That the Prince of Orange, after having heard them calmly, had told them, there was no occaſion to deliberate on this affair anew, for he was ſufficiently authorized by the reſolution taken,

during the siege of Luxemburg, to send these troops, without asking their opinion; and that they had ordered him to give the marquis of Grana assurances thereof, which he had accordingly done, at an interview with him about four months before; that he was not a man to retract his word, and would immediately send the 8000 men to the Spaniards, unless the States of Holland should by a formal decree expressly forbid him: that this was the only method to prevent him, but if they had a design to amuse him by proposing to consult their superiors, and such like evasions, he would not be thus obstructed. That if the deputies of Amsterdam would not acquiesce, their obstinacy would discover a disagreement amongst them, but could produce no other effect. No person was courageous enough to forbid him to send these troops, and he knew very well they could not do it, because no deputy could have received instructions on an affair so unforeseen; so that not one ventured to speak out upon this subject; and even if any one had, what would it have availed, unless he had been assured of being followed by a majority of the towns. All the well affected could do was, to insist upon having the resolution agreed to by their superiors; but the Prince of Orange made so light of this, that he instantly sent Pensionary Fagel from the States of Holland to the States General, where he had the resolution passed for granting 8000 men to the Spaniards, and that same evening gave orders for their marching. All this opposition produced, though weakly supported, was, that the Prince of Orange durst not propose the raising of 16000 men, nor the transportation of the Swedish troops.

The admiral of the Dutch fleet dispatched an express, on the ninth of September, 1683, in a frigate, accompanied with a ship which had lost her mast.

maist. He wrote the States General that the large ships could keep no longer at sea, without great danger. The generality of people said upon this at first, that since their large ships could not remain at sea, neither his Majesty's fleet, nor that of Denmark would be able to continue in the Baltic; and therefore it would be adviseable to order their ships into port: but the Prince of Orange, who was eager upon his designs, gave himself no uneasiness about the vulgar opinions, nor did he even propose that the return of the ships should be taken under consideration.

This Prince still continued to keep up the negotiation with me, either because he perceived that a general apprehension prevailed, and an utter aversion to war, or because he wanted only to sound the King's inclinations, which to me appeared most probable, or perhaps because he designed, in case affairs must be brought to an accommodation, to assume the honour to himself; for he told some of his friends, that he would die a thousand deaths rather than suffer the Spaniards to come to an accommodation by the King of England's mediation. He at this time gave me to know, by Dickfeld, that if I could, without mentioning Luxemburg, enter upon any agreement which would satisfy his Majesty, he would chearfully go into it, and would exert his utmost efforts to procure him that satisfaction: and next day Dickfeld sent to tell me, that if I had a power to treat about an equivalent in any other part of the King of Spain's dominions than the Netherlands, he would then explain himself fully and sincerely upon the matter.

Mean while the Prince of Orange set out from the Hague, to have an interview with the marquis of Grana; and as he had sent the 8000 men, contrary to form, the magistrates of Amsterdam sent

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This Prince ſtill continued to keep up the negotiation with me, either becauſe he perceived that a general apprehenſion prevailed, and an utter averſion to war, or becauſe he wanted only to ſound the King's inclinations, which to me appeared moſt probable, or perhaps becauſe he deſigned, in caſe affairs muſt be brought to an accommodation, to aſſume the honour to himſelf; for he told ſome of his friends, that he would die a thouſand deaths rather than ſuffer the Spaniards to come to an accommodation by the King of England's mediation. He at this time gave me to know, by Dickfeld, that if I could, without mentioning Luxemburg, enter upon any agreement which would ſatisfy his Maſteſty, he would chearfully go into it, and would exert his utmoſt efforts to procure him that ſatisfaction: and next day Dickfeld ſent to tell me, that if I had a power to treat about an equivalent in any other part of the King of Spain's dominions than the Netherlands, he would then explain himſelf fully and ſincerely upon the matter.

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to acquaint me they would never grant money to carry on undertakings which they disapproved ; and at the same time they delivered in writing to the States of Holland the strongest protests, whereby they declared, they would not involve themselves in the danger or expence which must inevitably attend the sending the 8000 men ; for the marching of the King's troops had struck them with a pannic, and they were averse to war. This obliged Pensionary Fagel to get the clergy to declaim afresh upon the proceedings in France against the Protestants. On the 23d of September, I sent these protests to the King, that he might judge what could be expected from persons, who, after having argued so reasonably, and given such formal and exact orders, had allowed themselves to be carried away against their opinion and interest.

I wrote by several posts, that I could not hear it was yet proposed to the States General to send their fleet to Gottenburg to take in the Swedes.

On the 17th of this month, I sent notice that I had discovered, from the commissions given by the Prince of Orange, of which I had copies, that he had sent 14000 men to the Spaniards, instead of 8000 ; this was a bold step, and it shewed sufficiently how little he regarded the States General : he could indeed do this the more easily, as the marching of the troops was wholly in his power within the territories of the Republic ; for by this means he could march as many as he pleased before the number could possibly be discovered. That this Prince was also exerting all his efforts to procure a levy of 16000 men ; but nevertheless Pensionary Fagel had not yet made such a proposal in the assembly of Holland.

On the 27th I sent intelligence, that the Prince of Orange had instructed count Waldeck to use all his

his interest with the Emperor, that he might press the Electors of Bavaria and Saxony, then at his court, to enter into the treaty of confederacy.

The King in a letter said, though he was persuaded the Prince of Orange had no other intention but to gain time for the Spaniards, nevertheless, he was willing to shew his inclination for peace; and if M. Dickfeld demanded an answer to the overture he had made, I should acquaint him his Majesty was not so desirous of having Luxemburg, but that I would undertake to inform him, if proposals should be made of any other equivalent proportioned to his just demands.

I soon had an opportunity of speaking with M. Dickfeld, who after a long conference told me, that the Prince of Orange would exert all his interest to procure satisfaction to his Majesty; but that he had so little knowledge of the places belonging to the Spaniards in Catalonia and Italy, which might be given as an equivalent to his Majesty's pretensions, that he could not offer proposals so readily and frankly as he desired. That the Prince of Orange had already been at some pains, and was still endeavouring to find out a person who could inform him exactly of these countries; and when he should obtain such a knowledge, he would not fail to acquaint me what he thought should be given up by the Spaniards.

Next day he told me, if instead of Luxemburg, which was demolished, and about twenty or thirty villages in this principality, which now only remained to the Spaniards, his Majesty was willing to receive an equivalent in the Low Countries; the Prince of Orange would procure him Dixmude, Beaumont, with the villages depending thereupon, and the dismemberment the King had caused to be formerly made from the jurisdiction of Ath, and

which had been re-united by the treaty of Nimegue; that there should be a line drawn from Newport to Namur, and all the villages beyond this line towards France, should be given up to his Majesty. I observed to Mr. Dickfeld, that they set a high value upon Luxemburg when the point was about giving it up to his Majesty, but now they accounted it as nothing almost, when an equivalent was to be given for it. That they must either esteem it inconsiderable, and yield it up, or if they set so high a value upon it, they must give a proportionable equivalent to his Majesty. I said afterwards, if with what they offered in Flanders, they would likewise give up some place in Catalonia or Italy, I would undertake to make such a proposal, but in the manner the overture was made at present, I durst not even mention it to his Majesty. He seemed to acquiesce with what I said, and told me that the Prince of Orange had not made any mention of an equivalent in the Low Countries, because he had not yet procured such light as he thought necessary, in regard to Catalonia and Italy; but he assured me, if I had got a sufficient knowledge of the situation of the places, and the extent of their dependencies in Catalonia and Italy, the Prince of Orange would agree to whatever should be thought reasonable to be given up by the Spaniards.

Dickfeld visited me a third time, but said nothing worthy to be mentioned: this obliged me to write the King, that if his Majesty judged it conducive to his service, to inform me of the force and extent of four or five of the towns in Navarre, the Milanese, and Catalonia, I could then inform Dickfeld thereof: that giving such information by word of mouth when it was asked, would not be to make proposals; that I could not thereby hurt his Majesty's

jeſty's intereſt, and the Prince of Orange would no longer have any pretext or reaſon for not explaining himſelf; if he was in earneſt, this would ſoon be perceived, and if he wanted only to gain time, this way of proceeding would put an end to every negotiation, without his reaping the leaſt advantage.

The Prince of Orange being at length determined by any means to force the States General to a levy of 16000 men, went to the council of ſtate, where he had a right to enter, and where they conſider the number of troops neceſſary for the ſervice of the Republic; and he reſolved to make them agree to what they call *A Petition to the United Provinces*. He accordingly obliged them to draw up a petition for a levy of 16000 men, with a deſign, as we ſhall ſee, of preſenting it to the province of Holland, which was to aſſemble about a week afterwards.

The King, by a letter of the 29th of September, told me, I might inform Dickfeld he was deſirous to have Luxemburg as an equivalent, only becauſe it was not included in the barrier; and all the country which ſurrounded it depending upon his Maſteſty, this place could not be of any ſervice to the King of Spain for the preſervation of his poſſeſſions in the Low Countries. That the exchange which the Prince of Orange propoſed in Flanders, was ſo little proportioned to the juſtice of his Maſteſty's demands, that it did not deſerve to be mentioned, unleſs he ſhould add what was neceſſary, to render the equivalent equal to his Maſteſty's pretenſions.

As to the exchanges which might be given in Catalonia, or Navarre (for the King wanted nothing in the Milanefe) his Maſteſty informed me, as to Catalonia, he would be ſatiſfied with Roſes, Cap-de-Quieres, a place of no conſequence, and Gironne; or with Campredon, Caſtel-Saillite, and

Seau-

Seau-d'Urgel, with all dependencies; and if in Navarre, with Pampeluna, and Fontarabia, as the only places which could bring to a conclusion, in these parts, all the disputes betwixt their Christian and Catholic Majesties.

This explanation enabled me again to see Mr. Dickfeld, with whom I had a long conference, which however amounted to nothing. We only each of us advanced our reasons, in regard to the equivalent which the Prince of Orange offered in the Low Countries, but he would not enter into any reasonable concessions, nor come to a farther explanation than he had done hitherto: so that I wrote the King I was more and more confirmed in my opinion, that the Prince of Orange had no intention of procuring a just satisfaction to his Majesty; that he only seemed desirous to know the extent of his Majesty's pretensions, and it was not unlikely he might thus make a pretext for bringing the States General to a rupture; that the King had acted wisely in being moderate in his claims, to have the glory of extricating the Spaniards from a piece of misconduct, and in having supported to the utmost his allies, from whom he wanted, by no means, to disengage himself.

The Prince of Orange sent me a proposal, afterwards, that a line should be drawn from Newport to Namur and Courtray; Leuse, Beaumont, and Chimay should be included therein, on the side of France; and this line should next extend from Namur to Luxemburg; that he made no mention of Catalonia, because he wanted first to make an equivalent in the Netherlands to satisfy his Majesty; that when this equivalent should be settled, he would make two other equivalents in Catalonia, resembling that in the Low Countries, and that he would use all his interest to bring the Spaniards into
such

such measures ; but that if he could not succeed in his endeavours, he would then entreat his Majesty to be satisfied with what should be deemed sufficient in the Low Countries. All this convinced me that the Prince of Orange wanted to make up the equivalent of a number of small villages, and dismembered feignories in the Low Countries ; and this he thought would be the more easily accepted, as he was to make it be believed, that this was only the foundation for making another equivalent in Catalonia ; and that afterwards he might, with a very good grace, press his Majesty to be satisfied with the equivalent in the Netherlands, under pretence that the Spaniards would not consent to give up any thing in Catalonia nor Navarre.

I accordingly made answer, that it would be in vain to make an equivalent in the Netherlands, in order to settle that which was to be offered his Majesty in Catalonia ; that he did not desire it to be in one place more than another ; and provided they gave him a proper satisfaction, either in Catalonia, Navarre, or the Netherlands, he would be content.

That what he now offered, was the same thing he had mentioned the foregoing Friday, but proposed in a manner less intelligible than before.

That I had no idea of this line supposed to be drawn from Newport to Namur only, and continued from Namur to Luxemburg.

That as to the villages in Luxemburg, I had already delivered my sentiments upon that head.

That in regard to the line from Newport to Namur, the position of it was not clearly enough expressed ; that there was no mention made of what was to be given with Courtray, nor what was to be annexed to Leuse ; in a word, the proposal, unreasonable as it was, was expressed in such ambiguous

ous terms as to be above my conception ; thus I was incapable of giving an account of it to his Majesty, especially as he made no other proposal, as I had already told him, than what he offered four days before, and what he himself had agreed was unfit for me to mention to his Majesty.

At the time when the Prince of Orange was, contrary to the inclination of the States General, sending not only the 8000 men which the Spaniards demanded, but also 14000 more ; when he was about to confer with the Marquis of Grana, to concert measures to draw the King of Spain and the States into a war ; when he was soliciting the latter to make a levy of 16,000 men, and when he was spinning out a secret negotiation with me, in order to sound the King's sentiments ; at this very time he found means by Pensionary Fagel, to bring the deputies of the States to a resolution, which being drawn up under the pretext of procuring an accommodation betwixt the King and the Spaniards, was a kind of invitation to their allies to prepare for war. The purport of this resolution was, that their ambassador should represent to the King of England, that the States having done all in their power to preserve peace in the Low Countries, and finding their remonstrances for that purpose ineffectual, and that they were upon the point of coming to a rupture, they entreated his Britannic Majesty to concur with them, in order to settle the differences betwixt his Christian Majesty and Spain as soon as possible. They beseeched him therefore, that he would use to advantage the three months allotted by the treaties, that they might enter as soon as possible into negotiation, that his Britannic Majesty and they might examine the pretensions of each party, and be thereby enabled to concert means to prevent the war. One may see from thence, that the Prince of

of Orange wanted only to gain time without having any desire to bring things to an accommodation ; since by his not trusting them to the decision of the King of England alone, he always kept it in his power, in the name of the States General, to raise as many obstacles as he thought proper. The consequence of this resolution will make it appear still more clearly, that the preamble was only meant as a decoy to surprize the States General, and engage them in a war, in case this preliminary negotiation, as he plainly foresaw, did not succeed : For it was said in this same resolution, that the States General should apply to the Spanish envoy, and tell him, they were not a little concerned to find the differences betwixt France and Spain likely to involve all Christendom in a dangerous war ; that the States would chearfully do all in their power to bring these differences to an amicable conclusion ; but that it was necessary the King of Spain, should on his part, contribute more than he had yet done for the defence of the Low Countries ; that the allies might not alone be incumbered with the burthen of the war, in case the negotiations should prove unsuccessful.

Towards the latter part of this resolution it was mentioned, that the States should invite the Emperor and King of Sweden to concur with them to persuade the King of England to begin the negotiation, and that each should deliver their opinion in regard to the conduct which ought to be observed, to prevent all inconveniences to secure the common welfare, and the repose of each individual power ; if this however should not be attained, and the negotiation be broke off, their Imperial and Swedish Majesties should come to an agreement with the States about the succour they would furnish for the defence of the Spanish Netherlands.

Mean

Mean while I looked upon the raising the 16,000 men, which the Prince of Orange intended to propose, as the most important affair; I spoke to some of my friends, who had the most interest with the leading men in Amsterdam, and suggested all I thought of any weight to dissuade them from such a measure; I told them the King was desirous of peace, but if the States General made new levies, the King would in honour be obliged to oppose them, and act against them with all his vigour; and thus they would find themselves involved in a bloody war, from the very desire of avoiding such an evil. The council of Amsterdam sent one of their members to me, to enquire whether I could assure them, that the King would not declare war, in case they refused the 16,000 men. They entreated me to let them know if I was acquainted with his Majesty's sentiments, and whether I could assure them upon this head, promising at the same time, that they would depend entirely upon the answer I should return. I answered, with all the respect due to such a mark of confidence; and I ordered them to be informed, that I gave them my word, as a man of honour, that the King had no inclination to make war; that it was even needless to caution him against it; and that I could positively assure them, if they did not agree to the levy proposed by the Prince of Orange, they would remain in peace: but at the same time I declared to them, if they consented to this levy, the King would then keep no longer terms, but directly attack the Spanish Netherlands and the States General. I informed some of the well affected republicans of this, who offered themselves as sureties of the truth of my assurance; so that the ministry of Amsterdam acquainted me, that they would rest satisfied with what I said, and on their part they assured me, they would never
 consent

consent to raising 16,000 men ; that they entreated me only to keep my word as strictly as they should theirs ; and that they might the more faithfully execute what they promised, instead of three Deputies, whom they used to send to the assembly of Holland, they dispatched six, that they might speak with more strength and weight ; and they insisted that the proposal for raising the 16,000 men should be put into the hands of Commissaries to be examined. They used this expedient to prevent the Prince of Orange from bringing on this affair suddenly, and concluding it in his usual precipitate manner.

The Prince of Orange this same evening could not help expressing his uneasiness at the conduct of the city of Amsterdam to one of his friends, with whom I was acquainted : he told him he was certain, he should make them agree to this new levy, as he had done in many other things, but they would comply too late, and out of season ; that he saw plainly they wanted to spin out this affair to have it brought before the general assembly, to be held the 15th of November, where they used to regulate the state of the army, and that then, after many evasive shifts they would at length acquiesce ; but that they did considerable prejudice in most affairs by this tardiness in their motions.

The Prince of Orange not being able to hinder the proposal for the new levy from being put into the hands of the Commissaries, agreeable to the request of the deputies of Amsterdam, undertook in one day to finish this affair, which, according to form, ought to have continued upon the carpet above a fortnight. For this purpose, he assembled the commissaries of the nobles, and of the eleven principal towns in Holland ; and he insisted they should immediately enter upon the affair. The body of nobles, and eight of the town, were for making the

the levy; those of Delft and Leyden excused themselves from delivering their opinion, alledging, they had no other orders from their superiors, but to hear the reasons advanced on each side, and to make a report thereof: but the deputies of Amsterdam declared, their city was positively against this levy, which they said would certainly draw a war upon them; for no sooner would it be resolved, than his Majesty would raise thrice the number of troops. That there was no other expedient adviseable, but to press the Spaniards to come to an accommodation, and to entreat the King of England to become mediator; for it seemed probable, his Majesty would still accept of a satisfactory equivalent. They advanced also many other arguments, and always remained firm to their orders, viz. not to consent to this levy. In short, the Prince of Orange kept them from nine in the morning till five in the afternoon, without being able to make them alter their opinion.

But what vexed him still more was, that the senate of Amsterdam gave their commissaries a paper of instructions, consisting of eight particular points, which they entreated them to be fully satisfied upon, before they should enter upon the raising sixteen thousand troops. These eight points were:

I. How far the obligation extended which the States General had entered into of assisting Spain.

II. Whether there was not hopes of bringing about an accommodation with Spain, and if there were not ways and means still remaining to effect this.

III. If the treaty of alliance betwixt Spain and Sweden was ratified.

IV. What the States General could promise themselves from treaties with the Electors of Bavaria and Saxony, and the Duke of Hanover, which
had

had been so much talked about, without ever being once communicated to the city of Amsterdam.

V. What succour was to be expected from the Emperor and his allies, and especially from Sweden.

VI. What force Spain could furnish for her own defence.

VII. To consider the power of his christian Majesty.

VIII. To take into consideration the decrease of the public finances, which were almost exhausted.

They insisted upon having satisfaction as to these articles, and delivered their own sentiments upon them in the strongest and warmest terms.

The Prince of Orange had next day a very warm dialogue with the deputies of this city; he talked so loud, that a person, who was in an adjoining room, told me he heard him say: "Well, gentlemen, if I was to go into the sentiments of your city, and be for the Spaniards giving up Luxemburg, I assure you we could never bring them to such a concession."

This I immediately sent notice of to the King, to shew him that the city of Amsterdam had openly declared to the Prince of Orange, that the Spaniards ought to give up Luxemburg; because this would the more enable his Majesty to take measures in regard to that place. The Prince of Orange was highly enraged against the city of Amsterdam, inso-much, that Benting told one of his friends, he had resolved to declare to the States of Holland, if they continued to oppose this levy, he would quit the Hague, and allow things to go on any how, without giving himself the least trouble. This was a threat he never intended to carry into execution, he only thought to intimidate them. As for my part, I did all in my power to confirm their resolution, and the same evening I sent them a person to inform them of every thing which I thought could

could tend to support them in such favourable sentiments.

The Prince of Orange, though greatly exasperated against the city of Amsterdam, was still more so against Van Buning, who after having engaged him in leagues against France, now of a sudden deserted him, and joined with the city of Amsterdam. This Burgomaster had indeed supported him in preventing the States General from making an alliance with France in 1679, and had assisted him to the utmost of his power in thwarting all the resolutions of this city, in favour of France. He had been no less zealous than the Prince of Orange, to form an alliance betwixt the States General and England. He had likewise acted in concert with him, in endeavouring to bring about an alliance with all the Princes of Europe, in order to support a war against France; but when a rupture was ready to happen, Van Buning finding things did not answer his expectations, and that the allies were not in a condition in two years to furnish a force sufficient to oppose his Majesty, declared to the Prince of Orange, that the only way was to make satisfaction to his Majesty, and at the same time to make a league with England, which all the christian powers might enter into; and yet he said, he could promise France would not undertake any thing, either by open force or re-union. The Prince of Orange would not acquiesce with these reasons, and reproached Van Buning for deserting him when he was about to execute the design formed by mutual concert: that things were now too far advanced to recede; and as for his part, after having engaged Spain, he could never consent she should give an equivalent for the King's pretensions, nor would he suffer him to take it by force. These different sentiments, which nevertheless tended, though by quite opposite

site means, to form a league against France, created a misunderstanding between Van Buning and the Prince of Orange, so that the former went in with the citizens of Amsterdam, who openly opposed the Prince of Orange's measures, and especially this design of raising sixteen thousand men.

This, however, did not reconcile Van Buning to the well affected of the other towns, for he never could procure their confidence. I asked the reason of this from some of my friends amongst the republicans. They said their coldness to Van Buning was not so much owing to his fickleness and inconstancy of temper, as because they perceived, though there was at present a disagreement betwixt him and the Prince of Orange, yet there was nevertheless a great conformity in their sentiments, as I have observed; since both one and the other seemed desirous to form an inseparable attachment betwixt the States General and England.

For this reason, such advantage as might be expected was not reaped from the conduct of Van Buning. One of the most sensible persons in the Republic told me, this Burgomaster declared openly at the private conferences, that the Spaniards ought to be obliged to accept of the arbitration, that peace might be more speedily concluded, and a treaty of guaranty formed with England, and treaties entered upon with the rest of the Princes in Europe; but as they knew this scheme of a general alliance had already very nigh kindled a war in Europe, and as they saw an alliance with England tended to the ruin of their state, and the destruction of their liberty; they would, therefore, never join with a man, who could at any time be reconciled to the Prince of Orange; and if he acted in concert with the Prince and Pensionary Fagel, they might carry affairs as they pleased, and nobody be able to oppose them.

them. As for those persons in Amsterdam, who were less daring, but more favourably disposed than Van Buning, they had quite different views; but they had no person of consequence to head their party, or to support their measures with proper spirit.

The Prince of Orange having sent me a map of the Netherlands, with a line of separation, to mark out the King's dominions and those of his catholic Majesty; I wrote my royal master, that I would not have done myself the honour of giving him an account of this last proposal, did I not apprehend it to be my duty to lay before his Majesty whatever should be mentioned from the Prince of Orange; that the proposal, however, was so unreasonable, that I would not formally charge myself with it; that it plainly shewed, the Prince of Orange sought only with a shew of civility to disengage himself from a negotiation he had commenced when he thought Vienna was lost, and when the Spaniards assured him, if this misfortune had happened, they should be obliged to submit implicitly to whatever terms his Majesty should impose upon them. That he had sent me a map of the Spanish Netherlands, wherein he had marked with a line what should henceforth be the boundary betwixt his Majesty's dominions and those of his catholic Majesty. That he placed on the side of France, Courtray, with that part of this chatellany upon the confines of Deinche, Leuse, and what is beyond, as far as Tournay, Beaumont, and Chimay. He included on the side of the Spaniards, Bouvines, and drew a direct line from thence to Luxemburg, which cut off from his Majesty all belonging to him in that Dutchy on this side of the line, in regard to Holland where I then was.

All

All the deputies of the assembly of Holland returned on the 21st of October, excepting those of Amsterdam: but I had received intelligence from persons belonging to the council of this city, that they had come to a resolution, the foregoing evening, still to oppose the levy.

The deputies of Amsterdam having arrived next day, and the States of Holland being assembled, they again positively refused to consent to the levy; those of Delft and Leyden joined them also, and the Prince of Orange could obtain nothing. He did not however desist, but again referred the matter to their deliberation. The deputies of Leyden altered their opinion, and came into that of the other towns: but the deputies of Delft remained firmly united with those of Amsterdam. The Prince of Orange sent them again to their towns to deliberate upon the affair a-new; and at the same time he demanded of the Spanish envoy a list of all the places which he pretended the King had taken possession of since the peace of Nimeguen, and he ordered nineteen copies to be printed, and sent them the nobles, and the eighteen towns of Holland.

What rendered the Prince of Orange still more zealous in regard to the interest of the Spaniards, besides the reasons so universally known, was, that he had requested the Marquis of Grana, at the abovementioned conference in August, to write to his court, not to consent to any thing the King demanded, and he gave the strongest assurances, the States would assist the Spaniards. The Marquis of Grana having accordingly dispatched an express to Spain for this purpose, his courier arrived when the council were upon the point of granting satisfaction to the King. His arrival produced an entire alteration in the measures intended by the Spanish court, for they instantly resolved to reject his Majesty's proposals;

posals; and thus the Prince of Orange became answerable for the event of this affair.

The Marquis of Grana being no less engaged than the Prince of Orange, and equally desirous of a war, made the Dutch troops march under Brussels, and proposed that they should proceed in conjunction with those of Spain to levy contributions on the French territories: but General Alva, of the Province of Friesland, who commanded these troops, having refused, the Marquis of Grana was obliged to order them back to their first station, and he sent a dispatch to complain to the Prince of Orange.

The deputies of Amsterdam having returned to the Hague, the Prince of Orange for the third time brought the levy under consideration; but they still opposing it, he sent them back again to their constituents, and they returned on the 28th with the same orders, and for the third time rejected his proposal.

The Prince of Orange endeavoured to make advantage of the orders given at this time by his Majesty, that Mr. Deval should leave France, and the declaration which Marshal D'Humieres had caused to be made to the Marquis of Grana, when he entered upon the Spanish territories, at the head of his Majesty's troops. He somewhat staggered the deputies of Amsterdam, but he could not entirely persuade them; and I, on my part, did all I could to confirm them in their resolutions. However, I could not reap all the advantage which might have been expected from the favourable resolutions of the city of Amsterdam. There were at this time two opinions which prevailed in Amsterdam. One of those, who were desirous all differences betwixt his Majesty and Spain should be adjusted, and that a stronger attachment than ever should be formed with France: The other arose from Van Buning, who

who was really desirous that all disputes should be terminated without delay; but that they should at the same time unite themselves with England, and form new treaties of alliance with all the Princes willing to enter into them. Van Buning maintained, nothing could tend more to the welfare of the States, than forming a strict union with England. He assured some persons of the States, that his christian Majesty and the King of England were irreconcilable enemies, and the Duke of York still more so; and that all this appearance of friendship was only an outward shew, occasioned by necessity: that his Majesty made use of the King of England to procure satisfaction from the Spaniards, without being obliged to have recourse to war; and that the King of England and the Duke of York had still more occasion for his Majesty to establish and keep up their authority, till they should dare to call a Parliament; but that as soon as the King of England should be freed from any apprehension of his Parliament, and the States General be willing to support him, and to enter into the league they had formerly refused, then it would soon be seen, that his Britannic Majesty would entirely desert France.

Mean while, the Prince of Orange spared neither threats nor caresses to obtain the sixteen thousand troops. He once more assembled the States of Holland, and declared to them, they would soon see a year like that of 1672; that at that period he was not so conversant in affairs to foresee the fatal consequences, as at present; but he could assure the States, if they allowed two months to elapse without raising new reinforcements, they would find themselves the year following reduced to much greater extremity than they had felt in 1672, and with much less resources than at that time. Pensinary Fagel on his part too, harangued them with

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great warmth; he assured the States of Holland, that the Emperor was about to conclude a peace with the Grand Turk, and that he was positive there would be a general treaty of confederacy the ensuing spring, amongst all the powers of Europe against the King of France.

But all these efforts proving ineffectual, he now endeavoured to make all possible advantage of the resolution he had drawn the States General into on the 4th of October, to enter into a conference with the Ministers of their allies, and the Spanish Resident; he appointed Pensionary Fagel to give an account of this conference to the States of Holland. He got them likewise to name commissaries to examine this affair. His design was to shew the Province of Holland, since even in the opinion of their allies (who consisted however, only of the Emperor's resident and the Swedish envoy) they could not find means of amicably adjusting the differences betwixt France and Spain (for this was what the Pensionary's report contained) there was now no other method to pursue, but to put the Low Countries in a state of defence, and consequently to raise levies.

But the Prince of Orange did not succeed by this expedient; for the commissaries having examined the report, and laid it before the States of Holland, the body of nobles and some of the towns devoted to the Prince of Orange, having declared, that though they were for trying all possible means of accommodation, they were of opinion nevertheless, the levy ought not to be deferred; the deputies of the greatest part of the towns declared, they could say nothing upon that particular, not having instructions from their constituents. As for those of Amsterdam, they declared, before any thing could be resolved about the levy, all possible means ought

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to be tried to settle the differences betwixt France and Spain in an amicable manner, and that they were persuaded the affair might be accommodated; that they could not however explain themselves farther, till they should consult their superiors; thus the deputies of Holland separated, in order to receive advice from their respective towns.

The Marquis of Grana sent Mr. Delval, upon his return from France, to assist the Prince of Orange, who advised him to go to Amsterdam whilst the present affairs were under deliberation, and to spread such reports as might be conducive to determine this city to consent to the levy.

I used my utmost endeavours to discover the secret instructions of Delval; and I found one of the principal things recommended to him was, to urge the Prince of Orange to demand the Swedes at Gottenburg. And this indeed was the first thing mentioned in a conference with him of two hours; but the Prince of Orange told him, that things were not yet in such a situation, that he could venture to propose the transportation of these troops; that he could not prevail on the States General to raise sixteen thousand men, and therefore was at present unwilling to propose any other affair; so that the fleet remained for a considerable time cruizing northward, in expectation of receiving new instructions from the Prince of Orange. Twice, however, it sailed to Gottenburg, without taking aboard a single Swede: though, at the same time, there is no room to doubt, but the Prince of Orange flattered himself he should obtain permission from the States General for embarking the Swedish troops; or that the King of Sweden would not refuse them, though even the commander of the fleet should have no other orders than those from the Prince of Orange alone; but several persons in Amsterdam, sometime after, received letters from Gottenburg, and even

from Stockholm, signifying, that the King of Sweden had refused to allow the embarkation of the troops in the Dutch fleet, though the admiral had no orders from the States General, but only from the Prince of Orange.

Although I did not choose to appear openly to interest myself in the resolution which the States General should take in regard to the levy proposed, yet I failed not underhand to work upon the magistrates of Amsterdam; and as I knew the Prince of Orange and Pensionary Fagel had repeated for two years successively, sometimes that his Majesty had resolved on war, and that the States General had no other method to pursue but to put themselves in a state of defence; at other times they would affirm the vigorous resolutions they had taken had put a stop to his Majesty's designs; I therefore thought it incumbent upon me to inform all with whom I had any correspondence, that his Majesty had neither resolved upon war, nor was he afraid of their power; but that he insisted upon satisfaction for his claims, and if the States would procure him such satisfaction, they might remain assured of the most profound repose; but if they thought by augmentation of their forces, or by new treaties to support the Spaniards in their obstinacy, I left them to judge what they might expect from such behaviour. These remonstrances gave a new light to several persons in Amsterdam, and prevented their going blindly into all the Prince of Orange's propositions; they then represented to their friends, that things were not so desperate as some would make them believe, and as they were well assured reasonable terms might be obtained from France, there was therefore no occasion for making new levies.

On the first of November I sent intelligence of an affair which seemed to me of the utmost consequence. I had discovered by means of a person, in whom the Prince of Orange put the highest confidence, that

that though in raising sixteen thousand men, the principal design of this Prince was to support the war, or rather to kindle it in the Low Countries, yet he had likewise, as a secondary view in this scheme, to have a powerful army in Holland which he might make use of in England, either when the King of Great Britain should drop off, or, as he always expected, when any other favourable opportunity should occur, when he might enter into this kingdom with an armed force; for he doubted not, if he could once procure this levy from the States General, that it would be an easy matter for him, under one pretext or another, to have them kept up four or five years, as he thought proper; and he persuaded himself, that before this time was elapsed, he should be able to make use of these troops to execute his designs in regard to England. I not only gave notice of this intelligence to the King and M. Barillon, but I also took care it should be communicated to the English envoy by a person not in the least suspected.

On the 4th of this month I informed his Majesty of another advice, which I received by a very secret channel, that as soon as news was received of his Majesty's squadron in the Baltic being about to return to France, the Prince of Orange had sent instructions to Willem Bastians, commander of the Dutch fleet, to sail towards Gottenburg, to meet the French fleet: they would in all probability, he said, insist upon his striking, but this he must refuse, and if they fired upon him, he should immediately come to an engagement. Willem Bastians made answer to the Prince of Orange, that the States General had delivered him their resolution, enjoining him not to strike to the French squadron, if he found them upon the Dutch coast at a certain depth, but otherwise he was to strike where ever he met them. The Prince of Orange, nevertheless,

wrote him again, to do as he had ordered; adding, he would be surety no harm should ensue, and if the States General should call him to an account, he had only to answer, that he had obeyed his master, who had a right to command him.

As to the proposal lately made by the Prince of Orange, the King returned for answer, that he could not give up any of his possessions near Luxemburg, because this place being incapable to serve the Spaniards in the defence of any of their territories, would only enable them to distress his Majesty's subjects; he would therefore never grant them such a power. He only commanded me to inform myself more exactly of the places to be given up, and those to be kept for Spain in that division of the Netherlands, which the Prince had lately proposed.

Mean while I availed myself not a little, and gained considerably with the magistrates of Amsterdam by that readiness which his Majesty shewed to settle his differences with Spain; so that on the 4th of November, no less than seven deputies returned from this city to the Hague, to support their resolution against levying the sixteen thousand troops, and in this they to the last persisted.

This same day I received a letter by an express from his Majesty. In this he gave me to understand, that, as my last letters had entirely confirmed him in his opinion, that the Prince of Orange was not in earnest as to his proposals, he therefore judged it proper, I should inform the States General on what conditions the disputes he had with Spain might be terminated; and at the time when Marshal D'Humieres by his orders attacked a certain garrison in the Low Countries, it was his intention I should then declare to the States General, the terms on which he was willing to make an accommodation with Spain.

That

That very evening I demanded an audience with the States General, and I begged there might not, according to custom, a day intervene betwixt my request and the audience. This precaution succeeded according to my wishes, since the States General were informed of the conditions on which his Majesty offered peace before they heard of the Spanish garrison being besieged; for the Marquis of Grana's courier, who brought the news of the siege of Courtray, did not arrive at the Hague till an hour after I had received an audience. Besides, I wanted to declare the pacific intentions of his Majesty to the States General the same day that the States of Holland assembled; not doubting but my memorial, which they would immediately carry from the States General to the States of Holland, would be of great service to the deputies of Amsterdam, who were firmly to oppose the Prince of Orange's designs.

On the 5th of November I went again to the States General, and told them, my master was willing to submit his disputes with Spain to the arbitration of the King of England, and though the town of Luxemburg, surrounded with towns and countries belonging to his Majesty, could be of no great service when its fortifications were demolished, yet he would be satisfied with it for an equivalent; especially, as this place could no ways be prejudicial to the barrier, which the States General so ardently wished to preserve: but that the backwardness of the Spaniards to come into any reasonable measures, had obliged his Majesty to order his troops to advance to Flanders, and to press the Marquis of Grana to give him such satisfaction, as he could in justice demand. However, as they had only answered his demands by acts of hostility, his Majesty intended no longer to defer using the means

providence had put in his power to do himself justice, but to attack some place in Flanders which belonged to his catholic Majesty. Nevertheless, as his principal intention was to establish peace throughout all Europe, he would willingly make the States General acquainted with what he would accept as an equivalent for his rights and claims on Alost, Ghent, and other places.

That the way to settle speedily the differences between his Majesty and Spain, was to give up the town of Luxemburg in its present condition, or even with its fortifications razed, with the few villages depending thereupon, in number but about fourteen or fifteen.

That if the Spaniards rejected this offer, as a second equivalent, his Majesty would accept of Dixmude and Courtray, with their dependencies; nevertheless, that Dintz and its dependency (though it properly belonged to the chatellany of Courtray) should remain to the Spaniards, and the fortifications of Dixmude and Courtray, nay the citadel of Courtray, be demolished; so that there should only remain one wall for the security of the manufactures and commerce of these two towns. Besides, that he should have the villages belonging to the chatellany of Ath, which had been formerly joined to the government of Tournay, but his Majesty had consented they should be separated from thence by the treaty of Nimeguen, that he might not retard the re-establishment of peace; Beaumont and Bouvines also, with their dependent villages, whereof there remained only four or five, the rest having come under his Majesty, by possession taken of them in his name, before raising the siege of Luxemburg; and lastly Chimay, with its dependences.

That

That if the catholic King chose rather to give an equivalent in Catalonia or Navarre; as to the first, his Majesty required what remained to the Crown of Spain in the county of Cerdagne, to which Puigcerda (which was already demolished) belongs, with Seau d'Urgel, Campfredon, and Castel faillite, with their dependences; or Roses, Gironne, and Cap de Quieres.

And in Navarre, his Majesty would be contented with Fontarabia and Pampeluna, with their dependencies. That these were the conditions on which they might establish a sure and happy peace before the year was ended; and that if the Emperor would accept of a truce, which the King had offered for twenty or five and twenty years, he consented, that the Princes of Europe, who were willing, should become guaranties of these treaties.

Whilst I thus declared the King's intentions to the States General, delivering them what I had said in writing, the deputies of Amsterdam spoke warmly against the new levy in the States of Holland, this day assembled. The Pensionary of this city declaimed above an hour. He represented the damage a war would bring upon their commerce; and that their liberty of fishing without molestation, was of itself more considerable to the republic, than what his Majesty demanded for a satisfaction; and that when Amsterdam had refused to grant the new levy, this was not the sentiment of a few individuals in the city, but all had unanimously concurred in this opinion. The Prince made a reply, and said, if the ambassador of France was to speak, he could not express himself more aptly than the gentlemen of Amsterdam had done for the interest of France. That he agreed it was right to think of preserving their commerce, but that they must not act in such a manner as to ruin the rest of the

country upon this consideration only. That though Amsterdam had so great a concern in commerce, the rest of the towns, which had not so much, or even those who had none, were nevertheless members of the republic: that he himself was more deeply interested in the preservation of the Republic, than all the city of Amsterdam; that he regarded not this unanimity of the council of their city; that he allowed all the towns were free, and uncontrollable in their resolutions; but that he would never suffer one town to give law to the rest; and that if he must march with a staff in the street (this is a Flemish proverb, which expresses with some strength, if he was driven to extremities) he would have recourse to this, and would consider Amsterdam no more than the least town in the Republic. But my memorial being at this juncture brought from the States General into the Province of Holland, the Prince of Orange was transported to such a degree of passion, that though a man of temper, yet he had now no command of himself; and quitted the assembly, before it broke up, in the most abrupt and precipitate manner.

Pensionary Fagel, who on the other hand is a very passionate man, acknowledged, that the Prince of Orange was too hasty; he wanted to reconcile matters, and advanced many arguments to the deputies of Amsterdam to persuade them to a levy. One of them replied, that what related to affairs abroad, was not to be taken under consideration, till those of a domestic nature were first discussed. That a levy of sixteen thousand men was demanded; that the city of Amsterdam payed more than a fourth of what the seven Provinces altogether contributed for the common expence, and frequently too they advanced money for the rest; that he entreated then the Province of Holland would consider

sider if they were in a condition to furnish the expence necessary for the sixteen thousand men ; since the city of Amsterdam, after having examined the state of their finances, declared, they were unable to contribute their proportion.

Thus the assembly broke up, without the Prince of Orange's creatures being able to effect any thing ; and the deputies were sent to their towns with my memorial, to deliberate upon it, and to return in four days to form their final resolution upon my memorial, as well as the proposal of the levy.

On the 8th of November I informed the King my master of all these particulars, and I acquainted him, that as this one city stood out alone against the other seventeen, the States of Holland had wrote to the magistrates of Amsterdam, entreating them not to remain obstinate in their opinion ; but however, if this city would not comply, by the constitution of their Province, they said they would be obliged to send a very considerable deputation from the other cities to reside in Amsterdam, at the expence of this city, till she should acquiesce with the general opinion ; but that this was an extremity which they had not had recourse to but once since the establishment of the Republic, when the little city of Gorcum wanted to have money coined which did not belong to the States General ; that nevertheless, they had begun this method of procedure against the citizens of Amsterdam, the Prince of Orange having caused a letter to be wrote by the deputies of all the other towns of Holland, to be given to those of Amsterdam ; but that the inhabitants of this city would not regard the deputation, for this sort of punishment could only frighten the petty towns, which might be affected with such an expence.

However,

However, I thought it would not be amiss to speak to the deputies of Amsterdam before they returned, to strengthen them against this new stratagem of the Prince of Orange. I sent privately to them, not venturing to go myself, for fear of rendering them too much suspected, for the Prince of Orange had already reproached them with acting in concert with me; I assured them, if they persevered in refusing the levy, that the Spaniards would give satisfaction to the King, and there would be no war. And upon the answer I received from them, I wrote the King, that these deputies were returned home thoroughly convinced of the reasons his Majesty had given for attacking Courtray, and more resolved than ever, notwithstanding this siege, to refuse the levy of sixteen thousand men.

I was accordingly informed at their return, that the council of their city had followed their sentiments, and that they were come with the most ample and favourable instructions upon the present juncture of affairs. I was even so lucky as to procure a copy of them before they were laid before the Province of Holland. The principal heads of these instructions were:

I. Absolutely to refuse the levy.

II. To demand, that all the Provinces should pay in, before the end of the year, all the arrears they were indebted to the public fund, and to the city of Amsterdam, which had advanced considerable sums for them.

The Provinces were not in a condition to answer this demand in the space of ten years.

III. To demand that the state of the finances should be examined into; that if they found they were obliged by an accommodation being refused, or by a general rupture, to raise levies, they might
be

be enabled to judge what funds there were to defray such expences.

This article was wholly levelled at the Pensionary Fagel and the Prince of Orange. The former was accounted a bad financier, for it was believed he had allowed the Prince of Orange to make use of a considerable part of the money raised for other purposes than the public service; and as the account had not been examined since the Pensionary entered upon the administration, it was believed such an examination would bring him into difficulties, from which he could not easily extricate himself.

IV. The deputies of Amsterdam were to declare, the council of this town was of opinion, it would be advisable to accept of his Majesty's second proposal, and they were to demand commissaries to be named, who might confer with me, in order to consider more fully the difficulties which might happen in the execution of this proposal, and thereby to take away from the Spaniards all pretence for a refusal, and so make them acquiesce in a general accommodation.

V. They had orders to declare to the assembly, that if, after the taking of Courtray, his Majesty should attack any other place, they should then return to Amsterdam to consider whether the levy was necessary. They were called upon some days afterwards, to perform this part of their instructions, when news came that Dixmude was attacked; but they made answer, that Dixmude and Courtray being in one equivalent, they reckoned these two places one and the same.

What rendered the magistrates of Amsterdam so resolute on this occasion (besides the general reasons for the public welfare and the assurances I had given them, that they would have no war if they refused

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the sixteen thousand men) was the three extraordinary steps lately taken by the Prince of Orange.

The first was, his having sent succour to the Spaniards without the consent of the States General, and directly contrary to the inclination of the city of Amsterdam, and in having given fourteen thousand men instead of eight thousand. Secondly, his having sent the fleet of the States to Gottenburg without their knowledge, or without giving them any reason for thus hazarding their ships at such an advanced season. This conduct of the Prince of Orange had given just cause of apprehension to the magistrates of Amsterdam, that if they granted the levy, they would no longer have it in their power to hinder war, since the Prince of Orange thus disposed of their troops and ships according to his sovereign pleasure. The third affair which irritated the city of Amsterdam was, the bad treatment which Van Buning and their other deputies had received from the Prince of Orange, who had not only insulted them with abusive language, but also endeavoured to intimidate them with menaces.

The assembly of the States of Holland on the 12th of November sat that day from eleven of the morning till five of the Evening. At their breaking up, I was informed that the deputies of Amsterdam had read there the memorials which I have mentioned, and that they remained steady in their refusal of the levy, and in the declaration they had made, that the only method to be pursued was, to endeavour to bring about an accommodation. So that after warm disputes on both sides, the Prince of Orange and Pensionary Fagel made the States of Holland resolve to have recourse to that form which I have observed was but once put in practice since the establishment of the Republic; that they should
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name a formal deputation from the body of nobles, and the ten principal cities of Holland, to go to Amsterdam, to oblige this city to consent to the levy. They accordingly named four deputies from the nobles, and two from each of the ten towns, with Pensionary Fagel, and the Prince of Orange at the head of this deputation, as first noble, and governor of the Province.

The Prince of Orange now found himself reduced to a great extremity, to be thus obliged to shew all Europe, that the first city of the States, and that which payed one fourth of all the taxes on the seven Provinces, formally opposed what he desired.

He was extremely sensible this would hurt him greatly with his allies: he, therefore, that same evening, sent a message to Amsterdam, to inform them of the resolution taken, believing they would make some advances to prevent this deputation coming to them; but they sent back word, that they could not alter their opinion, and would expect the deputies of Holland.

The Spanish envoy, who had caused a list to be printed, of all the places of which the King had taken possession, presented also this day a memorial, full of complaints and falsehoods; but this, however, had no effect upon the magistrates of Amsterdam.

On the 15th of this month, an eschevin of Amsterdam having sent me word, that he wanted to communicate to me somewhat from two Burgo-masters of this city, I set out in the night to meet him, about three leagues from the Hague, and I got to the place appointed at day break. He told me, that the council of Amsterdam having been fully informed of the equivalents which the King offered to receive, were of opinion they were extremely reasonable: that Van Buning was the only person who desired, that the King should
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give up to the Spaniards his possessions in Luxemburg; that they had also resolved anew to persist in refusing the levy, and that they were not only unanimous in this opinion, but that the whole thirty-six of the council had signed a written agreement, never to depart from this resolution.

About this time I received intelligence, that the Prince of Orange had formed a design to raise the levy, notwithstanding the council of Amsterdam refused to contribute thereto; and amongst many other expedients which the Pensionary Fagel proposed for that purpose, this was one of the principal; to get the Provinces to declare, that since the city of Amsterdam refused to contribute to the levy of sixteen thousand men, they would not give any thing towards the expence of the fleet, which the city of Amsterdam wanted to have ready to put to sea in the spring; and that by means of this declaration, he would have it in his power to take the sums which the Provinces had destined for the equipment of this fleet, to make up that proportional part which the city of Amsterdam ought to furnish for maintaining the sixteen thousand troops.

This obliged me to write to the King my master, that though I looked upon his Majesty's designs to be so far sacred as not to pretend to penetrate into them; yet I accounted it my duty to represent to him, that if he had resolved to order any place in the Netherlands to be attacked, such an undertaking would produce very different effects in Holland, according to the time it should be executed; for if he attacked any place in Flanders, at the time when the city of Amsterdam refused their consent to the levy, the Prince of Orange would reproach them as being the cause of such an attempt, and he would affirm this would never have happened, had they come into the general resolution; and the
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council of Amsterdam being thereby rendered desperate, would, in all probability, give into this assertion, and would then not only consent to the levy of 16000, but even 30000 troops. That on the other hand, if his Majesty did not allow his troops to come to action, whilst the city of Amsterdam obstructed the levy, and waited till the Prince of Orange should procure such a resolution from the provinces, in spite of the opposition of Amsterdam, and this be carried into execution: in that case it might be declared, especially to the city of Amsterdam, that the resolution of the States General to make levies, had obliged his Majesty to order his troops to come to action: the people of Amsterdam would then become more inflamed against the Prince of Orange, and the other cities, which he had in a manner obliged to consent to the levy, and had engaged them in such a measure only by assurances that it was the surest way to avoid a war, would then be ready to join with the city of Amsterdam, or at least would not obstruct his Majesty's undertakings.

Mean while the Prince of Orange lost no time, but employed all his friends to use their utmost endeavours with the magistrates of Amsterdam; he had from thence three or four expresses in a day: however, not being able to obtain any thing, he sent Pensionary Fagel and the deputies of the towns of Holland, to make the last effort; and he himself went to a house of his, three leagues from Amsterdam, to wait there for Pensionary Fagel.

But being informed that nothing could shake the council of Amsterdam, he went there the 15th of November, about six in the evening. His adherents thought his coming there looked auspicious, believing he would not have come, had he not been assured of success in his design. At his arrival he
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ordered it to be declared, that he came there in quality of governor. No body doubted but he had taken this step to be present at the deliberations of the council of the town; for when the people in 1672 obliged those in the administration to confer so much authority on the Prince of Orange, and when all ranks strove with a kind of emulation, to render him more powerful, the regency of Amsterdam at that time granted him the privilege of being present at the council of their city, as often as he should come there as governor of the province. But they avoided the snare laid for them on this occasion very artfully; for instead of bringing the affairs in question before the council of the town, they came to a resolution to refer the examination of all memorials to be delivered, to eleven of their principal members, whom they appointed commissioners for that purpose.

Whilst the Prince of Orange was at Amsterdam, the fleet of the States met with a dreadful disaster, in returning from Gottenburg. I wrote the King, that whatever intention the Prince of Orange had in sending the fleet of the States to Gottenburg, whether to take aboard the Swedish troops, or to satisfy the King of Sweden, who insisted that all the fleet should appear upon his coasts, however it was, that this affair would certainly hurt him greatly; that the fleet, when ready to enter the harbours, had been overtaken with a terrible tempest, which had begun about 12 at night on Monday, and lasted till Wednesday about six in the morning; that the fleet had been dispersed, and it was not yet known what damage it had sustained; that the first news gave an account that some of the ships had come in in a very shattered condition; three had been stranded, and nothing saved but the crews, and two others had been cast away.

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Mean while the Prince of Orange went the day after his arrival to the town-hall, with all the deputation: Pensionary Fagel declaimed there near three hours, and delivered what he had spoke in writing, which was put into the hands of the commissaries. The magistrates of Amsterdam, at coming out of the hall, invited the Prince of Orange, and the deputation to dinner, and regaled them in a sumptuous manner. The burgomasters, and all the members of the council were present. The Prince of Orange, who had brought with him some excellent topers, made designedly a sort of debauch with the burgomasters of Amsterdam, to try if he could find them more tractable in their cups. His creatures run about every where the remainder of the day, and all next day; they cajoled, they prayed, they solicited, and acted in every shape to bring over the gentlemen of Amsterdam. Nevertheless, the advices I received, positively assured me, they would not recede; and they sent me two expresses next day, to acquaint me, that the commissioners had employed the whole day in drawing up their opinion, which was indeed nothing but a repetition of the memorial sent before to the States of Holland, which may be reduced to four particulars, 1. Positively to refuse their consent to the levy. 2. That the only way was to endeavour to settle the differences betwixt his Majesty and the King of Spain in an amicable manner. 3. That they should make an enquiry into the state of the finances. 4. That they should press the other members of the state to pay what they stood indebted of arrears.

The Prince of Orange the day following invited the magistrates of Amsterdam to dinner. The burgomasters and echevins went, and many of them got drunk with the Prince's courtiers: but next day after their debauch, they shewed themselves at
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the council cool and sober, and they altered not their opinion for all the good cheer and cajoleries lavished upon them.

The Prince of Orange stirred not from his house all the 18th of this month: some believed he did not care to expose himself to hear the imprecations which the people then uttered against him. All the seafaring people, especially the wives and daughters of the sailors, were running about in the streets in the most frantic manner, making the most hideous uproar about the loss of the fleet, wherein their fathers and husbands had perished, of which he had been the cause, in sending them to Gottenburg, at such a season. The bad news encreased every moment; and they found at length, that above ten of their largest ships were lost, besides those which had been so disabled as to be unfit for service. These ships were so leaky, that they perished at once in the storm; for they were not in a condition to live at sea, as I before observed.

On the 22d of November, the Magistrates of Amsterdam returned such an answer to the Prince of Orange, as I had before wrote the King they had resolved upon; and I took the liberty to observe to his Majesty, that it was extraordinary they had kept the secret in such a manner from the Prince of Orange; that though he had tools and friends in the council of Amsterdam, yet he knew so little of the matter, that when they came to declare to him the answer of the city, he was struck with astonishment, and a paleness appeared in his countenance.

He did not however take this first refusal; he demanded that the city of Amsterdam should name commissaries to enter into conference with the deputies of Holland. They accordingly met, and each remained in their sentiments. Pensionary Fagel having drawn up a reply to the answer of the

city of Amsterdam, carried it with the deputation, and called upon them for a replication. The gentlemen of Amsterdam sent next day the same commissaries, to declare they had no other answer to give than what they had already given: upon this the Prince of Orange demanded a new conference; this was granted, but there passed nothing but protestations on each side, of the fatal consequences which would come from such proceedings.

At length he was willing to have his last answer; and he went to the town-hall, on Sunday morning, to receive it. He told them they entertained him in so genteel a manner, that it looked as if they desired to keep him a considerable time in their town; that they must know however, that this was not the purport of his journey; that he was to return their answer to the States of Holland; and he was apt to believe all those already given, were only the sentiments of a few individuals, and not of the council of thirty-six.

That though he saw the little desire they had to continue long in the union, he would take no notice of this, but would impute it to particular persons, giving them to understand however, he allowed them to be too much their own masters; that he had but too much reason to complain of the secret correspondences and unlawful practices they carried on with France; that nevertheless, laying aside all consideration to the deference and respect due to his person, and regarding only the interest of the state, he had exposed himself to all that might happen to him from the displeasure of their city; and that he had come in person to persuade them of the justice and good tendency of the resolutions which the States of Holland had taken; that he flattered himself, he in person, accompanied with all the deputies of the province, would have been able

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to bring them over to a reasonable way of thinking ; but that neither they nor he, notwithstanding all their remonstrances, and notwithstanding the pains and labour they had taken day and night for this purpose, could obtain any thing but ambiguous answers, and propositions for more time and delay.

But that, as he was acquainted with the sentiments of the States of Holland, he knew this would not satisfy them. So that, before he complained of the answers of the commissaries, named for this purpose, and the particular conferences he had with them, he still resolved in person, and in the name of all the deputation, to demand a categorical answer, not of the opinion of certain particular persons, as he had already observed, but of the whole council of thirty-six ; and to lay before them all the evils and terrible consequences which would ensue from an answer not conformable to the resolutions of the other members, that they might not plead their ignorance as an excuse.

The Pensionary of Amsterdam, in the name of his masters, replied, that they all acknowledged they wished the Prince of Orange had not pressed them to give a categorical answer, not from any scruple however of declaring their sentiments, but that their answer might appear less harsh and disagreeable ; and this from the respect and veneration which they had and always would have for his person : that nevertheless they had fully and precisely declared their sincere sentiments by word of mouth, as well as writing ; that they saw no necessity they were under to explain themselves farther, and they knew no person who could oblige them to it.

That as to what the Prince alledged about the sentiments of particular persons, they unanimously declared he was mistaken in this ; and they solemnly protested before the supreme Being, who knows the
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bottom of all hearts, and in presence of his Highness, who had done them great honour; that there was not one article in the answer which was not strictly conformable to the opinion of all those who composed the council of the city of Amsterdam.

That they durst now aver, as they could at all times, that he could not find more unanimity in sentiments, nor less opposition any where than amongst them.

That they aimed at nothing but the welfare of the Republic, the support of their religion, the preservation of peace, and they believed their resolutions were conformable to these purposes.

That they should have much to reply to what was advanced by the Prince of Orange; and that there were persons in the deputation, and even some who depended on them, of whom they had too great reason to complain (meaning Fagel, Pensionary of Holland) but they would reserve this to a proper time and place.

That if they had any thing particular to say in regard to the public welfare, they would give it in commission to the deputies they should send to the assembly of Holland, in which they thought in justice they ought to be accounted the principal member. This was one amongst many reasons why they thought there was no person who could oblige them to approve of the manner in which the rest had treated them; and they thought themselves in honour bound to guard against such usage for the future.

That they hoped these reasons would appear sufficient to the Prince of Orange to persuade him, not that they were unwilling to grant a levy, but that there being no necessity for it, they ought to oppose such a measure; that this was their resolution, in which they protested they would remain, and

for this purpose would give the fullest commission to their deputies.

That they found themselves obliged, from the strongest reasons, to think on the re-establishment of their finances, that in case of necessity they might have money to employ for the service of the Republic; especially as they found themselves so much drained by the great sums they had furnished since 1672, amounting, as the Prince of Orange knew, to more than 90 millions, which they were now obliged to demand.

That they were also desirous to declare to the Prince of Orange, that they thought it reasonable and necessary to take into consideration the proposals for an accommodation made by his Christian Majesty, which had been communicated to the States by his ambassador, in the memorial delivered on the fifth of November.

This reply irritated the Prince to a most amazing degree, and produced very warm altercations: he repeated so often that they kept unlawful correspondences with France, that the four regent burgomasters rose up, and after having talked together in a corner of the hall, they came to their seats again, and told him they owned they kept correspondence with France and many other States; that this was absolutely necessary and unavoidable in a city so powerful and of so much commerce as theirs; but that they never had any correspondence which they had not given an account of to the state; but as for him, he had ministers who carried on correspondences in all the courts of Europe, which he had not communicated to the States General; that they would however call him to an account one day or other, but the proper time was not yet come. One of the burgomasters told him, that if the city of Amsterdam had designed to alter their opinion, they

they would not now do it, but leave an example to posterity, that all the efforts of the Prince of Orange, and his presence, could not shake the council of the city of Amsterdam, nor turn them from their free resolutions.

The Prince of Orange could not contain himself longer; he got up hastily and left the hall, saying, he saw plainly they carried on secret intelligences, and knew with whom, but he swore he would make them repent of their conduct. The magistrates of Amsterdam proposed he should have dined with them at the breaking up of their council, and had accordingly provided a grand entertainment for him and the deputation: but when they went to wait upon him at his house, they were surprised to hear, that he had in great haste ordered the horses to his coach, and was gone with Benting and Pensionary Fagel, without taking leave of the Regency, as was usual.

Two days afterwards, the deputies of Amsterdam returned to the Hague with their answer, which the States of Holland had demanded. It was a confirmation of all they had said, and confuted what the Prince of Orange had laid to their charge, especially what regarded their having an unlawful correspondence with me. Mean while there were two or three of the Echevins who durst not come to the Hague, being afraid of some violence, for the Prince of Orange had particularly mentioned them in his menaces.

He had the answers and memorials of the city of Amsterdam, as well as those of the deputation read in the States of Holland. After this he proposed to have the levy raised in spite of that city; and Pensionary Fagel assured the assembly with an oath, that he knew, if the gentlemen of Amsterdam had granted the levy, an accommodation betwixt France

and Spain would have been already settled. The deputies of the towns, who had no orders to consent to a resolution directly opposed by the city of Amsterdam, would not acquiesce without the approbation of their superiors, and they returned to their towns to obtain their consent. I therefore wrote my master, that the only question was, how the council of Amsterdam would take this affair; that if they steadily opposed it, and refused supplies, the Prince of Orange would never be able to obtain his design, and would be obliged to submit; but if they acted coldly, and contented themselves, after having refused the levy, with only making protests against the resolution taken in opposition to their inclination, affairs would then be quieted by degrees, after a little noise.

The deputies of Amsterdam expressed their surprise, that in an affair where the unanimous opinion of all the towns was requisite, they should have taken a resolution contrary to the most powerful city of the state. They acquainted me however the same day, that they were obliged to use greater precaution than ever in regard to me, because the Prince of Orange, in full council at Amsterdam, had reproached them of carrying on a secret correspondence; he told them he knew I gave them fine words, and assured them of undisturbed repose, if they would refuse the levy; but that, on the contrary, he could assure them I imposed on them, and all my promises were only intended to amuse them till the approaching spring, when the war was to be commenced; and mean while his Majesty might strengthen his alliances, add to his forces, and keep the States General from putting the Spanish Netherlands in a state of defence.

They employed a person to wait upon me, by whom I was informed, they were more than ever de-

determined not to depart from their opinion: that they had resolved to demand the States General to have a conference with me, to treat about means of accommodation betwixt his Majesty and Spain; but that they were well assured all their pains would be fruitless, as the King of England did not give orders to his minister at the Hague, to propose a mutual cessation of hostilities, whilst they endeavoured to bring about the accommodation, and if his Majesty did not at the same time declare by a memorial, that, being in possession of one of the proposed equivalents, he would not attempt any thing by force, provided they would make a proper use of the time accounted necessary for the re-establishment of peace, and if he was not obliged to bring his troops to action to make reprisals. The magistrates of Amsterdam were persuaded they could yet be of service, and that every body would soon be convinced they were not deceived in the hopes they had conceived, of being able by their conduct to contribute to the re-establishment of peace, after the favourable declarations already made by his Majesty on this subject.

It is surprising the people of Amsterdam should apply to me to get the English envoy to act in this affair; it is certain indeed he did nothing, notwithstanding the orders I was inform'd he had received from England; so that I know not whether his instructions were exactly such as the French ambassador wrote me from England; for when the Magistrates of Amsterdam spoke to him upon this head, and when I urged him to explain himself on the 30th of November 1683, he told me positively, he had never received orders to declare, that the King his Master, approved of his Christian Majesty's proposals, but only to tell those with whom he had any connection, that if the States General could bring

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Spain to any conditions, the King of England flattered himself he should be able to act in such a manner as to procure an accommodation.

On the 29th of November, I received information, that the house of Lunenburg had promised to send troops into the Low Countries, as soon as the States General should begin to make the levy of 16,000 men.

The Echevin, by whom I used to speak to the magistrates of Amsterdam, having fallen sick by the fatigue he had undergone whilst the Prince of Orange was at Amsterdam, Van Buning and another deputy sent a person to wait upon me from them. I found great difference, however, in treating with these two persons, and with the Echevin; the sole view of the latter in procuring peace, was to unite the States General with the King, which was agreeable to our interest: Van Buning, on the contrary, finding affairs not properly disposed to support a war against France, wanted to bring about an accommodation with his Majesty, only that he might afterwards make a stronger union betwixt the States General and England.

This man came to me from the burgomasters of Amsterdam, to desire I would give in a second memorial to the States General, conformable to what the magistrates of Amsterdam had communicated to me the 26th of the same month. He made likewise two considerable demands; that the King would grant a delay till the first of March, and that he would name the King of England and the States General mediators; and they assured me, the council of Amsterdam would procure the second equivalent entire for his Majesty.

He told me the Magistrates of Amsterdam were at present so much suspected, that they durst hardly see me any more; but that they would treat with me by

by other persons ; they requested me not to write to Amsterdam by the post, but for the future to send an express, because the Prince of Orange stopt most of the letters at the Hague ; that they were doing their utmost endeavour to hinder the town from agreeing to the 16,000 men ; and that it was absolutely necessary I should give such a memorial as they demanded ; for, notwithstanding their repeated efforts, to get the first I had delivered examined, they had not been able to succeed.

On the 30th of November, they sent me by the same person, a letter which they had received at the Hague : in this it was affirmed, that the Prince of Orange had said the foregoing evening, that two burgomasters, whom he named, must be put out of a condition of opposing his designs : that another person near him added, that they must be sent to the other world ; and the Prince of Orange replied, that ten more must likewise accompany them. That a person who was fourth man in the council had given this intelligence, and that they had thereupon doubled the guards of their city, and in order to rescue them from this imminent danger, I must deliver the memorial with the utmost expedition ; that in this case, they would force the Spaniards to accept of his Majesty's offers ; and what they proposed would be the only way to ruin the Prince of Orange.

I did not think I could, without the King's permission, agree to what the Magistrates of Amsterdam desired : but still I thought it not adviseable to give them a peremptory refusal, but that it was requisite I should give them some encouragement in their present situation. I therefore returned such an answer as no ways engaged me, and at the same time gave them all the satisfaction in my power. It contained assurances of his Majesty's disposition for peace in general, for the liberty of the States General in parti-

cular, and above all, that of the city of Amsterdam ; and that his Majesty would never fail to do all in his power to screen them from oppression.

I represented to them however, that I could not make the particular declarations they requested without an express order, nor did I believe his Majesty could empower me to do so ; nor durst I undertake to ask what they proposed ; and I begged they would consider the matter more fully.

That they demanded his Majesty would propose the mediation of the King of England ; but that they had long ago expressed the same desire, and his Majesty had laid before them the inconveniencies of this, in such a manner, that the gentlemen of Amsterdam ought to have been persuaded thereof ; that they knew affairs could never be settled by means of a mediation ; and that after having been a considerable time in uncertainty and mutual distrust, which must involve them in great expences, they would infallibly be engaged in a war, which they wanted to avoid : that there were no better means to avoid such an evil than the arbitration which his Majesty had proposed ; and at this present juncture, to take advantage of the time he had granted Spain to make a proper equivalent.

That, as for the States General being joined to the King of England in the same mediation, they must know that the States General in effect consisted of no more than the Prince of Orange, and Pensionary Fagel, and thus to refer it to the States General, was only giving up the affair to the determination of these two persons. That they must remember, however, that the King of England had declared, if he was made arbitrator, that he would willingly take the opinion of the States General, nor would he come to any decision without communicating it to them.

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As to the delay, they demanded till the first of March, I told them they knew as well as I, that this was all the Prince of Orange wanted. That his design was to spin out the winter in empty proposals of accommodation, because he knew the advantage which his Majesty had at present, and that he himself could not begin the war till the spring.

That they knew Count de Waldeck was endeavouring to assemble 10,000 men upon the Rhine; that the house of Lunenburg had promised to send troops to the Low Countries, as soon as the States General should begin the levy of 16,000 men. (This was agreeable to the intelligence I had received from the magistrates of Amsterdam themselves) In short, I shewed them all the inconveniencies of a new delay; especially as there was no probability that the Spaniards would make any better use of this, than what they had done of that already granted by his Majesty.

I took care likewise, that they should be sounded as to what hopes they had from a new delay; since they could not even yet obtain from the Prince of Orange, that my memorial should be examined.

Whether they had any means, not hitherto in their power, to make the States General take advantage of this time, to bring about an accommodation, instead of thinking to raise levies?

If they could give assurances, that, during this delay, the levy would not be resolved upon.

And what engagement they would enter into, in case the Spaniards should allow the time to elapse without coming to any agreement?

In regard to the third article of the declaration, which they wanted me to make in the name of his Majesty, that his troops would commit no hostilities during the time agreed upon to bring about an accommodation, I replied, that I had done myself the honour to write upon the affair to his Majesty, after

their deputies had spoke to me, for that I could not take upon me to give such a declaration in writing, till I had express orders for that purpose.

That, in the mean while, to shew them how much I was persuaded of his Majesty's inclination for peace, and his desire to comply with every reasonable request from the gentlemen of Amsterdam, I would do what was equivalent to a memorial, since there was so much danger in delay. That I would wait upon the deputies of the towns of Holland on Thursday evening and Friday morning. That I would tell them, though I waited for the answer of the States General, nevertheless I address'd myself to them as the first members of the Republic, in order to persuade them to make a proper use of the time which remained to bring about an accommodation; and that his Majesty having ordered back his troops, there was no room to doubt but he would give the Spaniards time to determine upon the satisfaction due to his Majesty.

The King wrote me, that, as he did not pretend to regulate the resolutions he should take against Spain by what pass'd at Amsterdam, he could not therefore enter into any engagement not to act against that crown during the winter.

On the 2d of November, I received intelligence by a very sure channel, that the province of Friesland had resolv'd to consent to nothing till they saw what the city of Amsterdam should do; and what was no less important, that some of the towns of Zealand, the province which depended most on the Prince of Orange, had come to the same resolution.

I wrote to the King, begging he would pardon me if I again took the liberty to represent to him, (as I could do from my knowledge of affairs) that it was his interest, in order to preserve the friendship of the magistrates of Amsterdam, and keep up a

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confidence among them, in case his Majesty should attack any considerable place in Flanders, to empower me to declare to them that it was not from a premeditated design to invade the Low Countries (as the Prince of Orange wanted to make them believe) but that it was the obstinacy of the Spaniards, supported by the ambition of the Prince of Orange, which had obliged his Majesty to take such a step, that he had not proposed the equivalent to hinder their making levies, and to gain a proper time to attack Flanders : but that his Majesty really desired peace on the conditions he offered ; and that, if the Spaniards had accepted them in the limited time, there would have been no alteration in affairs.

I sent the King a letter from the Envoy of the States of Vienna, which mentioned that the Elector of Bavaria would enter into the treaty of alliance.

The magistrates of Amsterdam sent me word several times, that they waited with the utmost impatience till I should have orders to declare by a memorial, that the King would undertake nothing during the delay he had granted the Spaniards : and I wished the rather that his Majesty might give them such a mark of his respect, because they would then act more successfully with the rest of the towns, there being already some which had resolved in their secret council, to disavow the consent their deputies had given to raising the 16,000 men, and to order them not to allow it to be concluded in the province of Holland, without an unanimous consent.

Mean while the Prince of Orange waited for Prince Waldeck at the Hague, and I discovered that the scheme betwixt him and the Austrian party was, if possible, to begin the conventions they had so long proposed, and to concert proposals of peace with all the ministers of the Allies, to be offered to his majesty.

On the 7th of December, I wrote to the King, entreating him to remember that I often had had the honour of observing to him, that I was persuaded nothing but the fear of a war could keep the States General within proper bounds, and oblige them to bring the Spaniards to reasonable terms; that I was still persuaded of this truth; and I humbly requested his majesty to permit me to represent, as a thing extremely conducive to his service, that at the same time when he shewed them on one side an unavoidable war, that he would, on the other, give them certain hopes of an accommodation, if they pursued such a conduct as shewed they sincerely desired peace. This his Majesty had already done with so much prudence, that the siege and taking of Courtray and Dixmude, had more confirmed the magistracy of Amsterdam in their resolution of refusing a new levy.

Upon this same foundation I took also the liberty to tell his Majesty, that if he had no other design but to force the Spaniards to accept of the conditions offered, I was persuaded, from the knowledge I had of the Republic, most of the members of which heartily wished the Spaniards might be forced to a compliance, it was only necessary to acquaint them that all his Majesty undertook was only to oblige the Spaniards to accept of conditions, and not with a design by degrees to make a conquest of the Low Countries, as the Prince of Orange did insinuate; so that, if his Majesty attempted nothing in Flanders or Brabant, where the taking of the most inconsiderable place would certainly make a revolution greatly prejudicial to his Majesty's interest, he might attack Luxemburg after the delay was expired, without the fear of any such inconvenience, provided his Majesty at the same time ordered it to be

be declared to the States General, that the Spaniards having allowed the time granted them for settling the equivalent to elapse, without coming to any conclusion, he now himself chose to adjust all differences, and for the expences he had been obliged to run into to get possession of this equivalent, he would be contented with Bouvines, Beaumont and Chimay, with the villages formerly dismembered from the chatellany of Ath; that he granted likewise two months delay to the Spaniards to accept of this condition; and that all his troops might perform during this time to force them to an accommodation should not make any alteration.

On the second of December, the King informed me that he had resolved not to leave the Spaniards in quiet, so long as they refused to accept of one of the equivalents he had proposed; and as some of the places belonging to the Catholic King would by his orders in a short time be fired, he thought proper to acquaint me of this beforehand, that I might be able privately to communicate his intentions to the leading men in Amsterdam.

That the city of Amsterdam could not demand any thing more contrary to that desire they expressed of establishing peace, than a cessation of hostilities which might force the Spaniards to an accommodation; and that he was certain the King of England, who knew they would come to no terms till obliged by his Majesty's arms, would not take upon him to make a proposal to his Majesty, as had been mentioned.

I was at this time not a little embarrassed: for on one side I had the most precise orders to declare such things as must be extremely irksome, and disagreeable to the magistrates of Amsterdam; on the other side, I was teased by them, and indeed they wanted greatly to be supported. They sent a person

son again to me, representing the difficulty to which they were reduced of being obliged alone to stand out against all the efforts of the Prince of Orange and Pensionary Fagel; that they could not do this but by justifying their conduct, and this they could effect if his Majesty should order his troops to commit acts of hostility during the delay he had granted. That the Prince of Orange had told them that very morning, that tho' I buoyed them up with fine hopes, and assured them his Majesty had no intention to declare war, he consented they should judge by what they would see happen in a short time.

They said their conduct must be justified or blamed according to what passed in the Low Countries. That his Majesty having one of the equivalents he had demanded, they hoped he would grant the time necessary to bring about an accommodation. That they had already done beyond what could be expected of them, but if they were not assisted, they could do no more, and would perhaps be irrecoverably ruined. That I had assured them his Majesty was desirous of peace; they believed this, but were greatly surprized that at the time when the King of England made advances to bring about an accommodation, I had no orders to confirm in Holland, what his Britannic Majesty had told their Embassador, viz. That it would be adviseable the States General should be joint arbitrators with him. That their embassador having answered his Britannic Majesty, that it did not become them to be joined in arbitration with a great King, he had replied that it belonged to him to advance such scruples; and as he did not, if the States General continued to excuse themselves, he would look upon it as a design to avoid an accommodation. That the King of England could not speak so positively,

sively, without being in concert with his Majesty; so that I must either have orders conformable thereto, or his Majesty had no design to execute what it appeared to them he had promised, and had made them expect.

It would be tedious to repeat here all this man urged to me, and what I answered. I will only mention that I gave him to understand that the King agreed to all the magistrates of Amsterdam desired, and in a more advantageous manner than they demanded; that if I should declare there was to be a cessation of all hostilities this would only render the Spaniards more insolent, and the Prince of Orange more daring; that on the contrary the dread and effect of these hostilities would shew the Spaniards the necessity of coming to an accommodation; that there remained only therefore to assure the magistrates of Amsterdam, of the consequence which would arise from his Majesty's forces being put in action; and that as I had orders to assure them, that this would not alter the proposals his Majesty had offered, provided they were accepted by the end of this year, the Magistrates of Amsterdam might remain assured they had nothing to apprehend.

On the ninth of this month I was informed that Prince Waldeck was not to be at the Hague till the tenth of January; that this day being fixed upon to begin the general convention of the ministers of the Allies, the Bavarian and Saxon Ministers were to be there, together with the Emperor's, and those of Spain and Sweden.

I was also informed of the principal articles which they intended to take into consideration in this convention, to which they likewise invited France; they were to examine by what means they could establish peace; and if nothing could be devi-

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fed to give satisfaction to all parties, they were then to agree upon measures to be taken against those who refused to accept of the conditions which should be judged reasonable by the majority.

The States of Holland were two days assembled, and no mention was made of the levy. I had some difficulty to discover what they had under their consideration; I was at last, however, informed, that these two mornings had been spent in devising schemes to bring all into the same opinion; that for this purpose they had separately applied themselves to draw up plans, one of which they had sent to the city of Amsterdam. The person who used to speak to me from them, waited upon me the same evening: he told me that the Prince of Orange finding himself in the greatest difficulty, and the magistrates of Amsterdam being no less embarrassed, this Prince had entreated them to save his honour, and not to offer him an insult, which would ruin his reputation throughout all Christendom; that some of the towns having thereupon undertaken to find means to accommodate the differences betwixt his Majesty and Spain, and at the same time to save the Prince of Orange's honour, had at last agreed upon a scheme which the deputies of Amsterdam had sent to their masters for approbation.

The import of this was, that his Majesty having named an arbitrator, they hoped he would agree that Spain should nominate another; if Spain refused this, they would abandon his Catholic Majesty; and if the King of France would not consent that Spain should name an arbitrator, they would raise the levies; but if his Majesty agreed, that whoever Spain named should remain arbitrator with the King of England, they would consent to the levies for the Prince of Orange's honour, but they would not raise them.

They knew already that the Spanish court would name the States General; and the deputies of Amsterdam acquainted me, if his Majesty would not agree to them, they would substitute the King of Sweden.

I exclaimed vehemently against this proposal: I told them that the Prince of Orange had at last accomplished what he had so long desired. I represented to them, for the third time, the inconveniences of an arbitration in the hands of the States General; I told them they were deceived by their ambassador in England, and that his Majesty had no thoughts of bringing his indisputable rights to a compromise. That ever since my memorial delivered on the fifth of last November, the point was not an arbitration or mediation, but the acceptance or refusal of one of the equivalents offered by his Majesty. That the King of England was neutral, and might be an arbitrator; but neither the States General nor Sweden could be arbitrators, because they were in league with Spain for the explanation of the treaties of Nimeguen. That the Prince of Orange wanted nothing more than such a consent for the levy; that he could easily find sufficient obstacles to hinder the effect of the arbitration, if it was even accepted. That Pensionary Fagel, who had the direction of affairs, could protract this to an immoderate length; that the deputies in secret affairs would give such a decision as the Prince of Orange pleased; and thus the accommodation not being settled, he would take advantage of the consent to the levy, and actually make it. That I therefore hoped the council of Amsterdam were sensible of the dangerous consequences of this proposal, and would reject it.

He replied, that by the peace of the Pyrenees, his Majesty naming an arbitrator, the King of Spain had

had a right to name one also. That he could assure me from the deputies of Amsterdam, that this affair should not be trusted to the deputies for secret affairs; that the regency of Amsterdam had joined themselves inseparably to the provinces of Friesland and Groningen. That several towns of Holland had likewise joined them: that they had only such a complaisance for the Prince of Orange, as not to dishonour him; but that this Prince saw very well to what an extremity he was reduced, and that he could not stand out against the laudable designs of the magistrates of Amsterdam. That they could not at present explain themselves more precisely; but they assured me his Majesty should be satisfied; and as they had used all their efforts to avoid a war, they would not now run the risk of falling into one, whatever his Majesty might desire. I replied, that I doubted not the good intention of the gentlemen of Amsterdam, but that I did not believe they could effect it; that the Prince of Orange wanted only to gain time by such empty proposals; that I had good intelligence of this; and that I had the honour of communicating it to his Majesty three months before.

I at last convinced this man of the fallacy of this scheme, the injury which the gentlemen of Amsterdam were about to do themselves, thereby to raise the Prince of Orange's credit to the highest pitch, after they had begun to shew him that he could not for the future carry on any thing contrary to their inclination. In short, that under pretext of saving the Prince of Orange's honour, they were going to destroy their own, and all the fruits of their vigorous conduct, and for ever to ruin the hopes of such honest persons as wished to see the liberty of the Republic re-established.

I begged

I begged this man to represent all these things to the magistrates of Amsterdam, and to make them consider the reasons I advanced, and report to me their answer. I was not even satisfied with this, for I sent a person in whom I could confide to Amsterdam, and I spoke also to some of their friends.

This person returned to me two days afterwards, from the deputies of Amsterdam, to tell me they had wrote to their master all I had urged; that their constituents being convinced by my reasons, had resolved to reject the proposal, and had accordingly instructed them to keep to their first orders, and absolutely to refuse the levy.

This man added, that the council of the city of Amsterdam, had at the same time ordered their deputies to represent to me that they stood in necessity of the King's assistance; and without this all they had done would be of no service to his Majesty, and the greatest prejudice to themselves. That they would not have acted in the manner they had done but from an entire confidence in the assurance I had given them, that his Majesty was desirous of peace; that the Prince of Orange assured them of the contrary, and had made most of the towns believe what he said; that if, after the expired time, his Majesty should attack any place, the Prince of Orange would make his advantage of this against them, and they would then have no arguments to advance against those of the Prince of Orange, to hinder the levy; that they would then find themselves obliged to consent to it, and the States General would be drawn into a war though against their inclination.

That his Majesty having taken possession of one of the equivalents which he demanded, it could no longer be said, that the vigorous measures which the
Prince

Prince of Orange made the States General pursue, hindered his Majesty from coming to action; that it would be acknowledged on the contrary, that it proceeded from a pure desire of peace, and to support the magistrates of Amsterdam, who had refused the Prince of Orange every thing which they thought would tend to kindle a war.

That they had never had such an opportunity of exerting themselves as now offered, if his Majesty would furnish them with means; that they demanded it of him in the most humble and pressing manner, and with the more confidence, because it tended to his Majesty's advantage, and because they had no reason to believe, that a new delay could be any ways prejudicial to his interest in the present situation of affairs.

For this reason, they entreated his Majesty to be so good as to order me to deliver such a declaration as he should judge proper, in regard to the steps which had been taken at the Hague for the establishment of peace, to let them know he was willing to give them time for this purpose; and that he would upon this account grant them another delay, which should not be prolonged upon any account whatever. They promised to act in such a manner during this time, as to bring the Spaniards to accept of one of the equivalents; that if they could not effect this, they said it would thereby appear, that his Majesty had no ways been any hindrance to the peace, but the whole blame was to be thrown upon the obstinacy of the Spaniards; and that the magistrates of Amsterdam would no more be answerable to the other members of the state for what should happen, and they would not be forced to consent to the levy.

I gave such an answer to the gentlemen of Amsterdam, as was agreeable to my master's instructions,

tions, and I added what I thought most likely to convince them; but at the same time, I informed the King that I had not convinced the person sent me, and far less the people of Amsterdam; that they believed themselves ruined; and that I really apprehended they would be greatly embarrassed, if his Majesty should make any attack on the Spanish Netherlands.

I ventured even to write to the King, that I should look upon myself guilty of breach of duty, if I did not do myself the honour to represent to him, that it was certain, if his Majesty intended to conquer the Spanish Netherlands, as they were assured in Holland he could do, he had then no occasion to pay any regard to the solicitations of the city of Amsterdam; but if his Majesty wanted only to force the Spaniards to a peace, I could venture to affirm, that in the present situation of affairs in Holland, a siege would not oblige them to it; and the Regency of Amsterdam thinking themselves deceived, would be obliged, contrary to their inclination, to act in defence of the Spaniards.

That the King knew I had for four years repeated to him, that the Prince of Orange took advantage of his moderation; that, if I wrote the contrary, it was because the present state of affairs so required it. That the Prince of Orange assured the States that the King was resolved to make war, and the magistrates of Amsterdam maintained, his Majesty had no such intention; that it was his interest to strengthen their party against that of the Prince of Orange, to preserve the affection of the people of Holland, and to gain their confidence, which this Prince could not easily destroy. That my duty obliged me to represent to his Majesty, that if some satisfaction was not given to the gentlemen of Amsterdam, I saw no probability of keeping them;
that

that they and all the well affected, would run into an opposition against all his Majesty's designs, and the Prince of Orange would then acquire a greater superiority in Holland than ever.

Mean while the answer of the city of Amsterdam was carried to the assembly of Holland: it not a little chagrin'd and perplexed the Prince of Orange, who durst not the day following mention the levy, for he found that several of the towns had forbid their deputies to consent as long as those of Amsterdam should oppose it.

This Prince being in the utmost despair, to find, that several of the towns had disavowed their deputies in giving consent to the levy of 16,000 men, sent for the burgomasters to his chamber, one after another. He threatened destruction to some and their families, and he tried to win others with fair speeches; but notwithstanding all this, he could not make them alter their sentiments: this affair greatly mortified him, for when he had obliged them to consent to the levy, he doubted not but they would have met with the approbation of their superiors; and indeed there are but few examples of such a disavowal, so that the well affected, who were before discouraged by the little hopes they had of seeing their ancient liberty established, began now to resume courage, flattering themselves, if the magistrates of Amsterdam continued steady to their purpose, they should be able to curb the authority of the Prince of Orange, and re-establish that of the Republic. The council of Amsterdam came to a resolution, as soon as possible, to bring about an accommodation betwixt France and Spain, and then to endeavour to renew their ancient alliances with his Majesty, being persuaded if such measures were not pursued, their Republic would be ruined in its domestic, as well as foreign concerns. I was even informed, that they

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had a design, after the accommodation was concluded, to call the Prince of Orange to an account for certain steps he had taken beyond the extent of his office; and to abolish the deputies of secret affairs, by means of whom he had kept several important affairs from the knowledge of the States General; and that they had likewise several other designs of the same nature, which they might easily carry into execution, if they continued firm to their resolutions, of which, however, I could not take upon me to assure his Majesty, for indeed it would have been highly imprudent in me to do so.

I had a different opinion however of the design they had of bringing the differences betwixt his Majesty and the King of Spain to an amicable conclusion. I acquainted the King my master, that I was well assured they would never recede from this, and that I therefore, at their desire, entreated he would grant them the only means which could maintain and support them against the Prince of Orange. I likewise of myself suggested another reason, that, as the assembly was about to meet in Holland where the military establishment was to be regulated, and this affair must be decided towards the end of the year; I apprehended the declarations which the King should command me to make at this time, would be of great weight to make them augment their troops, or leave them on their present footing.

I added to this, that if the King found it agreeable to his interest so far to satisfy the city of Amsterdam, and the well affected of many of the towns of Holland, and the provinces who had joined them, by commanding me to deliver to the States such a memorial as they demanded; it would be of great service that the magistrates of Amsterdam should be persuaded, that it was entirely out of regard to them, that his Majesty had granted it, and because
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he hoped that their conduct being properly supported, they would bring the Spaniards to a peace.

For this purpose, I entreated the King to grant me a day or two beforehand, that I might privately communicate to the magistrates of Amsterdam, the substance of the memorial which I should deliver to the States General; for I was certain this would have a quite different effect, than to keep them unacquainted with the contents till the delivery of the memorial; that I could even make an appearance of concerting it with them, if they knew from no other quarter what the King was to determine in their favour.

And I thought such a particular conference with the gentlemen of Amsterdam, before I made any declaration to the States General, would be still more serviceable to his Majesty, because I could make declarations to them in a more particular manner than I could do in a memorial to the public, in regard to the resolution in which his Majesty would constantly abide, not afterwards to grant any longer delay. That I would give them to understand, as it was entirely out of regard to them that his Majesty had granted this last delay, he would think it extremely strange, if they should enter into any of the Prince of Orange's measures, if after the time was elapsed to no manner of purpose, he should demand any thing of them in favour of the Spaniards, that they ought to be convinced his Majesty was inclined to peace, since he agreed to give so much time, which might be so advantageously employed in carrying on the war which the Spaniards had begun; and that all his Majesty should after this undertake with his arms, could not be imputed to any desire of making conquests from Spain, but to the necessity he was under of forcing this crown to make peace, since all the fair

and gentle means used for this purpose had proved of no effect.

The States of Holland being assembled, the Prince of Orange kept them from eleven in the morning till eight in the evening, without being able to make them agree to the levy, notwithstanding all the efforts which he and Pensionary Fagel exerted for nine hours, to accomplish their purpose. The deputies of Amsterdam stood firm in their resolution: those of Delft and Schidam seconded them, declaring to Pensionary Fagel, that they were expressly forbid to consent to the levy, unless it was resolved upon by the unanimous consent of the whole province.

The deputies of Amsterdam then called upon Pensionary Fagel to take the votes, and to bring to a conclusion this affair, which had been so long protracted: but Fagel seeing the issue would be a refusal of the levy, and the affair thus irrecoverably ruined, would not ask the opinion of the towns which had not yet delivered their sentiments, and adjourned the assembly.

The direction which the Pensionary of Holland has in all affairs, gives him a great advantage. They have lodged an extensive power in the office of Pensionary, to enable him the better to oppose the ambitious schemes of the Prince of Orange, and to assert the public liberty: this the predecessors of Fagel always did with great resolution, and some of them suffered thereby, witness Barnevelt and De Wit: but Pensionary Fagel abusing the power of his office, took advantage thereof to ruin the liberty of the Dutch, and to raise the authority of the Prince of Orange. Thus I had the misfortune to have the power of a governor, and the address of a Pensionary in Holland always united against me; so that it was almost impossible to suc-

ceed in any thing ; for when an affair went as they wished, it was immediately concluded ; and when it happened otherwise, they deferred it from day to day, till they brought over the towns to the inclinations of the Prince of Orange.

This Prince being now almost destitute of all hopes of getting a resolution for the levy of 16000 men, devised a new expedient to gain his point. He concerted with the Spanish Envoy that he should notify to the States General, the order which the King his master had given to treat the subjects of his Christian Majesty as enemies ; but this produced a contrary effect. He intended by this to shew them that war being declared, they must now think of means to defend the Spaniards. But the deputies of the towns reasoned otherwise, and all of them declared that this was a desperate step of Spain, who wanted to draw all Europe into her quarrel ; and as for them, they would not engage in it.

Pensionary Fagel perceived he had taken a false step : so that when the deputies of Amsterdam demanded that he would put this memorial of the Spanish envoy, and the declaration the Marquis de Grana had made in the Low Countries, into the hands of the Commissaries to be examined ; he refused this, knowing they wanted to take an advantage of it ; and that the examination of these papers could not but be prejudicial to the designs of the Prince of Orange. Thus he contented himself with only ordering the deputies of the towns, to communicate them to their masters.

The magistrates of Amsterdam constantly pressed me to obtain the King's permission to present the memorial they had for so long a time demanded, and desired me to prevail on him to grant a new delay, and especially to entreat his Majesty not to
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attack any place in Flanders or Brabant; alledging that if the folly of the Spaniards should oblige his Majesty to undertake any enterprize in the Netherlands, they should be reduced to great extremities, and should be drawn contrary to their private interest, and even contrary to their inclinations to support the Spaniards, in order to prevent the Spanish Netherlands from falling into his Majesty's hands; but if he should attack the Spaniards in Catalonia or in Italy, and be contented with raising large contributions in Flanders, with ravaging all the open country, and with attacking the Spanish troops when they left their garrisons, they were assured that the Spaniards would come on their knees to beg of his Majesty to grant a peace. I shewed them that all the King's steps ought sufficiently to convince them, how much his Majesty wished to give pleasure to the magistrates of Amsterdam; that they did not exert themselves so much as they might do; and that I could not find that they thought of doing any thing more to obtain a peace besides their refusing to consent to the levies being made. On which they communicated to me the resolution they had taken to declare when it should be necessary to prepare the state of the war for the following year (which ought to be done within eight days) that they would no longer reckon in their service the troops they had lent the Spaniards; and that the state being burthened with many extraordinary expences which it could not bear, the city of Amsterdam would no longer pay the regiments in the service of Spain. They could do nothing that would more sensibly affect the Prince of Orange: but Van Buning warded off this blow, in order to favour that Prince, and this resolution was not executed, as will be seen in the sequel.

I wrote to the King in this same letter, that I could not tell what methods he would employ to reduce the Spaniards to reason; but that if he was resolved to take a place in the Netherlands, and willing to make choice of Luxemburg, I could assure him, that of all the places there, this would give the least uneasiness to the Dutch: that I could not answer for it, and that no person whatsoever, not even the Prince of Orange could know what the States General would do in this case; but that it was certain that the siege of any other place in Flanders, however small its importance, would have a greater effect in animating the States General to take up arms in defence of the Spaniards, than even the taking of Luxemburg; especially if, at the time when a siege was going to be laid to that place, a declaration was made, by which his Majesty should assure them, that after its being taken, he would consent to an accommodation with the Spaniards, without carrying the war any farther.

The deputies of the towns being returned to the Hague, those of Delft and Schidam still made known their former instructions, not to consent to the levies being made, at least till all the other towns in Holland, gave their consent. The Pensionary Fagel summoned them to declare whether they had no other orders, and on their saying that they had not, he separated the assembly for eight days; hoping to be able, during this time, to oblige these two towns to enter into his sentiments.

But that same morning, before they were separated, the deputies of Amsterdam, who in the preceding assembly had, without effect, desired to have the memorial of the Spanish Envoy, and the declaration of the Marquis de Grana put into the hands of commissaries, in order to their being examined,

mined, represented to the States of Holland, that the Spaniards had taken a very precipitate resolution, and desired the assembly to think of the methods that might be taken to bring them, notwithstanding this declaration, to consent to an accommodation; and in case they could not bring them to accept it, to consider what was to be done by the States General. The Pensionary Fagel excused himself from registering this proposal, on account of the assembly's not being complete; for the Prince of Orange, who had foreseen their making this demand, had caused the body of the nobles to be absent: but the deputies of Amsterdam, to remedy this inconvenience, gave their proposal in writing.

Upon this the Pensionary Fagel, shewed that the Prince of Orange plainly perceived the cabals forming in the province of Holland; that they would proceed in the same manner as in the year 1672; that the effect of this conduct would be the ruin of the country; that the Prince of Orange openly protested that he would not be responsible for it, and that he would not even appear in the assembly of Holland while things were carried on in this manner.

The deputies of Amsterdam did not appear to be at all surprized at these reproaches; this obliged the Prince of Orange and the Pensionary Fagel to change their stile, which they did commonly enough in addressing themselves to those whom they could not oppress; for as soon as violent measures had failed them, they knew how immediately to have recourse to a milder treatment, and suddenly to proceed from menaces to entreaties. The Prince of Orange therefore sent, three days after this quarrel with the magistrates of Amsterdam, for two of the most worthy men in the republic, who were well affected, and generally known to be good republicans,

when he let them know, that he had proposed the raising of 16000 men, believing that this was the best method of procuring an advantageous accommodation for their allies; that he had insensibly engaged himself, and that the resistance of Amsterdam, was arisen to the greatest obstinacy: that however he had proceeded so far, that he should entirely lose his reputation if he did not succeed, he therefore desired them to exhort the magistrates of Amsterdam not to dishonour a person to whom they had intrusted the government of the State, and the conduct of the army: he observed, that their intending to push things to extremities would be the greatest affront that could be offered him: that in short, he no longer demanded the levies being made; but only that they would preserve his honour, and that this would inspire him with an eternal gratitude to the magistrates of Amsterdam. That all the favour he wished to obtain from them was their consenting to the new levies; that on the word of a Prince (on which they might safely rely) he agreed, that after their consent given, things should remain in the state they were then in; that a single man should not be raised, and that he would only endeavour to obtain an accommodation between the Kings of France and Spain.

I was informed of the Prince of Orange's having taken this new step, and therefore immediately sent one of the well-affected to Amsterdam to prevent the consequences that might proceed from it; for I was afraid that I had more reason to be apprehensive of this, than of any other step he had made: however it did not meet with better success; for the magistrates of Amsterdam made a pertinent reply to every thing that was represented to them, and concluded that they ought not to consent to a thing, which from the manner in which it was proposed, would

would be of no service, and could be of no other use but to deceive and betray their allies.

The ruling persons of Amsterdam did not stop here; for the prince of Orange having, as I have just observed, separated the assembly of Holland for four or five days, in order that he might, during that time, gain over the two towns of Delft and Schidam, they took advantage of this delay, and made use of it in drawing two of the towns of North Holland into their sentiments; and those of Delft and Schidam continuing steady, the party of the magistrates of Amsterdam began to be strengthened.

But at the same time they agreed not to make the declaration they had projected of their no longer paying the troops which had passed into the service of Spain: for Van Buning had either prevailed on them to change their opinion, or they found that the execution of this design would be attended with too many inconveniences. They only resolved to oblige the Spaniards to retract their declaration of war; and in case they refused to do it, to draw their troops out of the Netherlands.

The Prince of Orange, who at the same time caused all the other provinces to deliberate on the raising the 16000 men, knew that the province of Gelderland had consented to it. This is not surprising, since he had there the greatest authority, from his having, in the year 1679, usurped the right of nominating all who were admitted into the States of that province: but the clause they resolved to add to it, sufficiently discovered the consequences which even the Prince of Orange's creatures foresaw would proceed from the raising of these troops; for they stipulated, that troops and all sorts of necessary ammunition should be sent for their defence; and added, that as their strong places were in a bad state, and would soon be taken, they demand-

ed that the other provinces should engage to receive into the union, and not as subject towns (as had been resolved with respect to Utrecht in the year 1673) those places in their province which the King should take, and which he should restore to the state.

The province of Zealand did not so easily come into the Prince of Orange's measures; he had sent Mr. D'Odyck thither: and as out of the seven voices of which the assembly of that province is composed, he had three, viz. that of the nobles, as he is the only noble in Zealand, that of Flushing, and that of Terveer, as being lord of these two towns, it would not have been at all surprizing if Zealand had blindly conformed to the Prince of Orange's wishes. Yet Mr. D'Odyck met with the same difficulties there as the Prince of Orange had done in Holland; the towns of Middleburg and Goes absolutely refusing to consent to the levies being made, and Zyrickzee, being unwilling to give its consent, at least if it was not unanimously resolved upon by the whole province.

The King returned me an answer, dated the tenth of December 1683, on the proposals I had made to him on the part of the magistrates of Amsterdam, and informed me, that he had nothing to prescribe to me, more than what I myself had said in answer to their two demands, that a delay should be granted them till the first of March, and that he should consent to the mediation of the States General, in conjunction with the King of England: that it was likewise very prudent in me to ask what they would engage to do, in case the Spaniards suffered the time to slide away to no purpose. His Majesty also ordered me to let them know, that it was not impossible for them to preserve the Netherlands in the state they were in, and always to establish

blish there a perfect tranquillity. That provided his Majesty was well assured that the United Provinces would not assist the Spaniards for the time to come ; or that the troops they maintained in the Netherlands would only be employed in the defence of the places belonging to the Catholic King, and not in doing any damage to the countries and subjects of his most Christian Majesty, the King would also draw his troops from the said countries ; content himself with the possessions he now enjoyed, and in other places make use of the means God had put into his hands to oblige the Spaniards to cede to his Majesty one of the equivalents he had proposed, and a just satisfaction for the expences occasioned by a longer delay.

The King also resolved, in order to remove the inquietude they were under from the apprehension of the enterprizes that might be undertaken by his troops, while they were examining with me the means of procuring a peace, that I should assure them, that he would not attack or take by surprize any of the places belonging to Spain, before the 20th of January, which was a sufficient time for letting his Majesty know what I should have agreed upon with them.

Two days after the King informed me, that I was to add to what he had already ordered me to tell the person who acted for the magistrates of Amsterdam, that provided the levies were not made, and the troops sent by the Prince of Orange to the Marquis de Grana, were really employed, as his Majesty had already observed, in the sole defence of the places belonging to the crown of Spain, his Majesty would lay himself under an obligation not to attack any place in Flanders, and would consent to press the Spaniards, by the lodgment of his troops in their country, and by the exaction of contributions,

to consent to one of the equivalents proposed by his Majesty : so that this affair would produce no other change in the barrier than that of the taking of Courtray and Dixmude, which his Majesty would preserve in his possession as well as their dependencies.

The King wrote to me four days after, to inform me, that as I had acquainted him that the city of Amsterdam desired to have the public acquainted with the delay he was willing to grant, he permitted me to shew that city the pleasure he received at hearing of their good conduct, by engaging even by a writing not to lay siege to any place before the end of January ; but that I should prepare the magistrates of Amsterdam to prevent their being surprized at seeing the Marshal d'Humier's on the one side, and M. de Montel on the other, enter the dominions of Spain ; and at perceiving that the Marshal de Crequy was going to bombard Luxemburg.

I found myself intrusted with a very disagreeable commission, and I did not doubt but the magistrates of Amsterdam would feel extreme vexation at hearing that the King, after having made his troops stay so long in the dominions of Spain, and after having by open force taken possession of Courtray and Dixmude, would still bombard Luxemburg, and that at a time when they so obstinately refused to agree to the Prince of Orange's proposal to make new levies, and when they were assured that the King was not disposed to carry on the war ; this made me imagine it necessary that I myself should talk with the deputies of Amsterdam, in order, as much as possible, to soften this bad news ; and also because I was persuaded that a firmer confidence ought to be established between us, that by this means whatever was said both on the one side and the

the other, might have the greater weight, and that his Majesty might rely with the greater certainty, on the assurances given by the magistrates of Amsterdam themselves, than he could do on what was said by a person acting as an arbitrator between us. But I here found difficulties which I imagined almost insurmountable: these gentlemen caused to be represented to me the reproaches cast upon them by the Prince of Orange for having carried on a secret correspondedce with me; and that, if they saw me after this, they should be incapable of undertaking their own vindication, and should render themselves suspected; and a thousand other things were said of the like nature; but as I was sensible that they generally consulted a particular person in whom they placed a great confidence, I spoke to him, and so thoroughly convinced him of the necessity of their entering into a more strict confidence in me, that he persuaded them to it, and the Pensionary of that city came to my house with another deputy who was in the secret; after having taken, as a pretence for this interview, an affair relating to the vessels which go every fifteen days from Amsterdam to St. Vallery.

As I had just received another letter from the King, by which he informed me, that notwithstanding the declaration of war published by the Spaniards, he would still adhere to the very same proposals he had ordered me to make to the States General, I found myself in a much better condition to represent to the deputies of Amsterdam the goodness his Majesty had shewn on this occasion, and to persuade them that his Majesty was only induced by the strong entreaties made use of by their city, to take such measures as were suitable to their desires, though they might be prejudicial to his Majesty's interest.

I then observed, that the King had ordered me to assure them, that he was not disposed to carry on the war; I alledged the reasons his Majesty had given me, and added, that there could be no greater proof of it, than his not doing it when he might do it with such advantage. I told them that the King had learnt with pleasure, that the magistrates of Amsterdam appeared, by their conduct, sufficiently convinced that the Spaniards would not agree to a peace, till they saw themselves pressed by his Majesty's arms; and found that they were not supported in their obstinacy by the States General.

That his Majesty having been informed of the firmness with which the Magistrates of Amsterdam had with this view hindered, as much as possible, the methods the Prince of Orange was desirous of taking in order to engage in the war, and knowing besides how many difficulties they had to surmount on the part of the Prince of Orange, and the Pensionary Fagel, he had without hesitation supported them in their good designs, by taking all the measures which they themselves had desired.

That they had desired three different things of his Majesty at three different times; not to perform acts of hostility; to grant a delay; and in case the Spaniards continued obstinately bent on refusing all kinds of accommodation, to carry his arms into Italy or Catalonia, and to be contented with engaging in the open countries in Flanders and Brabant. Demands that were equally prejudicial to his Majesty's interest. That the cessation of acts of hostility, as well as a new delay, would render the Spaniards more intractable: that the war would nevertheless be continued; but that it would be continued later, and his Majesty would lose time and considerable advantages.

That

That in regard to the third point, they ought to consider, that his Majesty had all his troops in the frontiers of Flanders; and that he must make them march three hundred leagues, and traverse all France, in order to reach Catalonia.

But after having represented these difficulties, I asked what judgment they ought to form of the King's sentiments with respect to a peace, and particularly of his favourable regard to the magistrates of Amsterdam, if he granted all their requests, or at least, if he put them in a condition that would make their obtaining them depend on themselves alone.

I then told them, with respect to the last point, to which they were the most attached, that it was not impossible to preserve the Netherlands in the state they were then in, and to establish there a perfect and lasting tranquillity. That, provided the King was well assured, that the United Provinces would not assist the Spaniards for the time to come, or at least, that the troops they had in the Netherlands should only be employed for the defence of the places belonging to the Catholic King, and not in injuring the countries and subjects of his most Christian Majesty; he also might oblige his troops to retire out of the Spanish Netherlands, and to be contented with what he now possessed, and with making use in other places that could give no jealousy to the States General, of the means God had put into his hands, in order to oblige the Spaniards to give him one of the equivalents he had proposed, and just satisfaction for the expences occasioned by a longer delay.

That, in regard to the delay, and the cessation of acts of hostility, I had orders particularly to assure them, that the King would neither attack nor surprise any of the places belonging to Spain, before
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the end of the month of January; and that, if they thought it necessary that this assurance of a delay should be public, in order that they might be able to take advantage of a declaration, which in so authentic a manner would justify their conduct; his Majesty was pleased, in order to give them a testimony of his esteem, and to show them how much he relied on their good dispositions, to consent that I should engage, either by word of mouth, or by a written memorial, which I would present to the States General, that he should not undertake any siege before the end of January; and this I should do according to the plan I had received, which I would communicate to them. This memorial contained nothing more, than that his Majesty would still engage to rest satisfied till the end of next January, with receiving one of the equivalents he had proposed, and not undertake any siege till that time was expired; there were only some terms which expressed a little too strongly, that this was done in favour of the magistrates of Amsterdam.

I at length added, as a proof that his Majesty placed the utmost confidence in them, that the marshal d'Humieres was, in conformity to his Majesty's orders, to enter immediately on one side, and M. de Montal on the other, into the Spanish Netherlands, to make reprisals for the disorders committed by the Spanish troops in the countries belonging to his Majesty; and that he also intended, at the same time, to cause bombs to be thrown into the city of Luxemburg, to punish that city for all the acts of hostility it had committed against his Majesty's troops, and against his subjects, and to spread terror, by this example, through all the other great cities in the Netherlands, on account of the mischiefs they had reason to apprehend in case they renewed the war.

They

They could not here help interrupting me, and telling me, that though they acknowledged that his Majesty was most sincerely disposed to accept of a peace, and that he had the goodness to resolve to support the magistrates of Amsterdam, yet, what he was going to cause his troops to undertake, would expose the magistrates of that city to the reproaches of all the other towns; that they had nothing to object against his Majesty's sending his troops to perform military executions; but his sending the Marshal d'Humieres on one side, M. de Montal on the other, and his ordering the Marshal de Crequy to destroy such a place as Luxemburg by bombs, would appear so terrible to the other members of the State, that they would immediately fall upon the magistrates of Amsterdam, and tell them that his Majesty would never have engaged in such enterprises, if they had suffered the levies to have been made. That they did not doubt of his Majesty's having no further view, but merely to throw bombs into it; and they could assure me in confidence, that for their part they would continue firm notwithstanding this; but that they apprehended that the other towns, which they had drawn into their party, would abandon them. They added an infinite number of other reasons; to which I replied, that his Majesty could never do any thing more proper to second the designs of the government of Amsterdam, than by giving his troops these orders. That without reckoning what his honour required him to perform, after the declaration of war published by the Spaniards, which at least made it necessary that his Majesty should let them perceive the danger to which it had exposed them; it seemed to me, that when they saw more of his Majesty's troops in the field than would be necessary for taking three of the best places belonging to Spain, without attacking any of them,

nothing could afford a stronger proof of his Majesty's having no other design, but to reduce the Spaniards to the necessity of accepting the peace. Besides, the more troops were sent by his Majesty, the more room would the magistrates of Amsterdam have, to let the other towns see the dangerous situation the Spaniards were in; and that the 16,000 men which the Prince of Orange would have them raise, would not secure them; and that they had no other method to take but to press the Spaniards to accept the conditions offered by his Majesty; or, in case of refusal, to abandon them, and desire his Majesty not to attack any of the places in the Spanish Netherlands.

As to the delay, I was surpris'd to hear the frank and open manner in which they expressed themselves. They confessed that they had desired it as a means which they thought necessary for maintaining in their interest the other towns that had already declared for them; but that they had agreed with me in the reasons I had alledged for not granting it; and that since his Majesty resolved to do something that would be more advantageous to them, they should be glad to consult their superiors before they returned me an answer on that subject. They confessed that the Spaniards would reap advantage from it; and that if his Majesty, instead of one month, should give them two, or even three, they would be much farther from agreeing to a peace on the last day than the first; since the Prince of Orange and the Spaniards said, according to custom, that they had nothing to do but remain firm; and that his Majesty would yield by little and little. I was very glad to hear the deputies of Amsterdam tell me of their own accord, what I had so often observed in the letters I had the honour to write to his Majesty.

I in-

I informed them that his Majesty found great difficulty in granting them this delay ; that he had done it contrary to his judgment, and in opposition to his own interest, with the only view of drawing the magistrates of Amsterdam out of that state of perplexity, to which they had shewn his Majesty, that they were reduced. On which I took occasion to represent, that another Prince who had less affection for them, would not behave towards them in the manner his Majesty had done ; but would think of improving such a favourable conjuncture, in order to render himself master of the Netherlands, whilst the magistrates of Amsterdam found themselves obliged to hinder the troops being raised, by their being unwilling to become subject to the Prince of Orange.

That, instead of this, his Majesty, as soon as they demanded his assistance, held out his hand to them, and resolved to sacrifice his own interest to their safety, and for the support of their liberties. That this delay was only granted on their account ; that I had orders privately to tell them so ; and that I had been permitted to render them public only in compliance with their requests ; and that therefore I should, in this instance, regulate myself according to their desires.

They were also greatly satisfied with my telling them, that as the memorial was only intended to contribute to the success of their designs, they should settle the terms in which it should be expressed ; because I really thought there would have been some danger in the King's goodness to them appearing in so strong a light as it did in some expressions in the memorial he had sent me.

At length, we entered into the particulars of every thing they agreed to perform.

They, in a formal manner, engaged not to consent to the levies being made, and to raise up such obstacles

obstacles against them, that they should not be raised, provided his Majesty would not attack any place in the Spanish Netherlands.

They engaged to hinder the Prince of Orange from sending a single man to the assistance of the Spaniards more than those they had already sent.

They assured me, that they would warmly press the assembly of Holland to cause the declaration of war made by Spain to be revoked; not that they hoped to obtain it, but in order to have a pretence for demanding that their troops should be recalled, if Spain refused to agree to it; and as they could not be sure of their being able to obtain the recall of the troops belonging to the province of Holland, any more than the revocation of the declaration of war by the Spaniards, I desired, that in this case, they would refuse to pay the troops sent into the service of Spain, according to the design they had already entertained, and which they had communicated to me some days before; but as they had no orders from their superiors with respect to this article, they could not return me a positive answer.

They also engaged not to consent to any measures capable of fortifying the Spaniards in their obstinacy, or that could give the Prince of Orange an opportunity of entering into the war.

At length they told me, that they would do whatever they could perform consistently with the constitution of the republic; and that, as to such things as they could not engage to perform, on account of their being unable to answer for their accomplishment, they would content themselves with promising to do them, and with endeavouring to the utmost of their power to perform them: as for example, they could not give me their word that they would make the States General abandon the
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Spaniards, in case his Majesty carried his arms into Catalonia or Italy, but they hoped they should be able to it.

Upon this I wrote to his Majesty, that the constitution of the republic was such, that the deputies of one town could not engage to make the States General agree to any thing, because, in order to this, they ought to be unanimous, or at least to have a majority of votes, which they could not answer for, on account of the influence of the Prince of Orange; but that they could engage to perform every thing that was negative, because their refusal would hinder the taking of any resolution.

On the 24th of December, I sent the King advice, that Mr. Citters had wrote some time before to the States General, that the King of England pressed him to make known to them, that if the Spaniards would consent to their being arbitrators in conjunction with him, he would endeavour to prevail on the King of France to consent to it: that I had informed M. de Barillon of the ill effect of such advances made on the part of the King of England; that in the mean time no orders had been given about it; but on the contrary, Citters had lately wrote three different letters, not only to the States General, but also to the magistrates of Amsterdam, in which he gave them the same assurances; and that from hence the Prince of Orange drew great advantages against the ruling persons of Amsterdam.

I was about the same time informed from good hands, that the Prince of Orange had sent troops to the Spaniards; and that he had ordered the deputy governor of Ecluse to let the regiment of Torcé depart at the first orders of the Marquis de Grana. This last did not fail to demand them as soon as the King's troops under the command of the Marshal D'Hu-

D'Humieres were entered into the countries under the dominion of Spain, and the deputy governor of Ecluse made them immediately march to Ghent. I informed the Magistrates of Amsterdam of this proceeding; and as they had not the least knowledge of it, they were greatly astonished, and promised to procure proofs, and to make a good use of this intelligence.

I received a note from the deputies of Amsterdam, by which they desired immediately to deliver to the States General the memorial I had communicated to them two days before, and only to alter some terms which pointed them out in too strong a light. This memorial was presented at a proper time for destroying all the artifices of the Prince of Orange, and the falsities which the Pensionary Fagel had advanced that same day before the States General.

The Prince of Orange hearing of the entrance of the marshal D'Humieres into the country of Was, the march of M. de Montal, and the pretended siege of Luxemburg, which it was supposed the Marshal de Crequy was going to form, and which was much talked of, had resolved to improve this opportunity, and spoke to the deputies of the States General with great warmth; he had even pretended, in order to give himself the greater credit, that he had received certain advice that his Majesty designed, after his taking Luxemburg, to cause Mons to be invested and attacked by the Marshal D'Humieres and M. de Montal; that after this, it would not be difficult for his Majesty to render himself master of Namur; that, within two months time, the King would conquer all the Spanish Netherlands; and that this was the effect of the good conduct of the deputies of Amsterdam, to whom they were obliged for it: but my memorial gave these gentlemen room to defend themselves, and even more and more to
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make appear the necessity of accommodating affairs in an amicable manner.

The deputies of that city came to me the same day, at four o'clock in the afternoon, by the order of their superiors, to desire me to return the King their most humble thanks for the goodness he was pleased to shew them on this occasion, and after protestations of a most sincere attachment to his Majesty's interest, they entered upon business, and told me, that they had resolved to give him the assurances he had desired from the States General, provided he would engage, according to the desire of the magistrates of Amsterdam, not to carry his arms into the Spanish Netherlands. They informed me that they stood in need of my assistance in the execution of this design; and that it was necessary for me to go to the houses of the deputies of the other towns in Holland.

1. That I should let them know what were his Majesty's intentions in relation to the delay he had been pleased to grant.

2. That I should convince them that the King of England approved the equivalents proposed by his Majesty.

3. That I should insinuate to them, that if they came to a resolution to raise the 16,000 men, his Majesty would immediately attack the Spanish Netherlands.

I cannot help making the remark whenever I find occasion for it, that there was no room to fear that the menaces made use of by the King to the States General would reunite them, or draw them into the war, since the magistrates of Amsterdam, who were so unwilling to enter into it, desired that threatenings might be employed whenever it was necessary to obtain any thing from the States, contrary to the sentiments of the Prince of Orange.

4. That

4. That I would make known to the principal towns his Majesty's disposition to carry his arms into Italy or Catalonia, in case the Spaniards should not consent to the peace before the last day of January; and that the States General should agree to abandon them.

They shewed me, at length, that they could almost answer for it, that by means of this step, they should be able to give his Majesty the assurances he demanded, and that the next day they would make a proposal in the assembly of Holland to recall all the troops the Prince of Orange had sent to the Spaniards, that were above 8000 men; that if they could not obtain this, they hoped at least, with the assistance I should give them, to be able to cause these troops to be forbid to act in any other manner than for the defence of the places belonging to Spain, and to cause them to be ordered, in case his Majesty sent word to his generals to burn the villages, to remain in the towns, and to leave to the Spaniards the care of defending the open country.

After having made a compliment to the deputies of Amsterdam, I entered into the particulars of their proposals, and made no difficulty of consenting to go to the deputies of the towns, to give them a kind of explication of the memorial I had presented that same day to the States General.

As to their wishes that I would declare the sentiments of the King of England in relation to his Majesty's offers, I told them that this was what more properly belonged to the English envoy than to me; and that such a declaration would have much greater weight when proceeding from his mouth than from mine; more particularly, as there was reason to apprehend, that this minister would go to these very deputies to disavow whatever I should say in relation to the sentiments of the King his master. And

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it was very probable that he would have done so, for he had frequently told both me and the deputies of Amsterdam, that his Britannic Majesty had never ordered him to say that he approved his Majesty's proposals; and besides, he was a person of mean intellects, of a clownish behaviour, very passionate, and one who kept no measures; we therefore agreed that I should mention this affair in such a manner as not to run any hazard of offending the envoy of England, from whom we might always hope to receive some advantage.

As to the manner in which they would have me explain myself in relation to the raising 16,000 men, as this was entirely contrary to the orders I had received, I represented to them, that it did not seem to me a proper occasion for my going to threaten all the deputies of Holland, and that the declaration they desired me to make was nothing less than a menace; but that I could perform what they desired from me with a better grace, and give the States of Holland the same apprehensions of the war, without menacing them with it; that, in order to this, I need only explain myself as if the raising the 16,000 men was no longer the affair in question, and tell them that they might imagine in what manner his Majesty would have received the news, if instead of seeking the means of procuring an accommodation, they had employed themselves only in levying troops; that they doubtless saw the consequences this would have produced; and therefore I readily rejoiced with them on their not having taken resolutions that would have infallibly involved them in the war.

And as to their demand that I would assure the deputies of Holland that his Majesty would, on certain conditions, consent to carry his arms into Italy or Catalonia, I warmly remonstrated that they had resolved on what was contrary to their own interest.

That

That without reckoning, that it was unreasonable, after their having ardently wished for this favour, and his Majesty had granted it only in consideration of their repeated petitions, that they should now offer it to all the towns in Holland. That beside this consideration, my making this proposal would be sufficient to render it suspected, since the Prince of Orange and the Pensionary Fagel would not fail to say, that his Majesty had great designs concealed under these specious offers; and that this would be sufficient to hinder the States of Holland from accepting them. On the other hand, if they themselves made the proposal, they would have the honour of it, since they knew the orders I had received to give them an intire satisfaction on this subject; and that it would be so much the more easy, to make all the other towns relish the advantages of this proposal, as they would not have any distrust of what appeared to come from the magistrates of Amsterdam, and that even the Prince of Orange would have fewer pretences for opposing it. They acquiesced in these reasons, and we agreed that I should only speak in general terms of the good dispositions of the King to maintain peace in the Netherlands, in case the States General should not be able within the time limited to bring the Spaniards to give satisfaction to his Majesty.

They even assured me, that if the measures we were taking did not succeed, they would find the means of giving his Majesty assurances with which he would be satisfied; and informed me, that they had orders from their burgomasters to declare to me, that they were very sorry for the scruples they had hitherto made of seeing me; but that from hence forward, they would wait upon me at my house, whenever I had any thing to say to them.

I went

I went to all the deputies in the towns of Holland to put in execution what I had concerted with the deputies of Amsterdam. I informed them, that the King, on seeing that the Spaniards let the time pass in a useless manner, which he had given them, in order to their accepting the conditions offered by his Majesty, had resolved to do himself the justice which the Spaniards had for so long a time refused him.

But that his majesty having been informed, that many Princes and States of the Empire had thought his offers just and reasonable, and perceiving likewise the inclination of the States General to bring the Spaniards to give him a just satisfaction, he had resolved still to give them a month's time, to see if, within the space of this new delay, the Spaniards would not resolve on accepting an accommodation which was so much to their advantage.

That on this account I had given, by his Majesty's orders, a memorial to the States General; but, as I perfectly knew, that if the Spaniards let this time pass, without giving satisfaction to his Majesty, he had resolved not to grant them any farther delay, and that after this he would exert all the power God had given him, I had thought it my duty to inform them of it; to the end that they might employ a time that was in itself so precious in bringing the Spaniards to accept of the peace.

As they all answered me, that their design and their interest led them to desire a peace, and consequently to procure it for Spain by their utmost endeavours, I had a natural opportunity to explain myself conformably to what I had concerted with the deputies of Amsterdam.

I therefore replied, that his Majesty was thoroughly persuaded of what they had told me, and that, for my part, I was very glad to see them able

to execute their good designs, which would not have been the case, had they made the new levies, for then the war would have been kindled, and would have lasted for many years: for the Spaniards, who had performed so many acts of hostility since they had the States General's troops, and who, on the hope of these levies being made, and of a powerful succour, had declared war, would have engaged the States in it, the very moment that they were informed of the levies being granted.

That they ought not to doubt that his Majesty's prudence made it necessary that he should prevent the design of the Spaniards, and that he would not have failed to do it, even though the States General had resolved to make the new levies; but that, since this was not the case, I rejoiced at finding them in a condition to procure an accommodation with the Spaniards.

At length I shewed them, that having explained his Majesty's sentiments in relation to this new delay, to some of their members, they had shewn great uneasiness on account of what might happen after it was expired, in case the Spaniards would not, within the time limited, agree to a peace; that I could assure them in relation to this point, that his Majesty was graciously pleased to promote the tranquillity of the States General, and that if they had any apprehensions which it was in his Majesty's power to remove, I was assured, that, provided they on their side did what he had reason to expect from them, they would ever find that his Majesty entertained all possible dispositions to grant them what they might reasonably expect from him.

It was not without reason that the deputies of Amsterdam had wished that I would pay a visit to the deputies of the other towns in Holland: they knew that the Prince of Orange and the Pensionary

Fagel

Fagel were to make their last efforts to obtain the consent of the province of Holland to the levies being made, under the pretence of the entrance of the King's troops into Flanders, and the bombarding of Luxemburg. But the magistrates of Amsterdam, encouraged by every thing I had said to them in relation to the King my master, were more resolved than they had hitherto been to oppose it, by every method in their power.

It was very remarkable, that as the Prince of Orange had not communicated to any one the orders he had given to the troops to march into the Netherlands, the magistrates of Amsterdam had no proof of his having sent 14,000 men to the Spaniards, instead of 8000, so that they addressed themselves to me to obtain it, and I gave them a copy of the list I had received out of the Prince of Orange's family itself, and which I had sent some time before to the King.

On the 31st of December, the Prince of Orange caused the States of Holland to be assembled; and this meeting did not break up till five o'clock in the evening. It is impossible to express all the reproaches and abuse the deputies of Amsterdam met with in this sitting. As several persons made a merit with the Prince of Orange of speaking in this manner, and as others of them could do it with impunity, there were many deputies who did not spare them. At the breaking up of this assembly, I had a long conference with the deputies of Amsterdam, which may be reduced to three principal points.

The first consisted in the assurance they gave me of their being more than ever resolved not to consent to the levies being made; that notwithstanding all the endeavours of the Prince of Orange, he had been unable to bring this affair to a conclusion in

the assembly that had just separated, and that they had taken measures in order to influence the Spaniards to agree to an accommodation.

In the second place they desired to know if the King would make no abatement in the equivalents he had demanded. The reason they had to believe that he would, was, that, notwithstanding all they had said to the English envoy, they had been unable to draw any thing more from him, but that the King his master believed that his Majesty's proposals might serve to found a negotiation upon, but never that he thought them reasonable, they therefore imagined that the King of England knew that his Majesty would make some concessions.

I assured them that his Majesty would rather encrease than lessen the equivalents he expected in the room of his pretensions : they then desired me to explain the second equivalent, and to let them know what were the appurtenances and dependencies of Courtray, Dixmude, and the other towns, and what were the places the King had in his possession, to the end that they might have a clear view of this affair, if it was brought to an accommodation.

In the third place they asked, whether, in case they should be so unhappy as not to be able to oblige the Spaniards to conclude a peace, they might assure themselves that the King would carry the war at a distance from their frontier; that is to say, that he would not attack any place in the Spanish Netherlands, and that he would act there only on the defensive, and carry his arms into Italy or Catalonia.

And on their asking, whether what the King required from them might not be reduced to two points, viz. that the troops should not be raised, and that they should make those they had in the service of Spain retire

retire, or at least cause them to remain in the strong places without entering the field, either to march into the King's dominions, or to engage the troops that had entered into the open countries belonging to Spain; I told them that there was still another thing to be done, which was to recal the overplus of the eight thousand men, if they could not oblige the whole to return, which would be still better.

They replied, that they could assure me that the levies should not be made, and that they would make use of their endeavours to cause the surplus of those troops to be recalled which the Prince of Orange had sent above the eight thousand: but, as they did not hope to succeed with respect to this last article, they promised to exert themselves in such a manner, as that this surplus should not leave the strong places belonging to Spain; that they could not give me the same assurances with respect to the eight thousand men, on account of their being sent to the Marquis de Grana, in virtue of their treaty with Spain; and the Marquis de Grana, according to the tenor of the treaty, being at liberty to make them march wheresoever they pleased, they could not hinder him from doing it: but they could safely answer for the States General's sending no more; and if they should not be able to prevail on the States General to give the assurances which the King demanded in relation to their troops, they would find expedients with which his Majesty would be satisfied.

On the fourth of January I sent the King an account of the good dispositions of the magistrates of Amsterdam; and at the same time informed him, for the tenth time, that the manner in which the King of England every day explained himself to the States General's ambassador, and the orders he

he gave to his envoy at the Hague, were more proper to destroy the measures I took with the magistrates of Amsterdam, than to be of any service to me; for things were reduced to such a point, that it became necessary for the States General, either to oblige the Spaniards to give one of the equivalents, or to abandon them; that the deputies of Amsterdam were unable to engage the States General to do either of these; and even they themselves could not attempt it, till they were persuaded and could persuade the others, that there was no medium between these two alternatives; that therefore what the King of England said, which destroyed this foundation, destroyed at the same time whatever his Majesty could expect from the magistrates of Amsterdam; and this the King of England did when he told Mr. Citters, that provided the States would make him any proposal of what kind soever it was, he hoped to bring the French King to agree to an accommodation.

As to the English envoy, he was of so little service in this whole negotiation, that the deputies of Amsterdam being willing to take advantage in the assembly of Holland, of some expressions which they had drawn from him; he, on the Prince of Orange's venting some reproaches against him, disavowed them, gave the deputies the lie, and talked in a manner the most extravagant, and the most injurious to the King's interest; and all that I was able to do, was my preventing his going to the deputies of the towns to whom he had resolved to complain of the deputies of Amsterdam, and to declare to them that there was not one word of truth in all they had reported; but the Prince of Orange did it in his stead, for he informed the assembly of Holland, that Chudley had declared to him

him that he had never told the deputies of Amsterdam what they had advanced in his name in that assembly, and that he expressly disavowed it. It may be judged from this, whether I acted wisely in having refused to explain the King of England's sentiments to the deputies of the towns of Holland.

However, the Prince of Orange assured the Spanish envoy, that by some means or other, the levies should be made; that he would cause the resolution to be taken the next day, which was the fifth of January; that his honour was here engaged, and that he certainly would not forfeit it.

The END of VOL. I.



